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ABSTRACT
It is an integral part of rights protection that "adequate"
remedies exist. This thesis examines the present functioning of
human rights legislations in Canada and articulates fundamental
problems with the current Canadian regimes in the enforcement
of rights against private actors . The possibility of using tort
action as an alternative in the protection of human rights in
Canada is then discussed, with particular attention given to the
potential for increased damage awards and for wider grounds of
prohibition of discriminatory practices.
The thesis revisits the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Bhadauriav. SenecaCollege and anaylzes the basis on which
human rights legislation was seen as a creating barrier to a
collateral tort action. In contrast with the decision in Bhadauria ,
the thesis concludes that the present state of tort law is capable of
handling this new category of compensable damage . It is further
suggested that the realities of human rights protection require
reconsideration of alternatives to the present schemes in order to
give effect to "adequate" remedies .
Drawing on the philosophy of A .J.M_ Milne, the thesis addresses
the role of judiciary as actively protecting the rights rather than
simply enforcing what already exists .
Referring specifically to a nominate tort of discrimination, the
thesis provides a framework for the consideration of such a tort,
relying on a standard of care equivalent to "negligence" in which
the private actor has failed to live up to a universal or
•
	
community" standard of reasonable behaviour .
In part, because any group can narrowly focus and prioritize
issues and concerns that are of primary importance to them as a
group, this "community" can not be a localized body . A well
functioning "community", instead, is characterized as utilizing
and applying universal standards and principles such the
principle to fair treatment. This principle entails that there be a
• sufficient connection" between the ground of distinction and
and the treatment involved . These become the standard by which
the private actor is to be judged .
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
History of the twentieth century has seen a growing
recognition of the existence of certain minimum standards of
treatment by which all nations must abide. 1 Nations can no
longer can legitimately profess to have absolute power over the
people within their borders .2 Whether this results from a priori
reasoning 3 or from a consequentialist analysis,4 it has been
acknowledged that there exist rights, attributable and claimable
solely by virtue of being human. Commonly labelled as "human
rights", these are tied to the essential nature of the person, with
concepts of dignity, mutual respect and equality, inter alia,
frequently ascribed . Argument still ensues over the exact
character, nature and scope of the rights, and considerable
debates centres on the methods for achieving the rights'
protection .
5
However, in contrast to what might be characterized
as controversies of perimeters, within the international forum
the existence of these kinds of rights is seen generally as being
beyond question. 6
I . Protection from the State
Coinciding with the trend to recognition of the existence of
human rights (and indeed a fundamental part of it), there has
been a growing international emphasis on instituting effective
means for the maintenance and enforcement of the rights
. To
1
2that end, international treaties and covenants have been
created, establishing standards of conduct .
Through regional and international documents, nations have
increasingly obligated themselves as states, to treat people
within their borders according to the agreed measures. The
placement of limits on the state, typically by constitutional
measures, has been a commonplace response to the treaty
responsibilities . This kind of restriction comes from a
recognition that the state has the potential for significant harm,
not only wielding substantial power, but also having the
authority to buttress its actions.
Considerable emphasis is placed on what is seen by some to
be the unique position of the state . No matter whether ethically
right or wrong, a state's actions have a sense of legitimacy
attached to them. As is often pointed out, where there have been
violations of rights the victim typically turns to the state- to
redress the situation. The state acts as protector ; but if the
state is the violator, the question arises "From where can the
protection come?" For that reason, limits on state action are seen
as crucial.
11. Protection in the Private Sector
Nevertheless, it is erroneous to assume that acknow-
ledgement of the need for restriction of state action has been
the only direction in human rights efforts at the international
level. Concomitantly, there has been recognition that the state
is not the only actor to be feared? Some countries have
3recognized this possibility for harm and have explicitly made
their constitutions applicable as a limitation on both the public
and the private actor.8 In this view it would be inconsistent to
call these "fundamental freedoms" or to deem these "intrinsic"
and yet to enforce them only against the State .9
Over the years the direction in rights protection has shifted
toward holding both public and private actors responsible for
human rights infringements. The excesses of the second World
War may have provided particularly clear indication that both
public and private actors must be answerable for violations to
dignity and equality. At the Nuremburg Trials the accounts of
war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture brought to the
fore that these acts were not only human rights violations
committed by governments ; they were at the same times
violations committed by individuals, 10 for which individuals
were to be held accountable . 11 The transgressions were regarded
not only as the end result of wholesale abrogation of the rights
of individuals, but also as breaches witnessed by the community
and to some extent acquiesced by it .
Further in support of dual responsibility for human rights
(that is, public and private), it has also been noted that the
domestic implementation of human rights agreements ultimately
depends upon all individuals. "As rights granted to the
individual, it is upon the beneficiary of these rights, the indi-
vidual human being, that the responsibility for preservation
falls" . 12 If society or its constituents become indifferent to the
4plight of others, not only are the rights of these victims eroded,
but the foundation of the community is placed in jeopardy .
At the same time, and with a view to consequences of non-
protection, it has become recognized more and more that the
state is not the only party capable of holding significant power
and control over the lives of people . The state controls the
law, 13 but others may dominate just as effectively through the
use of economic and social power . 14 It has been pointed out that
. . .in our day, the most grievious and most
frequent abuses of civil liberties occur in
the exercise of private power. The occasions
of discriminatory state action are few and
subject to relatively formalized procedures
for their exercise, when contrasted with an
employer's power to dismiss, a landlord's
power to exclude the needy, or an
entrepreneur's refusal to provide
service, capacity to infringe substantive
rights. Not only do the titularies of private
power have the capacity to infringe
substantive human rights, but no concept of
due process structures the manner in which
they avail themselves of this capacity. 15
In recognition of these ancillary harms, nations have at the same
time obligated themselves to ensuring that people are treated
according to the same minimum international standards by
actors other than the state. Consequently, states have become
more aware that the responsibility for assuring rights lies not
only with all levels and branches of the government, but with all
people.
In particular, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights ("the International Covenant"), 16 to which Canada
has been a signatory since 1976, in Article 2 (1) states that
5each state will not only undertake to respect the rights of all
individuals, but also will ensure to the individual all the rights
recognized in the Convention .
Article 2 (3) of the International Covenant elaborates on
that commitment :
Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes :
a) To ensure that any person whose rights
or freedoms are violated as herein
recognized shall have an effective remedy .
notwithstanding. that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in
official capacity. (emphasis added
It is evident that this notwithstanding clause would be
superfluous if the protection was only from government in the
first place .
17
It is not only logical consistency that dictates there should
be substantial mirroring between the public and private sectors
where human rights are at stake . 18 Even assuming that the state
could not undermine its own responsibilities through a form of
wilful blindness, 19 it certainly would be less than sensical that a
government would be prohibited from certain actions only to
allow private members to engage in the same reprehensible
behaviours. This is because it is the behaviours (and more
importantly, the consequences of them) that are reprehensible,
not the title of the actor .
In recognition of this, Article 2 (3) of the International
Covenant sets out that the responsibility of the state in detail .
Firstly, the state is "to take the necessary steps .. .to adopt such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to the rights recognized in the (present) Covenant." 20 To that
end, the duty is also
(b) ltl o ensure that any person claiming such
remedy shall have his right thereto determined
by competent judicial , administrative or
legislative authorities or by any other
competent authority provided by the legal
system of the State and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy ;
and
(c)[t] o ensure the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.
The consequences of these commitments are twofold. It means,
first, that there is a responsibility on the private actor not to
violate the rights of others and, second, that there is a
responsibility on the the state to ensure and enforce the rights
of others . 21 In this respect there must be not only protection
from the State, but also there must be opportunity for the
individual to achieve freedom and dignity through the State .
Inherent in that must be legal safeguards to assure the right .2
2
The international rights instruments also recognize the respons-
ibility of government to protect people in both public and
private spheres of activity .
III . A Theoretical Approach: A Movement away from Classical
Liberalism
While states have recognized the necessity for
the
protection of rights, some have also shown reticence to limit or
6
correct behaviour of private actors
.23 This, in part, may be due
to reasons of legitimacy and of resources . Although the state is
seen as carrying the power and the authority to require certain
behaviours of its people, the task of checking the individual may
be a far more difficult task than getting the state to change its
behaviours .
By way of explanation, firstly the state has a degree of
control over its own agents that it may not have over the
private sector. In part, this derives from the fact that we shape
our government-- theoretically, we select its form, we control
its actions and it is accountable to us-- all as part of our concept
of limited government . Consequently, limits on state action are
inherent .
In terms of practicality and resources, the state organ is
but a small percentage of the general population. The state can
alter the behaviour of its branches through the issuance of
directives and regulations. The state has a certain degree of
control over the day-to-day operation of its personnel, re-
warding through promotion or sanctioning through demotions or
job termination.
24
At the same time, government is subject to
more direct feedback because it is in the public eye.
These same devices are not usually available for use
against the larger population . Unlike departments of govern-
ment, the private sector is divided into considerably smaller
units-- either the individual or the business for whom the
regulatory machinery cannot be there all the time . Limited
resources of legislative time for the creation of laws and
8perhaps more significantly limited resources to enforce
them,
make these reasons of pragmatics .
In many respects it has been seen not only as more
difficult, but also as less appropriate, to change private conduct
than it is for public behaviour. Perhaps because in the western
world many of us tended to operate under a conception of
society in which laws are only to be "little islands of constraint
on a sea of liberty", 25 liberty stood as the norm and constraint
as the exception.
26
This type of classical liberal theory, however, has been
seriously questioned of late, in part because it values liberty
over all other competing rights, particularly equality . By way of
comparison,the international documents to which Canada has
ascribed acknowledge that liberty, although important, carries
with it inherent limits, limits that result from the equal rights of
others. Again, this may result from looking to the severe
consequences of inequality. Placed within a theoretical context,
the international movement to rights protection can be
characterized primarily as either a natural law or a rights based
perspective .
Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a philosophical framework
which establishes an understanding of the foundation of human
rights and which sets the duties of actors, whether the state or
the private person. Presented by A.J.M. Milne27 the approach
elaborates on Immanuel Kant's "humanity principle" and per-
ceives the person as developing rationality and consciousness of
self only from within the concept of "community" . Whether the
9community is the family, the tribe, the nation or
the world,
certain obligations must exist among the
people to ensure
community's continued existence . It is Milne's position that
these obligations, labelled our "common morality", in turn create
the moral foundation for the establishment of specific human
rights and demand effective protection of the rights .
Because it presents a view of human interaction that
functions on all levels of human discourse, Milne's analysis is
particularly interesting for the purposes of this thesis . In many
senses this is a natural rights perspective, not in that it
presupposes a "higher law" from God, but that it identifies a
higher law from within the human (social) nature .
This view defines the role of government as that of agent
for the community. Government's only legitimate authority is to
act for the well-being of the community, a responsibility which
is not to be confused with the well-being of special interest
groups or even the majority of the community in the short term .
State or government actions are always to be measured by and
compared with the "common morality" .
In Milne's assessment, as with government, the judiciary
must also apply principles of common morality in their adjud-
ications . Using these principles both as interpretive devices and
as standards against which legislation should be measured, it is
a responsibility the judiciary must fulfil whether they are
dealing with the public sector or the private one .
The approach also establishes criteria as to what
constitutes an "effective remedy", removing it from the realm of
10
personal values alone . By this, at a minimum what is meant is
1) a remedy adequate to combat the incursion 2) considered
impartially by an independent body 3) in a manner that leaves a
close enough connection between the violation and the remedy
of it, as to reinforce the negative consequences to the violator .
In Chapter 2 it is argued that the first of these elements,
adequacy, must be concerned not only with compensatory justice
(which is essentially re-active), but also with preventive justice
(which is pro-active). Adequacy must also be connected with
ease and availability of the remedy to the victim . The second
and third requirements listed above are self-evident, with both
appealing to our popular sense of "justice" .
IV. Canada's Efforts to Human Right Protection
Canada, having obligated itself to the requirements of
international covenant and customary international laws, is now
required to meet those obligations, irrespective of whether the
violator is the public or the private actor . This thesis examines
the specific manner in which Canada has approached its
international responsibilities, the areas in which Canada has
fallen short, and the ways Canada might more strongly enforce
the human rights which it has ostensibly committed itself to
protecting . In particular, the thesis observes role of tort law
could serve in the protection of rights .
Overall, Canada has striven to meet some of its inter-
national obligations through a patchwork of measures, each
touching upon a particular area of human rights but none with
11
sufficient breadth to handle the entire task. In many instances
Canada seeks to ensure a right only by refraining from acting-
by not intruding on liberties or by not making laws, basically
from allowing liberty and freedom to progress unimpeded .
Where historically there have been instances of a right being
restrained or repressed, e.g. a freedom of religion, the absence
of restraint becomes construed as a positive freedom .
Yet most rights cannot be secured in this manner . Instead
the rights require active effort on the part of government. In
the positive protection of rights Canada has utilized several
alternatives, includi ng criminal law and other legislative mea-
sures . At the apex of these is the Canadian Charter of Ri.ahts and
Freedoms (hereafter referred to as the aarter )Z8 functioning as
a cap on the overzealousness of government in its dealings with
its citizenry or others within its borders. The Charter is situated
as a standard against which any legislative or regulatory action
the government takes is measured.
Although the Canadian judiciary has hinted that the
common law is to be dovetailed to fit with the Charter, 29 the
Charter, itself, does not seem to limit, to any noticeable extent,
the efforts of private citizens in relationship to each other.
Even if examined on the basis of its operation within the
public law field30 the Charter falls well short of meeting its
international commitments and Canada has been castigated for
this .3 1 While other forms of Canadian legislation exist in the
human rights area, these operate in a piecemeal manner to
12
handle perceived deficiencies or only touch upon human
rights
matters tangentially .
V. Human Rights Acts as Protection
Chapter 3 describes how the major impetus for protection
in Canada has been left to human rights legislation operating at
either the the federal or the provincial level.32 Basically, the
legislation attempts to provide an inexpensive method of res-
olving complaints, generally in the area of discrimination, and
seeks, wherever possible, to generate "friendly settlement ."
As Canada's commitments obligate the country to making
sure there are effective remedies in place, human rights
legislation has been ( and should be) an important step in the
enforcement of rights.33 However, Chapter 4 points out that
there are difficulties in relying solely on this particular kind of
human rights legislation as in any way meeting our international
responsibilities .
Firstly, to attach the overarching term of "human rights" to
such legislation may be erroneous. Instead, its main emphasis is
on certain kinds of non-discrimination and, to some limited
extent, on the provision of equality .3 4 The legislation does not
give a right to work, or a right to education or even a right to a
family. Rather, it only strives for more equalized access t
certain goods or services provided in the first place . Thus, that
which is covered is but a small part of the whole spectrum of
human rights .
13
In addition, the legislation deals only
with certain
categories of discrimination - typically race, religion, sex and, to
a limited extent, age . By way of contrast, the Covenant prohibits
discrimination on the basis of certain listed categories and, then
additionally, commits States to prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of "any other status" 35 The chapter explains the difference
between the international obligation and the Canadian response
to it. In the former, once a discrimination on the basis of a
particular status is shown, the onus shifts to the defendant to
show that it was not unreasonable or was justifiable .
In contrast, the view of Canadian human rights legislation
has been that unless a category is listed, no violation can be
found no matter how unreasonable the distinction 3 6 This is only
one of the many limitations and deficiencies of the present
legislative approach in Canada .
Chapter 4 goes on to point out that the principal drawback
to legislation of this kind is that it serves numerous goals, some
which may be diametrically at odds with the others . The human
rights legislation, as it now stands, strives for a balance,
drawing certain dichotomies between public and private life,
and in doing so reflects certain policy decisions rather than a
necessarily principled approach to human rights.
It is argued in this paper that this legislation, standing
alone, cannot hope to deal with all human rights matters . For
example a major problem with reliance on human rights
legislation is its potential for ebb and flow according to the
caprices of the population and the temperament of the
14
government. Neither propensity accords well with a formulation
of human rights as being intrinsic to the individual . At the same
time these kinds of machinations severely affect the goal of
providing an "effective remedy" which is Canada's international
obligation to uphold .
Moreover, it is argued here if we are searching for
"effective" remedies, what human rights legislation allows to be
compensated (or, more accurately to what extent it allows harms
to be compensated) may be one of its greatest drawbacks37
Compensation under human rights legislation derives only from
specific statutory heads of damages and under monetary "caps"
that may inadequately meet the actual harms felt .38
VI. A Role for Tort Law
Lacunae exist within the human rights legislations, and
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the viability of tort law to fill the
gaps. Because the recognition of human rights appears to be a
twentieth century phenomenon, to some presenting tort law
(typically seen as entrenched in the nineteenth century) in a
human rights framework may seem foreign. In this paper it is
argued that, at our present stage of development, torts are
capable of handling some types of human rights issues
. It is
posited that tort law has already demonstrated some capacity in
the area, by historically providing compensation for harm to the
person's physical and psychological well-being . 39 In particular,
psychological well-being has been extended over the years to
deal with less palpable injuries like indignity or emotional
distress, 40 a movement that accords well with significant aspects
of human rights losses. Chapter 5 marks that progression.
On a jurisprudential basis, tort law also accords with human
rights goals. Tort law "recognizes the interactive responsibilities
and rights of those who function in a community ...the essence of
tort law is arguably the imposition of liability for failure to
measure up to a community standard and a consequent shifting
of losses incurred by that failure". 41 The aim of tort law has
been perceived as functioning, inter alia, to correct and
compensate for past harms in a measure that is roughly
equivalent to the plaintiff's loss and as acting to deter violations
and shape future conduct. Indeed, it has been noted that
historically
the function of tort remedies was seen
primarily as admonitory or deterrent . An award
against a tortfeasor served as punishment and
as a warning to others ; it was in a sense, an
adjunct to criminal law . designed to induce
antisocial and inconsiderate persons to
conform to the standards of reasonable
conduct prescribed by law.42
Although tort law has subsequently gone beyond this role, these
compensatory and admonitory functions would seem to be well
suited to the protection of human rights . Indeed, tort law has
been used in a variety of ways in the protection of human rights
by other nations (and even by Canada), albeit not always
explicitly recognized in that framework .
15
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Admittedly, tort law principles may not be able to handle
all the diverse goals inherent in human rights protection .
Typically, torts are equated with the remedy of damages, and
frequently we do not see monetary compensation as adequately
resolving some types of human rights problems,
such as
systemic discrimination
. 43
Indeed, on a gut level we may tend
to see monetary compensation as a purchase of the right to
violate . It is important, however, to distinguish between the
inadequacies of monetary compensation sui generis and the
inadequacies of tort law in the area of human rights . 44 Other
remedies such as injunctions, declarations and specific
performance are all available through the tort action as well45
It is only curial reserve in considering these other remedies that
may place a rein on tort law's capacity .
46
VII. Bhadauria v. Seneca College
Nonetheless, this line of argument in favour of tort law
protection may be seen by some as otiose, if human rights
legislation has already "taken over the field", displacing any role
for either judiciary or for tort law. The 1978 case of bhadauria
v. Seneca College47 raised exactly that possibility when the court
was asked to recognize a tort of discrimination based on either
the public policy in Ontario's Human Rights Code 48 or a new tort
duty based on the statute . While the Court of Appeal believed
that there could be a tort of discrimination, the Supreme Court
maintained that as Ontario's legislation was a "Code", complete
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unto itself, the judiciary could not simultaneously recognize
a
new tort.
In Chapter 7 it is respectfully argued that in Bhadauria the
court erred in excluding a civil remedy . The legislature did not
explicitly set out that there should be an exclusion. At the same
time, the authour feels that Bhadauria also needs to be
understood in the context of the development of tort law at the
time. Bhadauria would have raised several legal difficulties
(which have since resolved), that the judiciary were not able to
respond at the time .
In part, Bhadauria was decided on the basis that the
legislation gave an effective remedy. The judges cannot be
faulted for assuming that the trend towards protection would
continue; however, research on the actual functioning of human
rights boards belies that. It is argued that in light of
developments within some provinces (such as British Columbia's
wholesale removal of its human rights board),49 the judiciary's
presumption of the existence of an "effective remedy" may have
been myopic and erroneous. The boards have been subject to
short term ideological shifts that jeopardize the rights of the
most vulnerable . This, therefore, runs counter to any idea that
these are intrinsic rights . These tendencies, plus the substantial
differences between the provisions of the legislations and
Canada's international commitments, make the acknowledgement
of human rights torts in Canada that much more pressing_
However, even if there is a theoretical capacity for torts to
handle human rights claims and even if there is the need for
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intervention, the question still remains whether the judiciary is
the proper body for that intervention . As critics are wont to
retort, "Whey have been conservative--even reactionary . . .". S 0
So, administrative decision-making has generally been removed
from the courts, generally on the arguments of expediency and
expertise . It is suggested in this paper that neither justification,
expediency nor expertise, need necessarily hold. While pre-
viously a good portion of the judiciary have not been fully
apprised of human rights issues, experience gained through
interpretation of the Charter, as one example, has gradually
been changing that situation .
Also, even though the judiciary traditionally have been
seen as indifferent to these kinds of claims, 5 1 their past
decisions in this area attempted to retain a certain degree of
logic and symmetry of the law.52 They worked from principles
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It will be shown here that the same requirement now offers
promise for a greater protection of human rights . Chapter 2 sets
out an explanation of (and a rationale for) human rights based
on the social nature of the individual. This theoretical
framework generates principles functioning on all levels of
human interaction and offers a specific role for the judiciary
with interpretive principles to guide them .
19
VIII . Tort Possibilities
Chapter 8 suggests where the judiciary might act by allow-
ing human rights torts. While the possibility is greatest where a
province's legislature totally rid itself of human rights
legislation (in contrast to where provinces which substantially
changed the trappings and the coverage), such a drastic measure
would likely be political suicide . Therefore, it is unlikely to
ever occur (at least to the degree suggested) . However, other
possibilities are explored: categories of discrimination that are
prohibited in most provinces, but not in some ; human rights
legislations that are not "codes" ; human rights outside
discrimination (for example privacy) ; and human rights outside
a specific province's legislation (areas where the legislation
might have theoretically covered , but have not been interpreted
as being so covered) .5
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CHAPTER 2 :
THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO LAW
I . Introduction
In an effort to better appreciate what may properly be
expected of actors in regard to human rights (whether the actors
are the legislature, the judiciary, or private individuals), it is
appropriate at this time to engage in a general discussion of
human rights . In particular, it is essential to understand both
the meaning and the source of these rights . It is important to
establish why human rights exist outside of particular moral-
ities and how the rights should fit into our jurisprudence . This
understanding then leads to conclusions as to what is necessary
where violations have occurred .
Documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights i and the International Covenants 2 typically contain a
statement of rights to be protected, giving little by way of
explanation of what a right is, what particular rights entail,
from where such rights derive or why these particular rights
are attributable to all humans .Writers or commentators on early
human rights -style instruments, such as the French Declaration
of Rights of Man and the Citizen or the American Bill of Rights,
sometimes spoke of the ascribed rights being "self-evident" .
However, mere appeal to moral intuition seems unsettling and
one is left searching for explanations . At the very least, it is
safe to say that rights embodied in various documents or
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charters of human rights have arisen in reaction to recognized
deprivations . In other words, their evolution and recognition
are ultimately caused by actions or treatments of individuals
which came to be considered so unreasonable that it was
necessary to have a specific declaration against that type of
treatment .
II . The Concept of Human Rights
While it may seem trite to express this, the term "human
rights" combines two distinct ideas, " human" and "rights" which,
when consolidated, establish a significance wider than either
concept singularly . In the book Human Rights and Human
Diversity, A.J .M. Milne has written that
if the adjective 'human' is to be taken
seriously, the
	
idea of human rights must be
the idea that there are certain rights
which, whether or not they are recognized,
belong to all human beings at all times and
in all places_ These are rights which they
have solely in virtue of being human,
irrespective of nationality,
religion, sex, social status, occupation,
wealth, property or any other differentiating
social characteristic
. 3
"Right", in combination with the concept "human", leads to
certain assumptions of "inalienability" and "inviolability",
because one can lose one's human rights no more than one can
divest one's human nature . 4 The key notion in the concept of
"right" is "entitlement" . Where entitled to something, to be
denied it by the action of someone is wrong and, if entitled to
something, it is right or proper to have it .
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It is always important to keep in mind that there may be
differences between society's treatment of those with particular
rights and the existence of the human rights . As with the simile
• the thief who steals the pocketwatch, the lack of enforcement
• the right does not remove the existence of the right .5 The
right of the owner subsists, even though she does not have the
watch. More abstractly, the absence of de facto protection of a
particular right, such as equality, does not negate the claim to
that right or to its enforcement .
III. Source of Human Rights
A. Kant and Rationality
From a natural law or rights based perspective if human
rights exist solely by virtue of being human, then it must follow
that something within the person, or more accurately something
• the person, creates that right . Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration offers one particular conception of that "something" :
All human are born free and equal in dignity
and rights . They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood_
It would appear that in this view, "human nature" (in particular,
humankind's capacity for rationality) must somehow be
intimately tied to rights .6 Certainly for early writers, those
capacities or reasoning and consciousness of self were connected
to the concept of person and, in turn, to the concept of rights?
From rationality and self-consciousness came the capacity to
choose, to make and act on one's own decisions ; but in order to
29
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effectively exercise that capacity, control and coercion had to be
absent. Thus a right to autonomy was seen as necessary .8
Others have elaborated on these ideas of rationality and
consciousness of self. Immanuel Kant argued that to act
rationally was to act ethically .9 However for Kant, human beings
ought to act only on maxims or principles which havev
universal validity. These maxims must transcend the particular .
If a principle ( or "categorical imperative") could not be adopted
by everyone, it must not be adopted by anyone .
10
One such categorical imperative was the "humanity
principle" which dictated that one must "treat humanity,
whether your own person, or in that of another, always as an
ends withal and never as a means". Under this principle, to treat
a person as a means would be to treat her as lacking in intrinsic
value. Otherwise, if she had any value at all, it would only be
extrinsic and instrumental . To treat one as having intrinsic value
required that the person be respected as an autonomous agent,
that is, a person capable of formulating and pursuing purposes
of her own. 11
Yet in the exercise of the human capacity for autonomy,
there must necessarily be some restriction . In search of those
restrictions, Kant maintained that no one must adopt as his own
any purpose which could not be universalized . Applying this
.universality criterion", Kant posited that, while it was logically
possible for everyone always to respect everyone, it was
logically impossible for everyone to act the contrary to this .
12
Hence, it followed that there was a universal obligation to
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respect the personal autonomy of every person, including
oneself . In turn, Kant based the attribution of dignity to the
rational being on her autonomy or capacity for self- legislation
or control of self .
1
3
B. Beyond Kant: Recognizing Human Rights as Derived from
"Community"
Since Kant's time, other writers have looked beyond our
capacity to reason as a foundation of human rights. For them,
the answer lay in the corollary of reason -- our capacity for
action. Thus for these writers, " It]he practical effectiveness of
reason is manifested not in the capacity to reflect but in the
power to originate or inhibit action." 14 For them, human action
needed not only voluntariness (autonomy) but also intention to a
goal which the person viewed as worth attaining.' 5 From this
perspective "the concept of a right is logically involved in all
actions as a concept that signifies for every agent his claim and
requirement that he have (or at least not be prevented from
having) the necessary conditions that enable him to act in the
pursuit of his purposes . So in this view, rights are necessary
conditions that allow him to act ." 16
This argument has been taken even further . While
acknowledging Kant's philosophy, A.J.M. Milne has noted that it
has been seen deficient in some respects, inter alia, it is too
closely tied to the concept of liberal democracy . 17 In Milne's
view, in order to show that respect for certain rights is required
by a universal minimum standard, it is necessary that there be a
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standard. For Milne, this standard had its roots in the
requirements of social life itself and was applicable not only
within every human community, but also to all human relations .
Milne extrapolated from Kant's arguments, explaining more
fully that nothing has intrinsic value unless someone values it .
As all others may not value us, our intrinsic value came from
the fact that we value our own lives. We need not have intrinsic
value for others .
Milne located human consciousness of self and rationality
in the person's ties with community, seeing Kant's analysis as
being too closely related to a concept of the "individual" as a
solitary soul and as operating without an understanding of the
individual's ties with the community. For Milne there is also a
social basis for the human identity that must be recognized . If
she is to become a person in the fullest sense, there must be
some form of community in which the individual can grow . 18
Expanding on the arguments of others, Milne agreed that
human action is purposive and intentional, but the worthwhile
goal (the end in itself) that all human action seeks is social life,
to be part of the social group . 19 It is within the group that the
person establishes her identity . There is a consciousness of self
that develops as part of community in which the person finds
herself. She is part of, but at the same time distinct from, other
people in the group and at the same time, part of, and distinct
from all other groups. She develops her capacity for personal
autonomy within the framework of social life, learning to adapt
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her purposes and to associate with other people for the sake of
shared purposes.
In this respect we have a paradox : it is only as a member of
a community that a person can become an individual person and
be in a position to pursue her self -interest . 20 In considering why
there are and should be any rights at all, Milne responds that
without rights there can be no human communities. Having
rights is part of what it is to be a member of any community .
Being a member of a social group entails certain things as
due to one from fellow members, and due to them from oneself .
If this was not the case, one could be treated arbitrarily. One
has rights and obligations vis a vis one's own fellow members .
Thus, "in this elementary but fundamental sense, the notion of
right is necessary for social life" 2 1
However, irrespective of any particular form of community,
if there is to be any social life at all, certain moral principles
must exist . These principles create a "common morality"- a
morality common to all communities irrespective of particular
differences . 22 It is the "common morality" that establishes the
moral foundation of human rights . Of these principles most, but
not all, are human rights in themselves .
C. In Further Explanation of the Relationship between
Co ii munity and Human Risthts
Milne notes that there are certain characteristics that
every human group must possess in order to be a community .
From every member is due a practical concern for the well-being
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of all fellow members, one that is to be reciprocated . There can
be no community where people are indifferent to each other's
lot. They can constitute a community only to the extent that
they are committed to the principle of fellowship and are willing
to acknowledge an obligation to do their best to meet its
requirements .
23
As with Kant, Milne maintains that to act rationally is to
act ethically. However, from Milne's perspective a person
becomes a moral agent only through the course of growing up in
a community. In becoming a moral agent, she learns she has
obligations, one of which is to give precedence to the interest
of the community over her self- interest whenever the two
collide
. 24
It is apparent that in this view the person is not
atomistic, and personal liberty, while extremely important, does
not necessarily sit at the top of any hierarchy of rights .2 5
Also, it is always every person's responsibility to assist in
promoting the community's interest . That interest is one that is
reducible to the common interest of the members, but not
common self-interest as individual persons . This is because a
person's self-interest is confined to what is best for her and for
those to whom she is close. As the self- interest may be quite
limited in time and narrow in focus, to attend only to it could
jeopardize the community's well-being . Thus, this principle of
social responsibility, which is an expansive right, sets limits on
the member's liberty rights.
26
Because each person is tied to the rest of the community
through an impersonal system of division of labour, there cannot
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be indifference towards the rest of the community. It is in the
individual's self-interest that the community act efficiently and
not threaten the person's conditions .
27
Undoubtedly, there will
be those who continue to act only in their own self-interest .
However, their actions will not be rationally defensible, in part
because, if all members were to act in this manner, the
community itself would necessarily fail .
In demanding that fellow members respect her rights, a
member commits herself to acknowledging and to meeting her
fellow members' correlative rights . This commitment is entailed
by the "practical reason principle" whereby one treats "like
cases alike" . The person who demands that others respect her
rights, while not respecting theirs is not treating "like cases
alike" . Z 8
As a corollary to the member's social obligation within the
community, trust is also necessary. Social obligations must be
augmented by trust - the knowledge that other actors will
acknowledge an obligation. This trust is one aspect of what
Milne terms "beneficience" which requires we choose good over
evil (or the lesser of two evils over the worse). Together with
the "practical reason principle", beneficience and trust are the
foundation of all rational action- moral, prudential, and
instrumental .
29
There are other essentials for any sense of "community" to
exist. There is the need for respect for human life and the need
for justice . With respect to justice, each member renders what
is due to her fellowkind and receives what is due to her (and
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fair treatment, for one thing, is always due a member) .30 It is
important to point out that this idea of "justice "extends beyond
particular justice, having distributive aspects to it as well.
To provide personal security for social life, there is the
additional need for freedom from arbitrary interference . As
well, there must be truthfulness both in action and in word .
This requirement not only forbids duplicity, but also helps to
uphold obligations. A community can handle some dishonesty,
but it cannot survive where there is too much . Civility is also
necessary for co-operation. Civility requires that one treats the
other with respect in all dealings, so that one cannot shock,
humiliate or insult others.31 Lastly, if the community is to
survive it cannot afford to neglect the well-being of the next
generation .
D. From Principles of Common Morality to Human Rights
Of the nine principles, Milne pointed out that social
responsibility is an obligation to the community, but confers no
rights on the individual . Fellowship, also, is not a right in itself .
One can give fellowship, but cannot demand it of others .
Each of the other principles must be modified somewhat to
form what may properly be called human rights . These become :
rights to life, to justice in the form of fair treatment, to aid, to
freedom (in the negative sense of freedom from arbitrary
interference), to honorable treatment, to civility and, in the case
of children, to care.32 Of these, the right to fair treatment is
seen as the primary right because at least it can always be
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respected when other rights come into conflict . Whenever
sacrifices for the community must be made, they must be made
in fair allotment
.33
Of the rights, only the the obligation to beneficence is
always absolute. According to Milne, no one is entitled to release
another from it because that right is the right to have all the
other rights respected . If one does not obey this obligation, one
is not choosing the lesser evil . 3 4 In this sense, beneficence is
redundant because it gives no more than what the other rights
have already given and, when any other right is violated, it is
violated .
E. Justice as a Human Right
Justice as a human right is formulated according to the
"proportionate equality principle" : treat equal cases equally and
unequal cases unequally and where treated unequally that
treatment must be proportional to the comparative inequality
.35
As a human right, justice entitles every human being to be
treated fairly, which in turn is the right to have proportionate
equality applied properly, whenever and wherever applicable .
This obligation of equal treatment is one that all are under
when involved in making allocations, in making assessments or
in competitions. The right is violated whenever its correlative
obligation is not met -- whenever equals are treated unequally,
or unequals equally. When an eligible person is excluded, the
allocation has been unfair in that the others have received
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greater benefits or greater burdens than they otherwise should
have
. 36
It is apparent that the definition would be excessively
narrow if the principle was regarded as implying only formal
equal treatment, and not the more expansive view of attainment
of substantive or material equality. Recognizing this, Milne has
acknowledged that what is involved here is not only a matter of
equal treatment of essentially equals, but also of unequal
treatment of essentially unequals .
Within Milne's framework in differentiating on an
unjustifiable basis the offender violates the human right to fair
treatment, because equals are treated unequally :
As fellow human beings the members of both
groups are equal in moral status , but the
treatment which the members of the dominant
group accord to the members of the subordinate
group is different from and inferior to that
which they accord to themselves.Purely
physical differences such as colour, as distinct from
differences of character and capacity, logically can
have no moral relevance and so cannot justify
unequal treatment. . .justification of discrimination__ .
is morally defective . It fails to meet the
requirement of the universal minimum moral
standard. (emphasis added)37
As will be detailed in later chapters in this paper, what
constitutes an "unjustifiable basis " for treatment is where
there is a lack of sufficient connection between the treatment
and the ground of differentiation. Consequently, this proposition
is closely tied to the definition of .discrimination at inter-
=national law which states that discrimination occurs "when in a
given case no sufficient connection exists between the equality
or inequality aspects on the one hand and the nature of the
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treatment on the other."38 International law recognizes that
sufficient connections exist only where the classification is
relevant to the subject, fairly related to it, not capricious or
arbitrary, but instead reasonable and just.39
IV. The Significance of Milne's Approach
One significance of Milne's work is that it sets the peri-
meters for all types of human interaction. The principle of social
responsibility becomes applicable to any form of community--
familial, national,or international, 40 and, where rights come into
conflict, resolution can be found by looking to what accords best
not only with the well-being of that particular community but
also the larger community 41
For example, a well-ordered society needs peace and
security, but it also needs justice . Whereas Kant emphasized that
one should not interfere with the liberty of another, Kant's
proposition says nothing about how we should treat that other
person or group. Instead, from Milne's perspective, those
standards come from the common morality principles
.42
Specifically, proportionality would demand that unequal cases
be treated only unequally in proportion to the inequality .
Milne's approach helps to respond to questions that
sometimes seem intractable -- such as "Where two rights are in
conflict, which of the two rights will give way?" The "intract-
able" often becomes less so when set against the standards of
the larger community, with the experience of that community
40
establishing an understanding of what is
"objectively" discrim-
inatory or unfair .
A . A View of Law . Morality. and the Role of Government
Milne's paradigm also establishes a framework in which to
understand the responsibilities of bodies, whether public or
private. Within Milne's framework, community obligation be-
comes the key to both morality and law. Of the two, morality is
logically prior to the law because there can be morality without
law, but not the obverse . While law can create particular
obligations, it cannot create obligations in general . 43 As Milne
puts it, "a law prescribing obedience to the law would be point-
less. It presupposes the very thing it intended to create : the
general obligation to obey the law ."
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Morality is also logically prior to government in that moral-
ity provides the necessary basis for trust between community
members. Without morality they would not be able to carry out
the co-operation which makes up the corporate life of the
community. To be a member of a community is, inter alia, to be
a moral agent.
Every government, whether or not it acknowledges it, is
subject to the requirements of universal morality. The
requirements oblige the government to do as much as it can to
protect the human rights of everyone in the country and
therefore never to do anything to violate the human rights of
those with whom it has dealings .4 5 That violation of rights can
result from either misfeasance or from non-feasance. In this
41
view, government as an agent of the community, must be
committed to the union of the common morality with the
morality particular to that group or area.46 The scope of
government's authority is limited to that which is necessary to
the community's interest, which is also the interest of members
as community members, not as private persons 47 In searching
for that which will accentuate the well-being of the community
the government does not advance a utilitarian interest, nor a
majoritarian interest, as either may not be conducive to the
overall well-being of the community .48
B. Role of the judiciary as Part of "Government"
From a natural law perspective, the person has rights that
are not necessarily conferred by society, but are to recognized
by it. From this perspective comes the conclusion that the full
purpose of government is to ensure that these rights are
instituted among people . 49 As well, from this type of analysis,
it becomes easy to suggest that the first duty of both lawgivers
and magistrates is to assert and protect natural rights .5
0
Where a country such as Canada has acknowledged
nationally and internationally that there are human rights
obligations, it has committed itself to a statement of essential
values upon which society is required to be based. In this view
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general
principles of law, the observance of which the court must heed .
This becomes the philosophical and jurisprudential backdrop
against which rights claims must always be considered .
This point of view stands in sharp contrast to positivism
which maintains that the appropriate role of the government is
to establish rights, and the role of the judiciary is to interpret
what has been granted . Postivists stress that the task of the
judiciary is to find the law "as it is, not as it should be ."
Positivists will accept that in last resort, where the legislature
has not spoken or has left a gap, the judiciary can act' in a
manner similar to that of legislators . In such cases, the judiciary
are to see that the law interpreted was made to accord with
"prevailing morality or strong or preponderant opinion" . In this
view, it becomes the judiciary's function to legislate, only being
guided by public policy--so that the law accords with the
dominant social and political doctrines .
By way of comparison, in Milne's view, the responsibility of
"government" always belongs each of the legislative, executive
and judicial fora. While each forum may fulfil that duty in a
slightly different manner-- the principles of common morality
should always guide their decisions . Under Milne's analysis, the
judiciary are not mere interpreters of law, they are the
guardians of human rights. Their first duty is to ensure that
no law prescribes that which is incompatible with human
rights .5 1 Judges have a responsibility to "capture", which is to
say, to ensure, the rights people actually have .5
2
For Milne there is nothing wrong with positive law . It
provides security for the community .53 However, positive law
and the concepts underlying it { "rule of law",5 4 "equality before
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the law",55 and "supremacy of the law"56) must be interpreted
within the universal morality .
It is apparent that, in contrast to the predilection of
positivists, natural law or rights based theories must b
concerned not only with formal but also with substantive justice .
For "by placing reliance on a catalogue of specific freedoms and
providing machinery for their judicial interpretation and
application, no less is being provided than a statement of
essential values, upon which a particular society or society in
general is required to be based ."-5
7
In this view, fundamental
rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the
observance of which the court must heed 58
C. When Rights are Violated
This rights- based paradigm also establishes an explanation
of what should happen when a right has been violated and harm
has occurred. Because a right is that to which one is entitled, the
violation of the right requires the redressing of the violation,
a remedy in essence .
1 . "Remedy"
To remedy, literally, means to counteract an error . How-
ever, one cannot talk of remedy in vaccuo . Instead, it is
imperative to consider both the nature of the particular right
and the goals in respect of rights in general. Together, these
will help to establish standards of what the counteracting efforts
should be . The nature of the right will depend on the right to
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which we are referring . The appropriate remedy of a violation
of the right to life or security of the person will necessarily
differ from that of rights of equality or privacy .
The overall goal in respect of human rights is the assur-
ance of the rights for all people, and with that, the acknow-
ledgement of each person's inherent worth within the
community. Assuredly, those goals would probably be best
served by the creation of an environment conducive to the
fostering of rights. The best "remedy" for a right would be to
never have it violated in the first place . Barring that, however,
whatever lesser solution is accepted should at least illustrate
the principles of beneficence (choose good over evil or the lesser
of two evils)59 and practical reason (treat equal cases alike) .
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. . . .2 . "Effective Remedy"
It must be remembered that in the protection of human
rights we are searching not only remedies but "effective
remedies." That term can mean a variety of things . On the most
minimal level, "effective" means that the procedure at least
does what it is supposed to do so that the judges impartially
follow the rules and regulations established for them without
regard to particular merit of the same .
However, as important as this requirement is, such an
approach would be unduly simplistic and would not necessarily
accord well with a rights-based perspective . The rules set for
the judicial or administrative body might themselves be excess-
ively narrow, thwarting the goal of rights protection. For that
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reason effective remedy must look beyond procedure to the
substance of what is given.
As will be discussed in more detail below, "effective" must
also mean effective in respect of this person or group, respon-
sive to the particular harms suffered by them. At the same time,
to the victim of a wrong," effective" must mean that which is
realistically accessible as a remedy . 61 In that regard the cost in
terms of time, money, or other resources must be considered .
One additional point should be made. As we are talking the
rights of all people at all times, not only is the result in any one
case important, but also the means . Even though one may have
violated the rights of another, the violator's own rights are not
thereby negated . Justice is still owed to that person and the
process of giving remedy always must recognize that .
.3 . Approaches to Remedies
a. Particular Justice
Theoretically, when dealing with human rights, one might
assume that it would be best would be to return the person to
the position in which she or he would have been had the
incursion not occurred . Over the centuries theorists have con-
centrated on that approach. For example, the Aristotelian con-
cept of "particular justice", focuses not on any intention of the
actor to harm the other party, but on the presumption that actor
has gained a benefit from his act, to the detriment of, or at the
expense and harm of the other person
. 62
When there was a gain, the Aristotlelian theory of cor-
rective or rectificatory justice examined the position of the
parties anterior to the "transaction" as equal and then restored
them to this antecedent equality. In law, this was accomplished
by transferring resources from the defendant to the plaintiff, so
that the gain realized by the defendant was used to make up the
loss of the plaintiff . 63 As far as possible, application of the
theory would use money to restore the plaintiff's pre-event
position. Basically, the idea was to put one in the position as if
one had not sustained the wrong
. 64
As far as it goes, this perspective coincides with A.J .M .
Milne's provision for proportionate equality ( or "each according
to his due") and with his concept of justice. According to Milne,
as a matter of justice, compensation is due from one party to
another when, without an adequate excuse, the former has
harmed the latter. However, Milne elaborates on the relation-
ship:
But justice also requires that the compensati
equality must be applied in deciding
the kind and amount of compensation .
It must be in proportion to the harm for
which the offending party is to blame .
(emphasis added) 6 5
Thus, both the amount of blame and the seriousness of the harm
must be assessed. Milne stresses that the blame should not be
exaggerated, nor the seriousness of the harm underestimated . Of
course, it is imperative that one, therefore, look to exactly what
the harm is .
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Once again, the answer to that, in part, depends on the
viewpoint one is taking . Atomistically, the harm may be framed
in respect of its effect on this person alone . To that narrow end,
the compensation is only to repair the plaintiff's loss. However,
from a rights-based perspective, the harm from a violation may
extend beyond the particular person or group to the community
at large. For that reason, among others, it also may be essential
to condemn a defendant's conduct. These are two diffferent ends
for one money judgment and it is important to keep clear what
exactly is being compensated .
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Within a rights-based perspective, the plaintiff's right to
compensation is always important and all the harms to the
person should be addressed . Milne stresses
It is part of the concept of compensation that
the kind and degree must be in proportion to
the culpable harm suffered. Too much, too
little or the wrong kind is not compensation
properly so-called. The idea of fairness
is thus integral part of the concept of
'compensation' , ...[thus] decisions about the
kind and amount of compensation must be made
according to the proportionate equality
principle .
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Proportionate equality in respect of compensation requires
a) that each relevant consideration be
considered positively or negatively .
according to whether it is favorable or
unfavorable ;
b) that those of equal worth must be rated
equally , those of unequal worth, unequally,
in proportion to their unequal worth ; and
c) that those which are unfavorable be rated
negatively in proportion to the degree to
which they are unfavorable . 68
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At this preliminary stage it is suggested that in the assess-
ment of any remedy to a rights violation, among the "relevant
considerations" should be
a) the harm done to the plaintiff- that
including all types reasonably flowing from
the "injury" ;
b) the harm occasioned to the person or the
group in terms of social perception ;
c) time and money expended in terms of
bringing the complaint ; and, very importantly,
d) the character of the offender ( whether it
is an individual or an institutionally
organized body ) .
This last consideration is important in terms of the harm
that has occurred and the perceived legitimacy of the actions .
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Milne's analysis would also suggest that it is important to attend
to the positive considerations as well-- for example, whether the
defendant has already altered his behavior and whether he has
already "paid" in some non-monetary sense such as adverse
publicity .
b. Beyond Particular Justice
At first blush there may be problems focussing solely on
particular justice in respect of human rights and remedies .
Firstly, it should be noted that to the extent "compensation"
relies exclusively on money, putting the harmed party back in
what should have been the person's "true" position may ignore
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the goal of "assuring" the right .70 Money may effectively tackle
harms flowing from the violation, but it is not the same as
having the right itself .
For example, in the area of discrimination in employment,
monetary compensation may offer some form of remedy, but
money is not the same as having the opportunity to apply for a
position or actually having the job. In many instances a true
remedy may need to be something similar to specific
performance- actually giving that which was taken .
Secondly, the "gain" by the particular defendant may not
be "equal" to the loss by the victim .7 l Instead the "gain" may be
one that has gradually accrued over the centuries . A common
example of this is the continuing wage inequities between men
and women, not necessarily by any intended "malice", but partly
through the ghettoization of women within in certain categories
of employment and concomitantly by the ranking of certain
"feminine" categories of work as less "valuable" in worth . Here,
what may be required is recognition that the starting point is
not equal for all and remedy may entail a search for methods
that will achieve re-distributions that are more equitable .
Moreover, the extent to which a remedy is limited to
"particular justice" and the extent to which a response con-
centrates only on 'this individual in regard to this particular
violation the remedy will be left short of the goal of assuring
the right in the future. This is because particular justice, so
construed, is unduly atomistic and fails to understand that
"community" and "individual" are integrally tied .
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Additionally, any reliance solely on particular justice
means those whose rights have been violated will always be in
the process of "catch up ", by virtue of the fact they have to
seek a remedy in the first place for what should have been
theirs by right . This type of justice fails to heed the goal of
prevention of future rights infringements by other actors, an
objective that is imperative for the community's survival . A
society that is constantly battling past violations leaves itself
open to perpetuation of the wrongs, as only the smallest seg-
ment of violators will be caught and even fewer will made to
offer redress for the wrongs . Constantly fighting past infringe-
ments may also be a poorer use of resources than efforts that
work to asssure the violations do not occur in the future . It
becomes obvious that remedies must meet these concerns . With
the above points in mind, an alternative to compensation should
be considered -- that of sanctions which will now be briefly
discussed.
c. Sanctions
Within the community version of rights-based perspective,
the protection of the community from further infringements is
also crucial . As previously mentioned, as important as compen-
sation is, it is nevertheless usually backward looking (or re-
active). For the most part it addreses only that particular
violation. Even that victim may find herself subject to the same
kind of violation elsewhere . For these reasons, among others, it
is important to discuss remedies, such as sanctions, that can also
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work to the future and gain the attention of the larger
community .
J . Finnis has suggested that sanctions
are required in reason to avoid injustice,
to maintain a rational order of
proportionate equality, or fairness, as
between all members of society . For when
someone, who really could have chosen
otherwise, manifests a preference .._ for
his own interests, his own freedom of
choice and action , as against the common
interests . .. then in and by that very action
he gains a certain sort of advantage over
those who have restrained themselves . . .
If the free-willing . . were to retain
advantage , the situation would
be as unequal and unfair as it would be for
him to retain the tangible profits of his
crime ( the loot , the misappropriated fund,
the office of profit, . . .) . . . Punishment, then
characteristically seeks to restore the
distributively just balance of advantages .
. .72
Sanctions also stand as evidence of a community's umbrage
to the violation. For each of these reasons sanctions should
always be an important consideration in the evaluation of
effective remedies. Chapter 5, in particular, examines sanctions
in the form of aggravated or punitive damages .
V. Conclusion
This chapter has covered diverse ground . Using the works
of A .J.M. Milne as a touchstone, the chapter has considered the
nature of human rights and has offered a framework in which
to understand both individual and government responsibilities
in respect of these rights. It has underscored the need for
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to understand both individual
and government responsibilities
in respect of these rights. It
has underscored the need for
more than just
a positivist role for the judiciary in the
protection of rights. Lastly,
the chapter has touched upon
considerations of what will constitute "effective
remedies",
looking not only to particular justice but beyond. Against this
background the following chapter examines the measures Canada
to date has taken in the protection of these rights .
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50 J
. Donnelly, supra n. 4 at 22 .
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A.J. M. Milne, at 161 .
52 See Chap 4 "Hard Cases" in R.Dworkin , Taking Rights Seriously
(Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 80 ff .
53
A .J.M. Milne, Bk II at 106.
54 Rule of law carries several different connotations-
a) independence of the executive branch of government
b) an ideal of rationality in the ordering of society, as opposed
to arbitrary decision-making .
From S. M . Waddams , Study of Law . 2nd ed . (Toronto: Carswell, 1983)
at 8-9 .
55 Equality before the law- no one is above the law and all are
equally subject to it .
56 Supremacy of the law- where legal obligations are paramount to
other obligations .
S7 Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, Introduction to jurisprudence (4th ed .),
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1979) at 100 .
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Ibid . at 101 .
59 There are several ideas that surround this, one being that the
right should be met with no greater remedy or resource and no
more complicated a procedure than the situation actually warrants .
In the Charter area, similar direction has been occurring . With
respect to the Charter there is a feeling that the court should only
interfere where special circumstances merit so that if a lower court
has jurisdiction and power to grant relief, the superior court should
refuse to grant jurisdiction . The superior court becomes more of a
court of later, if not last resort . Re Krakowski and the Queen (1983),
4 C.C.C. (3d) 188, 41 O .R. (2d) 321 (Ont . C.A.) . This deference of course
is only justifiable where the other body is capable of providing an
effective remedy in the first place.
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An interesting description of adequate remedies in the area of
the Charter is given by M . Pilkington's, "Damages as a Remedy for
Infringememnt of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1984) 62 Cdn. Bar Rev. 516, 519 . In her view, the framework should
be consideration of a remedy that would
1) most effectively redressed the wrong suffered by the
plaintiff,
2) deter future infringements and ensuring future compliance,
and
3) interfere as little as possible with private responsibilities .
Because this paper is based on the premise of private respons-
ibilities in, and of themselves, may not be a legitimate reason for
violating the rights of others, Pilkington's last consideration will
have less sway here .
57
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In the area of the Charter see Lamer's dissent in Mills v. The
Oueen (1986) , 52 C.R. (3d) 1 at 92-100; 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 481 at
565-571 ; 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 245-252
; (S.C.C.) in which it is
emphasized that a remedy should be easily available and not
smothered in procedural delays and difficulties .
62 R
. McKeon (ed.), Introduction to Aristotle, (New York: Random
House, 1947) p. 401 .
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.J. Weinrib , "Towards a Moral Theory of Negligence Law ",
(1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 37 at 38 :
"The wrongful act is reckoned to have brought equal gain
to the wrongdoer and loss to the victim . It brings A to the
position A + C and B to the position B-C . . .The corrective
justice will be the intermediate between the greater and
the less."( Cooper-Stephenson)
64 One perceived disadvantage to emphasizing "particular justice"
is that it seems to assume that everything was equal before hand
and we are perpetrating the inequality. On occasion human rights
commissions have touched upon "distributive justice " - e.g . Action
Travail . Arguably, where tort law moves into the areas punitive or
exemplary damages there is room for a form of distributive justice .
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. Morris,"Punitive Damages in Tort Cases", (1931) 44 Harv . Law
Rev. 1172 at 1175 - 1181 .
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A.J .M. Milne, Bk II, at 175, n.6
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At the same time it is also relevant to ascertaining levies that
will succeed in altering conduct . Traditionally, courts have allowed
the plaintiff to prove the defendant's wealth before the court would
establish punitive damages because a penalty that would cause the
poor or individual person to reform would likely make little
impression on the rich or corporate institution (supra n . ** at
Clarence Morris, p . 1191)
The actual role of publicity will become very important later on
in examining "compensation by human rights legislation .
70 Milne acknowledges this to some degree when he speaks of "kind
and extent of compensation" .
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Consider for example the proprietor who discriminates by paying
certain groups of his employees less. The group have lost wages in
comparison to their co-workers, plus endured loss of self-esteem,
respect and dignity. The owner may have gained nothing monetarily
58
or may have gained considerably . He may
have been more
competitive as a result of his actions, increasing his profits not only
by the amount of the wage differential but also by the profits
garnered from his more competitive position .
72 J. Finns, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1980), p. 263 .
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CHAPTER 3
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
I . Introduction
Canada has been addressing human rights matters in one
respect or another ever since the first Legislative Assembly in
1793, 1 but that response, typically, has been haphazard and
oftimes inconsistent . In part, the reason for this is the country
has responded only to particular subject matters2 or to
particular problem areas
.3
This has allowed issues to become
compartmentalized, without a view to seeing the situations as
any part of an overall manner of dealing with human beings.
The reasons for this piecemeal approach are open to conjecture,
but at least two come easily to mind . The first one is functional
and the second is socio- political .4
At Confederation, the interest of then- to- be federal and
provincial governments was solely the manner in which power
was to be divided between the two. In the end, the federal
government was accorded control over matters with a national
context or nature.5 The provinces were given control, inter alia,
over matters more closely tied to the particular region such
as "local works and undertakings"
6
and " property and civil
rights" . 7 In their respective divisions, each government could
also be seen as having a residuary power . 8
What is readily apparent is that the Constitution Act,1867
did not give exclusive legislative jurisdiction over human
rights to either level of government .9 Considering the period,
60
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that was as might be expected- improving the human condition
was not discussed in terms of nominate human rights .
10
However, this later meant that human right discourse was
reduced to specified activities that were subject to either
federal or provincial legislation, depending upon whether the
conduct to be regulated fell within the purview of matters
coming within the legislative authority of the federal or a
provincial government. As will be shown, it is Canada's federal
nature that has created significant problems to the area of
human rights, particularly in regard to the scope of the rights
and remedies available, but also in terms of attitude. 11 It should
also be noted, however, that our internal difficulties flowing
from federalism hold no weight, either ethically or in terms of
international law, when we are deemed in violation of our
duties
. 12
11 . The Functional Problem
While it might appear that by virtue of s . 92 (13) (property
and civil rights) the provincial government had exclusive
jurisdiction over many of the matters we might consider as
"human rights", this is a common misconception . "Civil rights "
in this context are not the same as "human rights" or even
"civil liberties" . The use of the word "civil rights" in s . 92 (13)
actually refers to matters between individuals, as opposed to
matters between the individual and government . 1 3 Civil rights
as construed by the British North America Act "comprise
primarily proprietiary, contractual or tortious rights: the rights
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exist when a legal rule stipulates that in certain circumstances
a person is entitled to something from another ."14 In contrast,
civil liberties (which form one part of human rights ) exist
where there is an absence of legal rules: whatever is not
forbidden is a civil liberty .
Analysing the focus of human rights codes to date, it may
be pointed out that the legislation has primarily concentrated
on matters dealing with employment, wage discrimination,
contractual rights and access to goods and services, all of which
fall within the class of interests of "property and civil rights"
and presumptively within provincial jurisdiction.1
5
In contrast, particular businesses with a national character
such as railways, telephone companies or airlines, are subject to
federal jurisdiction because of that national perspective .
Federal employees and the federal government as employer will
also come within the scope of the federal human rights
legislation. The situation becomes more convoluted when trying
to determine if the matter is in relation to a federal power
under section 91, such as " in relation to" federal works,
undertakings or business, or federal crown property, natives) as
opposed to merely affecting property and civil rights . In the
former situation the federal government again will be accorded
jurisdiction over the subject matter
. 16
Canada's problems deriving from the constitutional
division of powers are understood and acknowledged by human
rights commissions . The commissions will be the first to admit
that working one's way through this maze of jurisdictions can
b both confusing and disconcerting for complainants.1 7 A
legislated deference whereby human rights commissions will
decline jurisdiction where it is felt that the matter before them
is one better handled by other boards or panels further
compounds the matter .18
Aware that the constitutional division of powers can create
lacunae, governments, from time to time, have attempted to
ensure that a particular problem is resolved by at least one
level of authority. For example, when it was felt that neither
Ontario's Code nor the Criminal Code covered the problem of
recorded telephone hate messages, the Ontario Attorney General
called upon the federal government to deal with the problem
.19
However, what happens if the other government either fails,
ignores or neglects to act, becomes problematic .
A . An Illustration of the Difficulty
Scowby v. Glendenning20 demonstrates some of the
difficulties of federalism for the protection of human rights in
that provincial legislation may not cover certain federal actors
or may not give rise to jurisdiction over certain federal bodies
even where the violation occurred within the province .
In Scowby certain members of the Saskatchewan RCMP
were under investigation by the Human Rights Commission after
allegations that the R .C.M .P., in the course of arresting a member
of their party, needlessly subjected a group of natives to
indignities. The R.C.M .P. refused to co-operate and, instead,
went before the court asking for a writ of prohibition, claiming
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that the Saskatchewan Human Rights Board lacked the
jurisdiction to investigate or settle a complaint lodged by the
natives against the R.C.M.P.
The case eventually went to the Supreme Court of Canada .
There, it was decided that s.7 of the Saskatchewan Code
21 ,
under which the human rights commission was pursuing the
complaint, was "essentially criminal in nature" . Consequently,
that provision of the Code was constitutionally invalid, as it
fell under the federal head of power . At first blush, section 7 of
the Code, which states that every person shall be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention, sounds a lot like s. 9 of the
Charter .
The Supreme Court decision was in marked contrast to the
approach of the Court of Appea1 22, which concluded that "in
light of the broad spectrum of provincial civil or tortious
liability involving wrongful physical interference of the other"
[which the court saw as properly within the province's ambit],
and in light of the educative and promotional responsibilities of
the human rights commission, in this instance, any action
performed by the commission was merely incidental to its
power, and it could not be seen as acting in a superior court
f unction .
In light of the fact that the matter was not later tackled by
the federal government human rights board, Scowby would seem
to restrict the ability of human rights boards to do justice in
areas where there might be seen to be some minimal overlap
between the federal and provincial concerns . Individuals or
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groups who are supposed to be protected by human rights
legislation end up losing out .
III. The Socio-political Problem
From a "socio-political" perspective, when discourse is
entrenched in division of power dialogue rather than in a
discussion of rights, it allows human rights issues to be
viewed simply as a jockeying between federal and provincial
powers. Z3 Certainly, we have seen that until the advent of the
Charter, cases coming before the courts involving human rights
issues were resolved principally on the basis of being intra,
vires or ultra wires a particular government .
24
Thus, in the past, a law prohibiting Chinese merchants from
employing whites females, although patently racist in intent and
effect, was legally within the jurisdiction of the Saskatchewan
government in the early 1900s.25 Likewise, legislation against
communal ownership of land which affected the religious
beliefs and economic well-being of only Hutterites was legally
within the j urisidiction of the Alberta government . 26 In British
Columbia it was ultra vires the provincial jurisdiction to
prohibit the employment of Chinese in coal mines, 27 but it
would not have been ultra vires the jurisdiction of the federal
government. It is appalling that the courts upheld these pieces
of legislation as within the jurisdiction of either level of
government, allowing the conclusion to be drawn that
	
the
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blatantly discriminatory practices were within the legitimate
power of any government.
Moreover, this approach directs the discourse away from
a concern for "rights", i .e . things inherent to the person . Once a
subject matter is accorded to a particular level of government
that characterization permits situations to be viewed as discrete
political problems over political claims (that is, battles
between political philsophies ) . This establishes an attitude that
the legislative regimes in the area of human rights are solely a
matter of a particular province's political inclination, and
consequently, subject to those same political caprices .28 So, in
theory, a province more concerned with business property
"rights" may properly cut away at other human interests, if it
will serve the business orientation better. Alternatively,
argument becomes engaged over the legitimacy of taking away
"management rights" (a perversion of some concept of individual
property "right") rather than protecting the individual rights . 29
A . Consequences of the Socio-Political Perspective
As will be seen, considerable diversity exists among the
various human rights legislations . Again, in part, this is because
the human rights issues have become political devices . In
framing matters as "things" we are going to permit the
individual to have, as opposed to rights for which the person
is inherently entitled to have protected, we end up with
contests between the individual and any other political
combatants over the limited political resources . "Rights" then
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become more akin to "privileges" or, worse, they become
"commodities" to be sold or bargained away. At the same time,
as the Senate Proceedings in 1950 recognized, it is rare that
one can make infringements of rights the issue of an election : "in
fact it is almost impossible to do so, because usually the
infringement affects not very many people, perhaps only a few
individuals or a single individual . . . and usually an unpopular .
individual at that." 30
In the early stages of the development of the legislations,
the issues were not even considered rights matters . Instead,
they were framed as an employment problem (in hiring or
wrongful dismissal) or a landlord-tenant issue or a real
property concern . While the stance gave reassurance that we
were capable of handling that particular small issue, it also
left the legitimacy of the existing structure basically
unquestioned.
If one lives in a province where the legislation is weak,
realizing change is particularly difficult . A legislative majority
not only can politically ignore the calls or needs of minority
groups, it can also reduce the legislated rights of others or
legislate against them, which further entrenches the situation of
powerlessness. Yet even if one lives in a province where the
legislation is comparatively strong it is easy for governments
and courts to become complacent. As minority groups move
away from the most egregious examples of discrimination and
inequity, their pushes for further change oftimes meet even
stronger resistance.3 1 By pointing to provinces with weaker
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legislation, the retort of the majority becomes "We have done
so much for you, why aren't you satisfied?" Lastly, the people
lobbying for change fall victim of a "divide and conquer"
strategy, having their own limited resources divided between
two levels and thirteen fora, exacerbating an already serious
problem .
Keeping in mind these problems created by Canada's
federal nature, it is useful to examine what has been
accomplished in the human rights field by the Canadian
governments .
IV. History and Provisions of the Human Rights Acts
As earlier mentioned, Canada's first responses to human
rights matters were halting at best. This was not necessarily out
of any considered malevolence, but largely because "[t]he
prevailing attitude among members of the majority groups who
recognized [discrimination] as a social evil was that one cannot
impose morality by law nor legislate goodness and fair
play"(emphasis added) .3
2
Parts of the country would respond to particular problems
sometimes as they arose or as they reached crisis stature . In
doing so they would take a reactive rather than a proactive
position . Some of the first efforts were in British Columbia33
where discrimination in unemployment relief was prohibited
and in Ontario3 4 where fair accommodation or race relations
came up for consideration . Sometimes unfavorable judicial
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decisions would create the necessary impetus by stirring public
reaction and bringing pressure on the government
.35
The first detailed statute, however, did not come about in
either of these two provinces. Instead, it was Saskatchewan
which in 1947 enacted Canada's original human rights- style
legislation. 3 6 This effort contrasted strongly with the earlier
acts of other provinces and even with Saskatchewan's own
earlier efforts. This new form of legisalation dealt with a variety
of situations and problems. In addition to covering civil
liberties, it prohibited discrimination with respect to
accommodation, employment, occupation, land transactions,
education, business and enterprises, accomplishing this through
the use of penal sanctions .3
7
This method, however, soon was found to have significant
drawbacks, most notably the governments' reluctance to enforce
the penal provisions .3 8 In an attempt to overcome weakness of
this quasi- criminal legislation, Saskatchewan and other
provinces eventually came to rely on a method that had
worked well in the labor context - a process of assessing,
investigating and conciliating complaints, then setting up
boards of inquiry where conciliation was not possible .
Prosecution was used only as a last resort .3 9 However, in the
early years of the human rights legislation this tack was
limited to fair employment and accommodation practices .
Limitations were apparent even with this form of
legislation. Because the legislators had not provided enough
information to the public about it, people were unlikely to take
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advantage of the legislation . 40 Also,
the legislatures were still
approaching the whole problem of discrimination as if it was
only the victim's personal
problem and responsibility .41
Victims carried the full burden of bringing complaints and
seeing them through to resolution. Thus, issues
still were not
considered a "public problem" . Additionally, by seeing offenders
as discrete individuals (the "one rotten apple" in the otherwise
good barrel),
systemic problems were neglected .
42
In 1961 Ontario somewhat alleviated the shortcoming of
leaving the full burden on the victim
by setting up Canada's
first human rights commission. The following
year, Ontario's
legislature consolidated a number of
acts dealing with
discrimination in several fields, placing the matters under the
purview of the commission (and gave over
responsibility of
following through on a complaint
to the commission) . 43 Since
then, Ontario's Commissions have
had the dual role of
vindicating the rights of society and the rights of
the
individual . At the
same time, the establishment of
the
Commission was
expected to mitigate a good portion of the
expense that the victim would otherwise face, which, heretofore,
had prevented victims from getting justice
. Over the next two
decades, each of the provinces and territories
came to make
similar provisions.
A. Character of the Legislation
Today, the preambles tp provincial acts frequently allude
to the "inherent dignity" and "equal and inalienable rights of all
some Canadian
permanence to their legislations paralleling that
Charter .47 Those provinces treat
this kind of
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members", purportedly seeing these as
instrumental to
"freedom, justice and peace in the world" 44 Each
piece of
legislation conveys concern over both the private interest of
the complainant and the public interest of society 45 To that
end, the legislatures express a willingness to circumscribe what
might otherwise be absolute liberty. That recognition
is
established, federally, in section 2 of the Canadian Human Rights
Act , which states that in as much as every individual should
have an equal opportunity with others to make for herself or
himself the life she or he is able and wishes to have, that right
must be consistent with the person's accompanying duties and
obligations as a member of society. In order to have that equal
opportunity, the person must not be hindered by discriminatory
practice based on certain proscribed prejudices .
46
In light of the manifest importance of these concerns,
jurisdictions
	
have attempted to attach
f the
legislation as
having a special character, in that, it cannot be amended
except expressly by the legislature, and other pieces of
legislation are to be read as to conform with the human rights
act
. 48
Most, but not all, provinces also explicitly make the
Crown subject to the legislation.49 Such a minimum requirement
is patently clear. As one writer noted, "if the government can
exempt its own officers or employees from operation of human
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rights legislation, the deletrious effect
is too obvious to need
elaboration." 50
The country's various legislations, for the most part, are
"anti-discriminatory", in that they typically set out some
practices or areas of life in which it is prohibited to discriminate
on certain grounds, those main areas being the provision of
services and facilities, residential accommodation, employment
to the public and the display of public notices . In the
early
court cases, dealing primarily with jurisdiction of human rights
commissions, the judiciary expressed a perception that the
legislatures were striving to distinguish between parts of life
that were totally private (such as opinion or choice of friends)
and parts of life that lay outside that sphere . Consequently, in
the early judicial views it was assumed there existed total
liberty except where something was to be provided to the
public. Again, only a strong public connection could warrrant
interference.
Over the years, there has been a gradual shift away from
that public/private dichotomy. In some respects there has also
been a realization that food, shelter, services, and employment
are all necessaries to the person's continued existence 5 1 and
that repudiation of these both denies the value of the person
and, in effect, jeopardizes the person's very existence . Today, it
is oftimes stressed that, while the right of a person to make
private choices is important, that freedom can not be so critical
that it could effectively destroy the similar rights of others . As
the Canadian Human Rights Annual Report has noted, a person's
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right to hold a bigoted opinion does not , in itself, justify the
denial of opportunity of others .52
B. Prohibited Distinctions
It should be noted that Canada's movement towards
equalized opportunity has been hesistant at best. Even for
those activities seen as fundamental to existence, there has
been little in the way of efforts to prohibit unreasonable
adverse distinctions of all kinds in these areas . Only two
provinces have experimented with leaving the list of categories
for which discrimination is prohibited open-ended .
53
relying on
the phrase "without reasonable distinction ."
54
Both provinces
later abandoned the efforts . Instead,
across the country there
are select grounds of prohibited discrimination . Across Canada,
although twenty-four different criteria55 have been selected by
one government or another, no one legislative effort covers any
more than sixteen of them-5
6
and some touch upon as few as
seven.57 Indeed, it should be stressed that only four
grounds
of prohibited discrimination are found uniformly
throughout
Canada- race, colour, sex,58 and physical disability .
Other categories frequently enumerated
are: religion,
ancestry, ethnic origin or nationality . Over the
years as
particular groups lobbied or as particular issues arose in a
region, the grounds have been expanded .
So now under some
legislative acts there may also be included : mental disability,
political belief, sexual orientation, source of income, conviction
with a subsequent pardon, family status, or language .5
9
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From time to time the commissions have interpreted their
own legislation in a manner that has, in effect, expanded the
categories so that "sex" may
now be seen as covering gender,
pregnancy, or sexual harassment . 60
More typically, the grounds
are read restrictively though. Indeed, that
tendency has
recently lead the Canadian Diabetes Association to castigate the
Federal human rights legislation as offering less protection than
collective agreements provide
. 61
C. The Difficulties of Diversity
Elsewhere in political haggling we applaud diversity as a
provincial responsiveness to regional
or idiosyncratic
problems
. 62
We should question whether that tendency is
appropriate to human rights . Particularly for the victim of the
discrimination, this type of diversity is not comforting . It seems
almost hypocritical that one should
be protected from
discrimination by marital status
in the provision of food,
services and accommodation in Saskatchewan but not next door
in Alberta, or legislatively shielded
in employment from
discrimination on the basis
of political beliefs in Prince
Edward Island, but not across the waters in Nova Scotia
.6
3
It is important that we critically question whether there
are such a fundamental difference in living and thinking
in
Lloydminster, Saskatchewan and Cold Lake, Alberta, less than
50 miles away, to justify these differences . Arguably there is
not.
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These disparities (and others) weaken any idea of human
rights (even in the limited sense of anti- discrimination) as
being inherent to the person
. Arguably, our ideas of non-
discrimination are sufficiently well-developed by now that we
have passed the threshold where non- discrimination can
be
legitimately tied to specific categories or specific regions .
V. The Setup of the Legislation
It may be indicative of the Canadian disposition that most
of the decisions which affect a person's legal rights and duties
are not made in courts. As one academic noted," [these decisions]
are made in other institutions and only the tiniest fraction of
them are either in theory reviewable or in fact reviewed by the
courts.. .Canadians are accustomed to turning,
at least initially,
to administrative officials
and tribunals to enforce their
rights." 64
A moment's reflection affirms this
. In addition to our use
of ombudsmen, the existence of immigration boards, criminal
injuries compensation boards, tax appeal
boards, workers
compensation boards,
municipal assessment boards and
unemployment insurance boards all attest to our affinity for
dispute settlement outside the courtroom setting, "each of which
diverts attention from the court as a way of redress when a
right cognizable by the court exists ." 6 5 Our human rights system,
thus, is no exception to this particular approach of handling
problems.
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The reasons for this trend
are generally seen as ones of
comprehensiveness, efficiency and effectiveness
. Additionally,
the boards have been perceived
as having the ability to be
experimental, offering new responses to new situations . 66 In the
early days of the commissions, strengths were stressed :
The obvious value of the commission lies in
its
	
informality, its flexibility, its speed
and its demonstrated ability to secure
meaningful relief in the many cases that have
come to its attention. It applies the
knowledge , the financial resources and much
of the initiative , the lack of
which would otherwise usually prevent or
inhibit a disadvantaged person from seeking
redress. 67
A . The Process
The human rights legislation typically operates through a
series of procedural layers . It begins when an individual lodges
a written complaint with the commission . 68 That complaint is
investigated, and when deemed founded, attempts at settlement
are made. Sometimes where evidence
is tentative or where
conditions warrant, the commission may attempt to ameliorate
the situation between the parties .69
If conciliation cannot be achieved, the Commission may at
that point request the Minister to appoint a board of inquiry
.
Thus, at an early stage any decision for continuation
of the
matter has been removed from the complainant's control
and
remains with the Commission, the Board and the Minister, in
part because larger societal concerns are
simultaneously
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involved. At the inquiry stage the board can make such orders
as it sees fit and the Act permits70
and these are legally
enforceable .
B. Nature of the Boards:Following the Enforcement Model
In part, out of an assumption that the best way to deal with
discrimination is through education, and in part out of a
recognition that these parties will frequently continue to be in
contact with each other after the claim is answered, human
rights boards aim at a peaceful and "friendly" settlements as
their particular manner of resolution .71
Again, with a view to
irenic responses, prosecution is intended only as a remedy of
last resort, for it cannot usually be instituted without the
consent of the Minister.72
In this regard, the human rights resolution process is
perceived to be one that is quite unfamiliar at court, which
tends, instead, to see things as bi-polar and largely adversarial,
with the plaintiff's and defendant's interests
diametrically
opposed. 73 In part, this non-confrontational stance may be
the
result of a 1940's sociology and psychology of prejudice and
discrimination - in which "prejudice" was seen as a complex
of valuations and beliefs that stood behind discriminatory
behaviour . From that perspective, both individual
acts of
discrimination and segregation patterns
implemented by
individuals simply reflected
local prejudices which could be
changed by persuasion and education . ?4
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To its proponents, the non-adversarial nature of human
rights boards has been seen as conducive to maximizing the
dual goals of effective redress for the wrong suffered by the
plaintiff and of fostering the implementation of the rights by
deterring future infringements
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In many respects, this tack
seems closely aligned to the American efforts in the civil and
human rights areas where they, too, have been trying to
distance themselves from the "dispute settlement model",
moving more to an "enforcement model" which places emphasis
less on finding "fault" and stresses more the redirecting of the
defendant's conduct in such a way that it will conform to legal
norms. 76
Most human rights legislations in Canada utilize this
enforcement model, firstly by avoiding the
castigation of
respondent in the sense of finding "fault" . As Chief Justice
Dickson pointed out in Action Travail there was no indication
that the purpose of the federal human rights act was to assign or
punish moral blameworthiness . "While some people who
discriminate do so out of wilful ignorance or animus" and
therefore might be seen as having some
intention to
discriminate, "there can be no doubt that Canadian human rights
legislation is now typically drafted to avoid reference to
intention" . 77 Similarly, in O'Malley v. Simpsons Sears
the court
underscored that the main approach of the Ontario legislation
was not to punish the discriminator but rather to provide relief
.for the victims of discrimination.78
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courts for resolving problems [within their field], except for the
resolution of purely legal questions ." 81
Since that time, boards have earned a certain degree of
deference, curial and otherwise, by daily demonstrating their
competence :
The evidence suggests that the continuous
work
of an expert body, receiving and investigating
complaints, attempting to conciliate and
settling
	
grievances, acquiring experience and
information._- will do more to meet the
problem than the occasional prosecution,
conducted in public in the ordinary courts in
accordance with an adversary system which may
have the effect of aolarizinR the very
attitudes	which it seeks to soften
and change . (emphasis added) 82
Nonetheless,the courts still maintain an appellate position and
retain judicial review over
jurisdictional matters in most
instances . It should be pointed out, however, that these appeal
and review roles are quite different in nature and in approach
from initially considering the subject .
VI. The Availability of Remedies
The range
of remedies available under the legislations has
always been considered
to be a significant advantage . The
variety and open-endedness of remedies establish an excellent
capacity to handle
a diversity of situations that might come
before the commissions . By way of example,
under the Ontario
Human Rights Code, the board of inquiry may, by order
8o
courts for resolving problems [within their field], except for the
resolution of purely legal questions ."
81
Since that time, boards have earned a certain degree of
deference, curial and otherwise, by daily demonstrating their
competence:
The evidence suggests that the continuous work
of an expert body, receiving and investigating
complaints, attempting to conciliate and
settling
	
grievances, acquiring experience and
information . . . will do more to meet the
problem than the occasional prosecution,
conducted in public in the ordinary courts in
accordance with an adversary system which may
have the effect of polarizing the very
attitudes which it seeks to soften
and change . (emphasis added) 82
Nonetheless,the courts still maintain an appellate position and
retain judicial review over jurisdictional matters in most
instances. It should be pointed out, however, that these appeal
and review roles are quite different in nature and in approach
from initially considering the subject .
VI. The Availability of Remedies
The range of remedies available under the legislations has
always been considered to be a significant advantage. The
variety and open-endedness of remedies establish an excellent
capacity to handle a diversity of situations that might come
before the commissions . By way of example, under the Ontario
Human Rights Code, the board of inquiry may, by order
80
(a) direct the party to do anything that
in the opinion of the board, the party
ought to do to achieve compliance
with this act, both in respect of the
complaint and in respect of future
practices ; (emphasis added) 83 and
(b) direct the party to make
restitution, including monetary
compensation, loss arising out of the
enfringement and where infringement
has been engaged in wilfully or
recklessly, monetary compensation may
include an award, not exceeding $10,000 ,
for mental anguish. 84
Some jurisdictions have been active in expanding the means
of rectification available to their human rights boards, so that,
in some quarters, the remedies (on a theoretical level, at least)
can vie closely with anything the court can offer .
The federal human rights act, in particular, has recently
been called a "potent new remedy" to fight rights violations 85
In R v. Druken86 a law that barred those employed by their
spouses from collecting unemployment insurance was declared
inoperative under the Canadian Human Rights Act because it
discriminated on the basis of marital or family status . In Druken
the tribunal ordered Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission (CEIC), inter alia, to "cease the discriminatory
practice of applying ss . 3(2)(c) , 4 (30 ( d) and reg . 14 A". The
remedy was considered quite far-reaching because it effectively
rendered those provisions inoperative (similar in effect to a
court making a declaration under s. 52 of the Charter ) .
The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the order of the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. When the Attorney General
81
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challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal to make a general
declaration as to the validity of the legislation, the Court of
Appeal maintained that the tribunal's order was "entirely apt" .
The Court pointed out that the Act under which the Tribunal
functions expressly authorized it to order measures be taken to
prevent "the same or similar practice from occurring in the
future." 87
There have been other recent cases pointing out the power
of some human rights tribunals. Canadian National Railway
gained notoriety for not employing women in what it considered
to be "men's jobs". Women were effectively kept out of those
positions by the use of certain mechanics tests, which while
"neutrally applied" at entry level jobs, effectively prevented
women from being considered for the non- traditional positions .
In Action Travail, the Canadian Human Rights tribunal
imposed on the railway a "Special Temporary Measure" of
hiring goal of 25% women for all non-traditional openings, until
such time as CN was able to achieve a targeted 13 % female
involvement in the work force. This was seen as an effort to
both prevent future acts of discrimination and to "cure"
discriminations . The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the ability
of the tribunal to make such an order. 88 In this regard, it would
seem that the human rights boards have the ability to engage in
the long term supervision that courts are wont to avoid .89
When one considers the variety of remedies commissions
have provided to complainants over the years, such as getting
respondents to write letters of apology or letters of
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recommendation, having them post non-discrimination notices,
or having the respondent offer reinstatement or invitations to
apply for job, and establishing monetary compensations, it is
apparent that the boards try to tailor the remedy to the
situation that brought about the violation .90 Moreover, when
one encounters remedies such as the establishment of a labor-
management human rights committee with human rights courses
for all levels of management, as was done at a Calgary plant, it
is easy to question whether a court would have been able to
employ the same imagination or resolve . 91 Similarly, when one
encounters the $30 million settlement obtained for back wages
in a "work of equal value" case, it is hard not to be impressed .
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VII . Trends in Boards
Some commissions have had their role expanded over the
years. Under the new Bill C-62, the Canadian Human Rights
Commission will be the new enforcement mechanism for an act
respecting employment equity and mandated with removing
systemic discrimination. Unfortunately, as commissions' roles
broaden (but the financial resources do not commensurately
increase), commissions often find themselves charged with too
many divergent tasks . For that reason some groups are worried
that the Commission cannot adequately fulfill the new roles or
even the old ones . 9 3
Comparatively speaking, the Federal Commission seems to
be one of the stronger actors . While the categories of
discrimination
	
that the federal legislation covers has not
changed in the last eleven years, the
Commission's powers and
jurisdiction has been gradually expanded
since its inception in
1971 . Recently, it has been given
"the authority to approve
plans that employers voluntarily submit for approval to adapt
facilities and operations
and the way in which goods and
services are provided to meet the needs of people with
disabilities." 94
It has also been given the mandate to handle
affirmative action programs .
The federal commission's responses have often been
the
most publicized as well, partly because of the funding it
receives 95 and partly because of the number of its cases that
make it to appeal court or supreme court level for interpretive
resolution. However, as will later be shown, rather than as
indicative of any general trend, the federal commission may be
considered more an anomaly in the human rights arena
.
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CHAPTER 4 :
THE VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE :
HOW BOARDS FUNCTION IN REALITY
I . Introduction
Despite many of their apparent strengths, human rights
legislations (and the commissions that carry out those goals)
are fraught with problems and limitations . These shortcomings
fall into three general categories : a) substantive, b) procedural
and c) philosophical. While any one of these might weaken
the efficacy of the legislation, in combination they seriously
undermine our professed intention to protect the citizenry .
II . Substantive Shortcomings
These have already been discussed to some degree in the
discussion of categories and grounds of discrimination and in
regard to the federal/ provincial dichotomy. I would like to
offer The Red Eye case as a further example of the substantive
problems in the legislations .
A . The Red Eye
The University of Saskatchewan engineering student
newspaper, The Red Eye, used cartoons of women that, at best,
could be described as "in exceptionally poor taste" . The paper
had "explained" in an editorial that the reason the paper could
93
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rightly be accused as treating women as inferior was because, in
the editor's estimation, "they were inferior" .
Referring to s. 14 (1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code which prohibits the publishing or displaying of any
"notice", "sign ", "symbol", "emblem" or " other represent-
ation" which ridicules or belittles a person or group of persons
on specified prohibited grounds, the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Commission determined that the publication violated
provincial law. However, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v . The Engineerinv
Student's Society l found that although the student newspaper
had published articles, cartoons and photographs that were
clearly offensive to women, the paper was not in breach of the
provincial human rights legislation .
2
The Court concluded that, although these particular
publications would not be protected under the rubric of free
speech, that the articles, cartoons, and photographs would not
constitute any of the considered types of "representations"
under the Code.3 "But despite his discontent with the material,
Mr. Justice Cameron said the Code's drafters had constructed
the legislation too narrowly to be applicable in this case, thus
precluding any control over editorial content of newspapers ." 4
It was justice Cameron's position that "the text does not speak
to the making of statements, written or oral, having prohibited
effects . . .[t]he provision does not have that kind of sweep . If it
had, it would gather in statements in newspapers, magazines,
plays, performances, dissertations and the like." 5
Instead, Justice Cameron saw the nature and purpose of
s . 14 as centred on situations like the placing of a sign in a
restaurant window or in a union hall that would indicate a
discriminative basis upon which an opportunity might be
obtained or denied, such "No blacks here" or "Jews need not
apply ". It was the
	
judge's consideration that while the
"purpose of the Code pulls in one direction, the cast
section [pulls] in another . "6
Whether or not justice Cameron's interpretation
95
of the
of the
legislation was in accord with the historical realities, and
whether it may have been in accord with the legislative intent
in the past, for many people his conclusion is particularly
disheartening. It must be recognized that the actions of the
editor in the Red Eye case were more than just in poor taste
and arguably the actions offended more than just some people's
mores. Instead, the overall tenor of the paper treated women
as means rather than ends, and this article, in particular,
denied women as having intrinsic worth. The article constituted
a profound affront to the dignity of women . These were attacks
on the dignity and self-respect of females as human beings,
with slurs that reinforced sexual inequality? Here was a
newspaper whose contents could nowhere be construed as any
political statement and whose contents certainly were an
affront to the dignity of women as people . Yet redress for the
situation was not and might never be forthcoming .
Whether or not the honorable justice's technical
interpretation was correct, the decision points out the
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inadequacy of provincial statute law to handle this kind of
matter .
8
Canadian provinces for a long time now have battled
this problem of legislative measures that impact on the
media. Provincial legislatures have refrained from drafting a
wider section for the Code, presumably because such an action
might be seen as controlling free speech, 9 or as an intrusion
into the criminal law provisions against hate literature, either
presumably running afoul of federal jurisdiction. At the same
time, the federal legislature may refrain from acting, firstly,
because it purportedly touches upon free speech and secondly,
as degrading of women as it is, it does not seem to get to the
point where it could be construed as inciting hatred- ridicule,
contempt, derision, etc., but not hatred .
For the federal government, the question becomes what
limits should be placed on the freedom of speech, but for the
provinces the question remains "Is this part of our jurisdiction?"
In an attempt to resolve the provincial dilemma, some writers
have suggested that if the control is over the message, not the
medium, this is not a matter of federal jurisdiction. 10 If the
messages indicate discrimination or an intention to discriminate,
and the restriction does not harm the essence of free speeech,
free press or free expression, then the legislative measures will
be intra vices the provincial legislatuM . It is important to
note that the constitutional challenge once again redirects the
battle from the substance of the complaint to a technical one of
jurisdiction. Rather than openly discussing whether . the societal
goal of equality in dignity and respect is being flouted in the
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Red Eye article, and instead of articulating the limits on freedom
of speech, the discourse is high centred on a jurisdictional basis .
It is important to recognize that these jurisdictional
problems inhibit legislators from acting in the first place,
especially where the legislators know there will be a strong
chance of constitutional challenge . In pressing for changes to the
law, private actors face the same jurisdictional dilemmas .
B . Striving for Change within a Federal System :
Divide and Conquer
Another substantive shortcoming of the legislation is the
ability of individuals and groups to effect change within the
two tier system . It is particularly difficult for a provincial
interest group to be able to effectively lobby for a change in
federal, legislation. National groups exist, but they run into the
converse problem of having to direct their attentions not only to
the federal government, but also to the ten provincial and two
territorial governments. Power becomes diluted and reform
remains elusive .
C. Racism as Case in Point
Racism is one area which has been particularly prone to
the caprices of constitutional division of powers. The Canadian
Consultative Council on Multiculturalism noted that one of its
problems in pursuing complaints arose from difficulties in
ascertaining whether questions of racism were federal or
98
provincial jurisdiction. Its second problem (and to the Council,
a more important one) was that certain provincial Human Rights
Commissions appear to have broader powers than others . 12 It is
in light of this variability that the Council recommended that
"the federal government . ..take steps to confer with all provinces
in order to establish an amalgamation of all Human Rights
Commissions into one body, all having the same jurisdiction and
powers. . ." . 1 3 While that change is not likely to be forthcoming,
the suggestion leads one to consider if there might be another
way of these transcending the jurisdictional debates in order
to effectively protect the rights of all people . The common law
may be one possibility, because one of its strengths is the fact
that it transcends borders .
D. In Comparison with our International Obligations .
The problems of substance are compounded further by
the fact that the various legislations permit defences and
exceptions under the legislation that have no express
equivalents to our international obligations . Canada commonly
utilizes defences such as "bona fide occupational requirement"
and permits the restriction to services or facilities to "persons
of the same sex on the ground of public decency" . Many of the
legislations also permit exclusion of whole groups, such as
domestics and farm employees, plus others if the Lieutenant
Governor in Council gives permission .l
4
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Definitions of what is prohibited are restrictive as well.
For example, "age" in some provinces means
years, while in other jurisdictions it is defined
ages of forty-five and sixty-five . 1 5 In contrast
over eighteen
as between the
to the aims of
non-discrimination this ad hoc approach undermines the
concepts of intrinsic worth, with parties having to fit
themselves in to be afforded protection that should be theirs by
right.
By way of comparison, the approach at international law is
far more intregrated, partly because discrimination is defined .
At international law "discrimination occurs when in a given case
no sufficient connection exists between the equality or
inequality aspects on the one hand and the nature of the
treatment on the other ." Sufficient connections exist only where
the classification is relevant to the subject, fairly related to it,
not capricious or arbitrary, but instead reasonable and just.
16
The distinction must be " real and substantial", and that
classification must be relevant to the objects . 17
It has been established at international law that
discrimination occurs and the principle of equality of treatment
is violated, if the distinction has no objective or reasonable
justification. The existence of such a justification must be
assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under
consideration, regard being had to principles which normally
prevail in democratic societies . The justification must do more
than simply pursue a legitimate aim . The article is also violated
when it is not clearly established that there is a reasonable
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relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim to be realized . 18
Undoubtedly, many of the limitations, definitions, and
restrictions Canadian legislation employs would be acceptable
under international law for "securing the recognition and
respect of rights and freedoms of others" or "for meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and general welfare
in a democratic society" . 19 Some might not .
Consider the Canadian legislative approach for "bona fide
occupational requirement." 20 Ideas such as "bona fide" leave
open the possibility that a mere "rational" explanation for the
requirement will suffice, and possibly falling well short of any
type of proportionality betweeen the goal and the means used .
Moreover, the term "bona fide" tends to preserve the status,
duo . Even the term "good faith" with which bona fide is usually
twinned leaves room for unintentional or non-malicious acts
whose effects still discriminate . 21 It is those kinds of
interpretations that many hoped that human rights protections
would rectify, not re-inforce .
22
E. Substative Limitations as Evidenced by Variability in
Remedies
As previously mentioned, across Canada there is
considerable variability in legislation in what is permitted or
prohibited . Some provincial legislations carry the label "Human
Rights Code" and are apt to be viewed as comprehensive
schemes, replete with all remedies that might possibly be
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available to the complainants .23 Nonetheless, one of the
strongest criticisms lodged against human rights legislations is
the matter of awards in human rights cases . Victims frequently
do not seem to be adequately compensated .
Again, this results from the variability of remedies . At the
generous" end of the money spectrum is Ontario's legislation
which makes allowance for compensation to the complainant to
cover pecuniary losses resulting from the discrimination (but
to a limit of $2000), and allows up to $10,000 for mental
anguish where the actions of the respondent have been wilful or
reckless. 24 At the same time the respondent can be subject to
fines up to $25,000 .25 Manitoba's 1987 statute sets no explicit
limit on exemplary payments, though it may be too early to
determine exactly what range the commission will set for
itself
. 26
There is the possibility that the limits on the
neighbouring provinces will influence Manitoba's own standards .
What should be noted is that in Manitoba one court (it is
submitted completely erroneously) tried to establish a
correspondence between the quasi-criminal penalties and the
civil award .27 In that the fines are low or not used, this effort
would further erode the compensatory aspect.
At the other end of the spectrum, Alberta's Individual
Rights Protection Act28 may be the most technically narrow
remedy provision, as it neither specifically mention fines or
non-pecuniary losses . While this might seem to be inherent in
the Commission's broader power, at least one case has stated
otherwise
. 29
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At least one human rights board has specifically
commented that the primary purpose for awards is not to give
full compensation by way of damages in a civil suit, but rather
to discourage would-be violators of human rights legislation
and to provide a measure of recompense that is more than
token, compensating the complainant, at least in part, for
monetary loss and for the pain and suffering and loss of dignity
inflicted upon her or him .3 0 Arguably anything less than full
compensation is only a token gesture .
1 . Monetary caps
The general response of Parliment and the legislatures to
date has been to establish a monetary cap, especially in respect
of "special compensation". The major problem with dealing with
a monetary cap in the area of compensation of humiliation, loss
of dignity, loss of self-respect or self-esteem is that this sets up
a psychological range in which the human rights commissions
place the cases along a continuum. At the low end will be what
are perceived as the less hurtful cases or, perhaps more likely,
just the more commonplace. At the other end will be placed the
less frequent or more novel cases .3
1
Some recent cases from British Columbia might serve as
example. Members of minority groups often state that
discrimination at work is commonplace and minority groups
are often fired summarily. In one typical case, a complainant
was eventually awarded $350 for the humiliation suffered in
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being abruptly dismissed from work . That amount, by any
standard, is a pittance.
Two sexual harassment cases involving male employers
and female employees (presently a very topical subject matter)
each netted $1250 . By way of comparison, a sexual harassment
case involving a male employer propositioning of male
employee ( the incident which the complainant only considered
as a "blow to his ego") generated the maximum of $2000, with
no award given for lost wages_3Z Another less orthodox case
involved a white woman's complaint against a black taxi
driver accused of issuing "threats" against whites in general
.33
The woman was awarded $1000. The novelty of the situation
undoubtedly influenced the amount of the award .
What must be underscored is that novelty has nothing to
do with the impact of the violation on the victim, with how the
person feels . While novelty may catch the commission's
attention, it also skews the responses . That which is
commonplace may be all the more reprehensible, objectively,
precisely because of its frequency.
While it is arguable whether there can be such a thing as
an "objective " sum to deal with these matters, what one can
suggest with a fair amount of assurance is that the upper limits
of $2000 or $5000 may not be enough to tackle the most
egregious cases . At the same time, caps hurt the whole
spectrum of cases by putting downward pressure on them . Once
again, although in the establishment of damages in these cases
commissions are not bound by precedent, commissions cannot
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help but be aware of what they and their colleagues have given
in other cases, if only to promote consistency .34 These stand as a
measure by which the case at hand is seen as better or worse in
circumstances of the violation .
In part, these caps are in place because it is sometimes
felt that emotional or psychological reactions are easily
overstated and difficult to disprove . Simultaneously, there is a
concern that by not setting limits one may be giving in too
much to the individuals with the weakest character - what
might be considered "the thin -egoed woman", as juxtaposed to
the tortious or criminal concepts of "thin-skulled man" . There
also exists a feeling that dignity and self-respect are
principally internal characteristics and that the person's image
of self is to a great extent divorced from what people say of
her or him.
Again, this illustrates our ambivalence in the area. It may
be the fact that we are dealing with women, natives,
immigrants or any group victimized by discrimination that
makes us somehow trust their reactions less .35 Also, because
self-respect is an on-going concept, it may also be that some see
this as making this respondent pay not only for this incident
but also for the degrading actions of others. Lastly, and
exceptionally important, because the governments are also
subject to the Acts, it certainly is not in any government's best
interest to be heavily hit by damages .
The monetary limits sufficient for dealing with some
instances where a private actor, in an isolated incident, has
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suffered harm through the discrimination of another, may be
totally inadequate where the harm is suffered through corporate
action, the harm has involved numerous victims or the harm
has operated an extended period of time . In each of these, there
may be considerably more serious damage, warranting larger
sums than the boards may be able to offer . This is particularly
the case where the discrimination is systemic . Some provinces'
legislations
do make a private /corporate distinction, but
generally it is in regard to fines, not to damages . It may be for
this reason that the federal Human Rights Commission
recommended to Parliament in 1987 that the monetary cap be
removed and the Tribunal be given discretion in awarding
damages
. 36
That recommendation has been ignored to date . It
has also been argued before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
that the federal cap is discriminatory . So far the argument has
been rejected .37
2 .The Level of Awards Given : The Need to Qo Beyond
Tokenism
Even more serious is not what can be awarded, but what is
awarded. While awards in the areas of dignity, self-respect,
humiliation, and hurt feelings have increased since the 1970s,
they basically seem to have barely met the rate of inflation .
Dismissal on the basis of age will generally gross about $350
(and $125, or even $50, being more common to the
Maritimes 38 ), but sexual harassment will often come in at the
$500 to $1250 range . At law and in business, awards at this
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level are considered " nuisance awards", trivial amounts given
simply to get the person off one's back . More unsettling, what
these particular cases do not highlight is the number of cases
where no award is made at all. Again, variation among the
regions in Canada is strongly evident, with Maritime provinces
typically offering the lowest awards .3
9
The low levels of awards are seen to perpetuate the
problem by trivializing the matter. It is argued that awards
given so far in human rights cases are not a deterrent to the
offender and may leave the impression that rights violations
can be bought. "They certainly do not convince anyone that
discrimination is important ; on the contrary they demonstrate
its insignificance." 40 In pointing to the United States where
awards have been much more substantial by similiar
institutions, researchers have concluded that the level of
compensation and back pay can be the single most important
factor in changing employment practices .
41
Awards under the federal legislation seem impressive
(sometimes in the $25,000 to $85,000 range) but they typically
are only for loss of wages that have accrued to the time of
decision. Even then, there is the additional problem of collecting
what is owed to the victim, because some parts of the federal
Government do not perceive these financial settlements as legal
obligations under the Financial Administration Act,. As the 1987
Annual Report of the Candian Human Rights Commission notes, in
those cases approval of a Minister is required before the
departments would honour the
	
settlements .42 The second
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problem the federal Commission has encountered is that there
is no statutory method for enforcing settlements because
prosecution under paragragh 46 (1) (a) results in fine rather
than a civil re medy . 4
3
3 .Whv not Full Compensation?
The question remains " Why not give full tort or
contractual compensation?" Arguably,the answer is because it is
politically expedient not to do so. Less cynically, the answer
may also lie in the problem of evidentiary proof . Many of
these cases deal with circumstances that are difficult to
substantiate, and commissions give the complainant leeway
(allowing various hearsay evidences that a court might discard)
in order to establish a violation. In doing so, there must be
something in the respondent's favor to offset that flexibility and
lower compensation may be the counterweight . What this does,
however, is to mix factual finding of violation (or not) with the
issue of compensation. The lower compensation becomes unfair
to both parties, to the complainant who is receiving less than
full measure and to the respondent who is paying for a
"violation" that he did not commit .
The disadvantages of this situation for the complainant is
compounded by the fact, even when the violation has been
founded and damages have been proven, that in some
jurisdictions the Board is given power to give a remedy but is
under no compulsion to do so. At least in one case the Board has
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refused to do so and the court has refused to force the Board to
reverse that decision
. 44
F. Substantive limits from the Point of "Equal Benefit of the
Law" and of "Equ_al Protection of the Law" .
Some academics have tackled these substantive limits
from a standpoint of equal benefit of the law, opening up the
possibility of Charter challenge to the variability in the human
rights legislations. Rather than seeing the codes as bestowing
benefit on certain discrete forms of discrimination, it has been
suggested that alternatively " the benefit of human rights codes
can be characterized more broadly as the elimination of
discrimination per se . .." . The failure of a legislature to
address one of the Charter grounds of prohibited discrimination
might be viewed as denial of equal benefit of the law, "because
that benefit- elimination of discrimination per se - would be
denied in a unique way..." to this particular group . 45 It is a
position that has support at international law
. 46
We know that equality before the law will be infringed if
an individual has been treated more harshly than others by the
legislation on the basis of an irrelevant distinction made
between himself and those other persons 47 Place of residence
(that is, the particular province in which one lives) would seem
to be totally irrelvant to the remedy given in respect of human
rights legislation .
Conceivably, argument can also be made that the restricted
approach Canada's provinces and federal government have taken
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similarly offends Canada's international obligation to give
equal protection of the law . The differences amongst provinces
in their provision of remedies would seem to be a prima facie
violation equal protection of the law .
1 . R. v. Turpin and "Equal Protection of the Law "
The Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Turpin48 considered
the meaning of "equality before the law" under s. 15 (1) of the
Charter . In Turpin, the defendants objected to provisions of
the Criminal Code which mandated that in all provinces
except Alberta there must be trial by jury for murder cases . The
defendants perceived this requirement as a breach of equal
protection of the law, because they wanted trial by judge alone,
but could not get it in their province . 49
In Turpin the Supreme Court first explained that "the
guarantee of equality before the law was designed to advance
the value that all persons be subject to equal demands and
burdens of the law and not suffer any greater disability in
the substance and application of the law " .5 0 This was tied to
"rule of law" that the law be impartially applied and
administered
. 51
In Turpin,_ the S.C.C. found that the defendants had been
denied an opportunity available to others, and, thus, that their
right to equality before the law had been violated. However,
this was only the first part of a two-step test, and more was
needed to be shown, as the Charter permitted differential
treatment as long as it is "without discrimination" .
	
For an
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understanding of that term the Court relied on Andrews v. Law
Society of B .C.52 where the court offered a definition of
discrimination as
distinction . . . based on grounds relating to
personal characteristics of the individual or
group, which has the effect of imposing burdens,
obligations or disadvantages on such individual
or group not imposed upon others . or witholds or
limits access to opportunities, . benefits and
advantages available to other members of
society
. 5 3
In Turpin. the judge stated "[a] finding that there is
discrimination will, I think, in most but perhaps not all cases,
necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart
from and independent of the particular legal distinction being
challenged ." 5 4 In determining whether this has been the case
entails usually a search for a "discrete and insular minority"
. 55
To the Supreme Court the whole idea behind s . 15 is remedying
or preventing discrimination against groups suffering social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society . It involved a
search for indicia of discrimination such as stereotyping,
historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social
prejudice .
Putting aside for the moment the proposition that the
Supreme Court's position will require a body under examination
to already have a certain degree of politicalization - an ability
to organize and present itself as a "legitimate" group- that may
deny protection to the least politically organized ( but possibly
the most victimized by discrimination), application of Turpin to
the civil area needs be considered .5
6
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2 . Application of R . v. Turpin
It is apparent that a case involving human rights legislation
in respect of equality before the law and equal protection of the
law could come before the courts in at least two ways
(a) a defendant / respondent might complain that he was
subject of discrimination because the legislation punished him
but not the same violator next door . This approach to equality
before the law was accept in the context of the Canadian Bill of
Rights in Drybones .
b) a plaintiff! complainant might point out that a
similarly situated group (e.g . in a neighbouring province) was
protected by the legislation, but that the legislation of his own
province had not protected him by not offering him remedy,
consequently it disadvantaged him .
The respondent might be disadvantaged in that he is
subject to penalties or legal repercussions that others are not,
but he would have difficulty meeting the insular group criteria
of Turpin - or meeting the qualification that as a member of a
group he had faced stereotyping, historical disadvantage or
vulnerability to political and social prejudice.
In the scenario involving the complainant, the person is
subject to a legal disadvantage similar to Turpin . Depending on
the particulars, some complainants could probably meet the
second criterion as well, for example if the discrimination was
on the basis of sexual orientation or on economic condition .
Both of these illustrated groups have been subject to unproven
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and unjustifiable assumptions and stereotyping, to social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society.
Even with the complainant having seemingly met the
criteria of Turpin , the question then becomes whether there is
any opportunity of employing a Charter argument outside the
public law area. The Supreme Court in Dolphin Delivery v.
R.W.D.S .U . 57 basically stated that although the Charter did
apply to the common law within certain narrow confines, the
Charter did not concern itself with the bulk of the common law,
such as tort law. Thus it might seem that a tort based solely on
the Charter and without connection to either legislative
enactment or administrative regulation would fail .
Another approach suggests this need not not necessarily
be the case: Any legislation, including human rights acts, can
be challenged under the Charter . Where infringement of the
Charter not justifiable under s.l has been found, the Court,
under s. 24 (1), can offer whatever remedy it deems
appropriate and just" under the circumstances. Although the
Court has generally been unwilling to "read in" provisions into
legislations, we do know that " an appropriate and just remedy"
can include damages. Arguably, an adequate and justiable
remedy could also include the possibility of tort action where a
particular province's legislation failed to address a form of
discrimination recognized elsewhere in Canada. This point will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 . For the moment other
deficiencies of human rights legislations need to be considered .
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III . Procedural Shortcomings
The limitations here fall into several different areas
including, inter alia, diversity in the inquiry systems, extent of
judicial review or appeal, time limits for lodging the complaint
and who the complainant can be .
A. Physical Structure
The inter-provincial human rights inquiry system is so
divergent that it has been called a "crazy quilt" .58 British
Columbia has a two tier system where the complainant may have
an allegation tested before a designated member of the Council
of Human Rights. In Alberta, the human rights commission
controls whether a board of inquiry is constituted. In Quebec,
the Commission avoids the inquiry stage, simply by carrying the
cases before the court . 5 9
B. Board Jurisdiction
The diversity carries over to other areas as well. Nova
Scotia gives its human rights board jurisdiction over any
question of fact or law, while Saskatchewan simply mentions
questions of law. Under Ontario legislation, if the Commission
feels that the matter is better dealt with by another Act, 60 they
can decide not to deal with the complaint, but have no power
to cause that other body to deal with it, potentially leaving the
complainant without remedy .
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The issue of jurisdiction comes to the fore in other ways as
well. When Newfoundland changed its human rights legislation
in 1988 . Unlike other provinces, no reference was made to the
legislation having paramountcy over other provincial legislation .
Although the Newfoundland Code prohibits discrimination on the
basis of age, defining age as 19 to 65, the question arose
whether the Pension Act was discriminatory by requiring
retirement before age 65 . The Newfoundland Supreme Court
recently ruled that their Human Rights Code could not be
interpreted in such a way as to alter the provisions of the
Pension Act.
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C. Appeals and Judicial Review
Even with respect to appeal there is no uniformity
inter provincially . 62 A question of law founds an appeal in
Saskatchewan 63 while in Ontario appeal is capable of
encompassing any question of fact or law
-
( or both) . By way of
contrast, mixtures of law and fact are not appealable in
Alberta. 64 As well, in Alberta one can only appeal if one is a
party to the proceedings of the board of inquiry . Should the
complaint never get that far, the person is left totally without
redress. There may be judicial review, but the error must be
particularly egregious before the courts will step in. Moreover,
provision for judicial review would merely give the question
back to the board who may decide the matter the same way
once again .65 It must always be remembered that there are
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fundamental differences between
	
hearing a case at first
instance and hearing it on either appeal or judicial review .
D.Time Limits
Time limitations operate against complainants . According to
federal statistics ten per cent of complaints before the federal
commission are dismissed as out of time6 6 In Ontario the
complaint must be recorded within six months, but allowances
are made for good faith delay as long as it does not prejudice
"any person affected by the delay".67 For other provinces it is
generally six months, with no margin of error . Compared to the
usual two year and six year limitation period of tort law, this
seems exceptionally brief .
This brevity for bringing complaints may be tied to
problems of proof or, alternatively, to behaviour modification
through education and information . According to psychological
schema it is desirable to have "education" follow as closely to
the event as possible in order to effectively alter the behaviour .
Yet one is left wondering what other intentions and goals
might be operating . Firstly, if "education" is to be closely tied
to the violation, then long time delays in achieving settlement,
which are presently quite common, would seem to thwart that
goal. As well, some provinces set time constraints on the wage
compensation paid out to one year before the complainant,
reducing the possible costs to the respondent .68 Arguably, the
intention here may be the shielding of the respondent to the
detriment of the complainant.
E. Comvlaint-based System
The provincial legislation
subject to a variety of - problems in
well. Because the program is not
mechanism but a complaints -based
a dispute resolution system which
not the larger problem of systemic
acts typically state that "any
has
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been perceived as being
servicing human rights as
an active, transformational
one, many feel that this is
best serves individuals and
discrimination. Although the
person" who has reasonable
grounds to believe that there has been contravention of the Act
may make complaint and define "person"
as including groups
such as trade unions, or employers associations, the acts,
nonetheless, are primarily designed to deal with one -on- one
situations . This orientation works against what human rights
commissions generally agree is the most significant equality
problem, that of systemic discrimination which disadvantages
whole groups of people .69 In particular, "Whey cannot readily
identify or investigate systemic complaints in a sophisticated
manner or present them before tribunals and courts .' 7° At the
same time Commissions have not altered their own systems
significantly so that they can address systemic discrimination
effectively
. 71
An excellent example of this recently came to fore in
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm.) v. Saskatchewan (Dept. of
Social Services )72 where the human rights board in dealing with
the discrepancy between the amounts of social assistance
assessed damages for the the claimant . The decision potentially
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would have affected a significant number of other people on
social assistance in the province . However, the Board found it
had no jurisdiction to order respondent to repay others in
circumstances similar to original complainant, as the Board
only had jurisdiction to compensate complainants before the
Board . What the Board did, instead, was order respondents to
notify all other potential complainants that they might have
grounds for complaint . Not only is this a backward approach to
the problem, this response is uncomfortably close to the early
approaches in which victims carried a substantial part of the
responsibility for enforcement of the Act . 73
The question that remains of course, is : "Would any
forum fare better?" Courts, themselves, of course cannot
investigate systemic discrimination, but in a court action
sufficient interest and resources may be at risk to make all
parties present as much factual evidence as possible in order to
make or defend their case . Whether the courts could be more
transformational depends in part on the particular remedy
chosen - with injunctions potentially offering strong long term
respite .
As will be argued later,74 damages offers another
transformational role by making the cost of the present policy
economically more unattractive. This, of course, depends on
curial willingness to employ the particular remedy. It also
depends on the nature of the party- whether individual or class
action.
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F. Class Actions
Class actions are permitted in B.C .75 and in some other
provinces in respect of lodging complaints . The provision is
lopsided, though, in that actions against multiple respondents
(inverse class actions) are not allowed and boards may lack
jurisdiction to award damages to a class of persons?6
Consequently, in Saskatchewan the Board has recommended to
Minister of justice that the matter of class actions under the
Code be reviewed, particularly with respect to remedies
available . These constraints on class actions reinforce
perceptions that these are only one-to-one types of problems .
G. Costs
There is also the issue of costs . As costs are not specifically
provided for in the Acts, boards have declined to give costs77
In the eyes of respondents, the complainants are given an
unfair advantage . 78 While the Com mission carries the
complainants expenses in obtaining evidence, respondents bear
the costs themselves . Where this goes to a Tribunal or to
appeal, these costs can be substantial .
To " help to equalize the matter", British Columbia has
taken another tack . The legislation in that province makes the
complainant and the respondent only parties to the Inquiry,
with no provision for Commission to give assistance to the
complainant. While at first blush this seems to offer formal
equality" in that it treats people identically, it fails to recognize
that typically there is an unequal distribution of power and
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wealth between complainants and respondents . As a result, it
offends justice by treating unequals, "equally " .
In respect of its own legislation the federal Commission
has recommended to Parliament that Tribunals be given
discretion to award prescribed costs to either respondents or
to complainants where the Commission has not carried their
cases
. 79
H. The Internal Functioning:Rhetoric Versus Reality
Any of the procedural drawbacks enumerated above
would be sufficient to cause consternation to those concerned
with the effective protection of equality rights, but those can be
seen as secondary to many other deficiencies boards face .
Firstly, one thing becomes readily apparent in assessing the
effectiveness of the commissions - there is significant difference
between the rhetoric surrounding the legislation and the
reality . Although Canadian human rights legislation allows
commissions to initiate complaints and gives them a positive
duty to ensure compliance with the law, commissions in the
main have not used the power .$°
Also the "quick fix" , that we assume is an advantage of
the commissions, does not operate in fact . It is common for
complaints to take three to four years from filing to
resolution . 81 Concerns are expressed about cases heard in 1985
dealing with events in 1982 . Indeed, well-founded cases have
been dismissed because of the delays
. 82
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Critics stress that "Where is no compelling reason why
human rights proceedings should be so dilatory . For
complainants, a remedy so long delayed may be meaningless ; for
respondents, an interminably festering accusation is
intolerable". 83 Certainly, for the immediate parties it is
important that the distance between the event and the
disposition be as close as possible .84 Whether it may be less
important for societal objectives remains arguable . Nonetheless,
some jurisdictions are attempting to streamline their
procedures, but lack of resources can often impede this .8 5 It
would seem that the problem of speedy resolution is not unique
to the courts .
l . Limiting Effectiveness .
By far the most significant deficiency in respect of internal
functioning has to do with independence . International
instruments constantly stress that "everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights . . ." 86 and that for the alleged
violators there must also be protections: "everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing of a competent. independent
and imDartial tribunal established by law" (emphasis added) .87
Unfortunately, it is questionable whether Canada meets these
measures .
From the perspective of complainants, governments have
done numerous things that limit the actual effectiveness of
human rights law enforcement and the usefulness of human
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rights boards in remedying rights violations . Firstly, despite the
popular assertion that human rights are among our fundamental
values, the governments spend little money in this area .
88
Level
of expenditure is relevant as the resources of boards are highly
correlated to the board's effectiveness in providing remedies, if
only to the extent that the boards can investigate complaints .
2. Limiting Independence
Secondly, but very importantly, governments have
compromised the independence of the human rights
commissions. In contrast with with the Canadian Charter. the
statutes under which the boards are enacted are easily amended
or repealed. This leaves human rights protections vulnerable . A
prime demonstration of this occurred in the 1984 repeal of
the British Columbia Human Rights Code.89 Not only did the
Bennett government fire its entire human rights staff, replacing
it with a "council of human rights" who operated only on a part-
time basis, but the government also drastically altered the
range of those protected by the legislation . At the same time,
the changes removed both appeal procedures and penal
proceedings
. 90
Since that time, the Council has been criticized for having
an abysmal track record of discounting what others would
consider well-founded complaints, denying natural justice and
for refusing, on occasion, to hear relevant evidence . 91 The
British Columbia action has been seen by some as a "conscious
decision that a low priority be assigned to human rights, based
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on either some perceived political advantage
or because of a
philosophical belief that the right of business to be free from
government regulation outweighs
the interests served by
strong human rights legislation" . 92 Legislation that can be
altered so capriciously offends the concept of these rights being
fundamental or inherent .
Also, appointments to human right boards are frequently
politically based . It is a political fact that as governments
change, so does the composition of the commissions
. Not only
does this put human rights in the same category of all other
political machinations and patronage, but also critics suggest
that "when governments wipe away and recreate human rights
commissions and tribunals as part of a political patronage
system they indicate that human rights
are not stable,
fundamental values but partisan political programs ."
9
3
Moreover, commissioners are made to know that they are
not independent, but are expected to "behave'9 4 There have
been instances of government interference with human rights
administration directly by refusing to send complaints to
adjudication, stopping press statements, asking to have staff
members of a different political stripe removed, firing a whole
commission and staff and introducing a new "slimmer" human
rights act in the name of fiscal restraint
95
I mpartiality most
certainly can be called into question into such circumstances .
The result has been the development of boards who, while
probably sincerely caring about their mandate,
respond
conservatively, interpreting their jurisdictions narrowly so as to
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avoid the
	
expenditure of scarce financial resources in
litigation over jurisdictional matters .
3 . Other Concerns:Tenure and Accountabili~
There are other significant causes for concern - those being
the commissioners' lack of tenure and their accountabilty . "Only
Quebec and federal commissioners enjoy the security of knowing
that nothing short of an act of legislature will remove them from
office." 96 Saskatchewan is considered the next most secure with
a fixed term of five years . Yet legislative amendment
can
always usurp that security . All other jurisdictions provide
either no set term or a maximium term of office
. In either
case, commissioners continue in office at the pleasure of the
Cabinet and, again, tend to be removed from office when a new
administration is elected .97 Certainly, it can be suggested that
the ability to effect change is related to the term of office . In
comparison, judges are in a more comfortable position, knowing
that even if they make unpopular, but still "fundamentally
right" decisions, they will not be ejected . Even if the legislature
disagrees with the court it can always step in and re-open the
deb ate .
At the same time, this high turnover of human rights
commissioners after an election is viewed as further removing
accountability and continuity from the process . 98 " As far as the
important question of accountability only the Quebec
Commission has a direct relationship with the elected assembly .
All other commissions report to a minister ." 99 Overall, there is a
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strong feeling that where appointments are politically motivated
the system cannot be operating with impartiality for either
party to a complaint. For the sake of justice, impartiality is
always of concern, but where the government is selecting who is
going to to be judging its action, partiality becomes a matter of
even greater import .
The political connection also has significant repercussions
in terms of "fettering of discretion" . One of the elementary
principles of administrative law stresses that any "authority
exercising discretion must exercise itself and not under the
dictation of any other body. Discretion calls for an exercise of
independent judgment . 100 A basic prohibition in administrative
law underscores that "discretion" should not be exercised in
such a way that it becomes "dictation". 10 1 If governments
appoint and dismiss commission members t pleasure, any
discretion in decision-making may fall by the wayside, and
dictation may become the rule .
It is these kinds of concerns that have led academics t
warn that the failure to provide satisfactory remedies
for the
violation of rights may " effectively nullify the rights . Or worse :
transforming them to empty propaganda, precisely recited but
hypocritically ignored in practice
." 102
I . Problems from the Perspective of Respondents
When we consider what protections to offer respondents, it
is important to remember that it is exceptionally easy to react
as if the respondent is guilty of the allegation solely by virtue
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of an allegation having been made
. One must be careful that in
the quest for right's protections of victims the fundamental
social goal of justice does not get lost in the fray .
Several concerns have been expressed from the
perspective of the respondents . Previously mentioned, the
respondents often find the time it takes to have complaints
resolved leaves a sword of Damocles over their heads .
10
3 Also,
some critics suggest that there is a presumption of guilt in the
investigations or at least a sympathy for complainants and
that respondents may be "forced" into "friendly settlements
"
by investigators using threats or the prospect of
the
respondent facing boards of inquiry, even where there actually
has not been a technical violation .
104
Some feel that the boards have made orders of questionable
legality - such as coerced apologies, deleting sentences from a
letter, forcing consent. so that the commission might monitor
future hiring practices, compulsory initiation of affirmative
action programs, confiscation and destruction of
private
property.
105
Also, despite the educative and "friendly
settlement"
philosophy deemed to be underlying the various acts, it is
nevertheless important at the same time to realize that
respondents will typically consider contact with the Commission
as adversarial, even in the commission's early role
of
investigating a complaint .
106
Once matters get to the board of
inquiry stage, the board definitely appears to be functioning
in a similar manner to a court. 1 Q7 The respondent sees many of
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the principles of the court being used against him, but without
the safeguards that the court can offer .
108
Critics find other provisions disconcerting as well. One is
the harassment section of the Ontario legislation, which states
that the board shall remain seized of a matter, and upon proof
of repetition of harassment, the commission can order any
further steps to prevent a further occurrence . Consequently, the
matter is not subject to the six months limitation period imposed
on filing complaints. Detractors see this as forcing the person to
"forever live with the prospect that the original tribunal which
tried and found him guilty will be 'reconvened' and additional
sanctions or steps ' meted out
." 109
Pointing out the similarities between courts and tribunals
in that both can subpoena and compel witnesses to give
evidence,
110
critics have suggested that these provisions might
be subject to Charter challenges under s . 11(d) right to be
presumed innocent and (h) res judicata
.111
Consequently, they
would like to have respondents have full protection of the
Charter s. 11 in respect to these accusations . That particular
conclusion is questionable because these violations are not
typically interpreted as "offences" in order to come under the
umbrella of s. 11 of the Charter in the first place .
112
Some writers worry about whether investigative sections
of the Code would be able to stand up to the Charter 's
requirements in Hunter v. Southam .
11 3
It has also been
questioned whether the "reverse onus"
	
requirement of the
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"reasonable and bona fide requirement" for the denial of a
position would be constitutionally valid .
114
Concerns as well have been expressed regarding the penal
provisions . For the most part the commission rely on a civil
standard of preponderance of evidence to ascertain if there
has been aa violation.
11
5 There is worry, however, about that
where the action is also subject to prosecution and whether the
standard should be raised to beyond a reasonable doubt. It has
been argued that it could be possible that a comission could
find on the balance of probabilities that an offence had been
committed, yet a criminal court might not be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some have suggested this lack of uniformity
could bring discredit to the human rights administration .
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It
may be for this reason that the Federal Act does not carry penal
provisions for the act of discrimination itself.1 17 Instead, the
federal and some other provincial human rights acts carry
penal provisions for something quite different - the interference
with administration and enforcement of the human rights
legislation
. 118
IV. Philoso hical Shortcomin s
As becomes readily apparent, the Commissions sometimes
encounter conflicts of objectives : "inducing t to seek
simultaneously the publicity on one hand and on the other hand
the confidentiality from which conciliated settlements
spring ." 119 England has encountered similar problems, and it
has been stated that one of the gravest defects of England's
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commission has been seen that one agency is responsible for
both promotional and enforcement roles.
120
One issue that should be raised is the emphasis on
voluntariness, on educating , on getting people to respond
rationally and on achieving friendly settlements. At the time
these legislations were originally drafted, there was a belief
that, given proper information, the respondent could not help
but automatically change both his behavior and his attitudes :
Modern day human rights legislation is
predicated on the theory that the actions of
prejudiced people and their attitudes can be
changed and influenced by the
	
process of re-
education , discussion, and the presentation
of dispassionate socio-scientific
materials that are used to challenge popular
myths and stereotypes about people . . .Human
Rights legislation on this continent is the
skillful blending of educational and legal
techniques in the pursuit of social
justice . 121
With the advent of the human rights legislation, sociology was
in its halycon days, it being felt then that attitudinal
prejudices were the only forces at work and that education
could easily remedy the problem . After twenty- five years
one wonders if that approach may be, not necessarily
misconceived or naive, but simply insufficient .
Voluntary implementation of programs, for example, does
not seem to have worked as effectively as might have been
hoped. The Canadian Human Rights Commission has noted that,
while it has tried encouraging voluntary action in employment
equity, the results have been particularly disappointing . Out of
900 employers, only 34 had equity plans, in part, because some
companies saw employment equity as "yet another" new vehicle
for governmental intervention into management's domain .
Similarly, employers are not availing, themselves of the
opportunity of affirmative action.
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As far as business is
concerned, there is no economic advantage to engaging in these
particular courses and no economic disadvantage to not
participating in them. Indeed the most right wing detractors of
the legislation are quite willing to illustrate the economic
disadvantage they suffer by adhering to the legislation .
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One must remember business and institutional responses
may have little to do with lack of information or intention. to
discriminate. Businesses' reasons for following particular
course of action have more to do with "the financial bottom
line". Reasons vary, but often it is not personal bigotry that is
responsible. Instead, on occasion, it is the impression that
customers wouldn't like natives or Pakistanis serving them and
will go elsewhere .
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Social conformity becomes the response .
125
In other situations it is simply following a policy or procedure
that has "always" been in place. Business-wise, it is expedient
to maintain the policy , as change costs money.
While business certainly relies on information, more
often than not, the information comes from economic studies
not sociological ones, and arguably, if one is sincerely
concerned with protecting human rights, it is imperative to
respond to business in a way that is going to affect the balance
sheet. Recently, even the Canadian Human Rights Commission
has suggested that it is more important to "focus more on the
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forces of discrimination and less the dynamics of attitudinal
prejudices." As they have put it, it is no good to simply tell a
corporation to change its ways and become a good corporate
citizen .
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It is submitted here that there are at least two forces to
which companies will respond- firstly increased liability (with
attendant damages, costs and interest payable ) through a civil
suit and secondly the accompanying negative publicity. Even
where actions do not make it to court, there is a block of time
during which the complainant can use the media and its
predisposition to generate negative publicity against the
respondent so as to strengthen her position prior to or during
negotiations . In this way the public receives its information and
the respondent faces the dual costs of adverse publicity and
financial sanctions .
V. Conclusion
This chapter has considered the limitations of the present
human rights legislations and considers these as a significant
problem to the goals of rights protection . An alternative must
meet many of these weaknesses. The next chapter offers one
possibility- tort law .
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CHAPTER 5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORTS
IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PART I
I . Introduction: Tort Law's
	
Consideration of Human Rights
Interests
Tort law, historically, has been considered as a mechanism
for handling specific proprietary and personal interests. Yet
some of torts' earliest forms alternatively may be characterized
as dealing with human rights and basic civil liberties. It is
possible to draw parallels between the various articles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which may be considered
as quintessentially representing agreement among nations
about basic human entitlements, and various categories of torts .
For example, the torts of assault and battery offer redress
for security of the person,' thus paralleling Article 3 (life,
liberty, and security of the person) and Article 5 (cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment) of the
Declaration. Trespass, from which torts dealing with invasion of
privacy spring, covers ground similar to the privacy provisions
of Article 12 of the Universal Declaration . The tort of defamation
similarly coincides with other aspects of Article 12 (those of
honour and reputation of the person) . False imprisonment fits
under either Article 3 or Article 9 (arbitrary arrest, detention
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or exile). Even old family law torts fall under the same kinds
of interests protected as Article 12 of the Universal Declaration
(arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or
correspondence) and Article 16 (protection
of the family as a
unit).
Admittedly, the term "human rights " was never explicitly
attached to these actions. That phrase, here identified, is very
peculiar to the twentieth century . Nevertheless, the styles of
action at least demonstrate that tort law principle has been
capable of protecting human rights interests .
Other indicators of tort law's consideration of and
protection of human rights exist. As early as the 1890s , it was
recognized that two or more people acting together, on racial
grounds, to prevent another from obtaining residential accom-
modation might constitute civil conspiracy? More recently, the
appeal court judgment in Bhadauria v. Seneca College
set out
the progression of a very gradual movement of tort law against
discrimination. Even communal rights to matters such as a safe
environment have been tackled through torts, by way of the
law of nuisance .3
Nevertheless, one must be careful
not to overstate the
case. Many torts have also been viewed as having a proprietary
base, as opposed to a human
rights foundation . Also,
unfortunately, many of the categories of tort are narrow in
scope,
4
each having peculiar rules and defences seemingly
anathematic to human rights protection.5
	
Finally, what is
generally considered to be one of the most
fundamental of
rights, that of life, has not been protected by the common law .6
However, of even more interest to those working in the
area of protection of human rights is the current trend in
Canadian courts, one of expansionism and plaintiff orientation in
the area of tort law : "The 1980s can be viewed as a decade when
Canadian courts treated the law of torts as an increasingly
useful mechanism for providing compensation and in doing so
further developed it as a vehicle for the fair and just
distribution of societal resources ."
7
This trend can be seen as
a willingness in some judicial quarters to open opportunity
and move toward a more equitable treatment of people . It has
been noted that
[iln its recent dramatic expansion , tort has
interestingly overlapped and integrated with
other branches of law such as ...human rights
law . .. in ways which supplement and
enrich those areas. The enrichment , comes
because tort law has at its base the idea of
communal responsibility- imposed obligations
on every person and institution to respect
the foreseeable interests of others . ..8
This chapter sets out that trend- how tort law principles
have expanded in ways compatible with the protection of human
rights. At the same time the chapter points to the advantages
that tort actions offer .
II . The Advantages of Tort Action
The favorable aspects offered by tort law
to human
rights plaintiffs take procedural and substantive directions, as
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well as political ones. However, as tort law can move into areas
untouched by the legislation, it is in terms of the substantive
law that the advantages to the complainant will be the
greatest . The flexibility of tort law and its present overall trend
to expansion of liability offer protection in ways that might
not otherwise be politically available .
Once again, to understand why human rights legislation is
typically weak and how tort law can augment the position of
the aggrieved party, it is important to remember what is
involved or is at stake in changing the law in this area - that
is, the effective use of political power. It has been noted that
in respect of legislated human rights protection, often " . ..the
beneficiaries of the legislation are poor, unskilled at legislative
maneuvering from simple inexperience and badly distributed to
make the most of their political potential ."9 Firstly, a minority
group may be hard-pressed to believe in the political process at
all. Secondly, being segregated or isolated itself limits
representation of the group's interests . For example, even a
high concentration of a Chinese population or a homosexual
population in specific districts of a city will
generate, at
best, only a few seats in legislature. Consequently, their impact
as a group may be negligible on the overall direction of the
law.
By way of contrast, tort law relies less on the status quo of
political power. It, instead, requires a good legal issue and a
good solid case where a judge can feel that she or he is meting
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out "justice", in the basic sense of the word, regardless of who
the majority or the minority is .
A. Procedural Advantages
While the procedural weaknesses of human rights legis-
lation has already been discussed at length, a few strengths of
tort law deserve mention here
Tort law offers the procedural advantages of operating
under considerably wider time limitations in which to bring
the action. 10 Also, unlike the remedial provisions of the human
rights codes, in a tort case it is the individual who controls the
action, not another body like a Commission or a Minister . This
becomes important in situations where the Commission's and
the complainant's positions diverge after the
preliminary
investigatory stage . As the Commission cannot be compelled to
recommend appointment of a Board of Inquiry, and the Minister
cannot be compelled to do so either, the complainant may be left
unrequited.
In such cases where positions do differ, it has been
suggested that the plaintiff could at that point carry the action
at his own expense, 11 it being felt that this ability to make
decisions for oneself about what is best for oneself (and to live
with the consequences) is intimately tied to the concept of
personal autonomy. One must be careful not to overstate this
proposition because other priorities enter into the equation .
12
Still, other procedural advantages come to mind . Any
lawyer will readily acknowledge, that payment of interest is
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extremely very important to a case, as it can sometimes
exceed the amount of the damages . Although payment of
interest on damages has been allowed in one Ontario human
rights complaint, in most other jurisdictions it is not given . 1
3
Additionally, courts have a wider power of examination for
matters such as confidential records than do commissions . This
is particularly important as it is a restriction that makes it
more difficult for commissions to carry out their mandate
effectively in the first place .
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Costs, of course, are routinely given in court actions . By
way of contrast, however, the Ontario Human Rights Board has
declined to give it, citing that an award of costs to the
successful party was not expressly provided by the Code .
Moreover, the board saw its role as solely giving compensation,
as opposed to establishing costs .l5 This is an unduly restrictive
interpretation of its role . Such an argument might hold if costs
were punishment to the respondent; however, they are not .
Assuming that the respondent's actions caused the 'complainant
to bring the claim in the first place, then the complainant
would not have incurred the cost if she had not been wronged .
Part of compensation for
but so far those working
recognizehave failed to
jurisdiction
. 17
Class actions as set out by tort law
to the human rights area . Canadian
the victim may very well be costs,
16
under the human rights legislation
that as legitimate part of their
similarly offer promise
judges have begun to
recognize that class actions can carry significant advantages by
reducing the multiplicity of actions in a way that is economical
for both court and the parties . A the cost of litigation can be
spread among many, class actions permit the litigation of
monetary claims too small to support an action by an
individual and assure recovery on claims that would not
otherwise be enforced . Not only is access to justice improved,
but the class proceedings may serve a deterrent function by
preventing unjust enrichment or imposing an appropriate
measure of costs upon the defendant .
18
In Canada, class actions are allowed to proceed where,
without evidence from individual class members, the
defendant's liability can be established in common proceedings .
"Common proof of this kind may be possible in cases where the
class is attempting to recover a benefit that the defendant has
received from the defendant's records or from the records of
some other body. Once the total amount of the defendant's
liability has been determined through an 'aggregate assessment'
of this kind, it may be possible to distribute the resulting fund
to class members in relatively informal procedures to which the
defendant need not be a party" . 1 9 It is a response that achieves
a compromise between a traditional reluctance to engage in
'judicial creativity' in a controversial area and the desire to
provide a forum for claims that would otherwise be
unenforceable . 20 Human rights situations involving equal pay
for work of equal value would lend themselves particularly
well to this type of class action .
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, class actions often are not
permitted by human rights commissions or, where permitted,
it is a one- sided event in which claimants can combine, but
defendant cannot be joined. 21 Certainly, damages in class actions
have not been allowed by the boards 22
B . Advantages through Damages
Each of these procedural strengths - time limits, costs,
interest and class actions, are only small advantages compared
to that which can be offered by aggravated and exemplary
damages , both of which serve a different function in torts .
1 . Aggravated Damages
The head of "aggravated damages" is compensatory, in
that it indemnifies the plaintiff for the intangible injuries such
as distress or humiliation caused by the defendant's high-
handed, malicious actions, or his otherwise insulting behaviour .
Typically, the consequences to the plaintiff are the principal
consideration, rather than the defendant's intention to harm 23
"The aim of aggravated damages is to soothe a plaintiff whose
feelings have been wounded by the quality of the defendant's
misbehaviour .
24
A stereotypic example would be the Chinese applicant who,
rather than being told that the job has been filled or that the
employer was not presently hiring, was informed "We don't hire
Chinks here." In such a case, the conduct - of the defendant is
taken into account in so far as it affects the suffering of the
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plaintiff, whether that be by insult, injury to reputation or
mental pain .2
5
Another example of where this might be relevant in
human rights considerations would b
	
blatantly racist act
standing in his own
community. A recent example was the Sikh who unsuccessfully
held off an attack on his person by a group of men . 26 In addition
to physical harm suffered, he sustained a loss of respect within
his own community because, in the Sikh view, he " allowed"
himself to be attacked, by failing to adequately defend .
Aggravated damages would be appropriate here to compensate
for that additional suffering .
2. Exemplary Damages
By way of contrast, "exemplary damages" deal more with
punishment and with deterrence. While typically we leave that
role to criminal law, it is always a judge's duty in whatever
manner is appropriate to uphold respect of the law
In this country we live by the rule of
law. .. Not only must the law sanction the
deliberate and callous disregard by the
powerful of the weaker person's rights, the
law must do what it can to ensure, by whatever
means are at its disposal . .. that the legal
rights of a citizen are protected
from the tyranny of another . . .- in proper
cases damages should act as a deterrent to
deter the powerful from subjugating the weaker
to their business interests .27
Consequently, it has been noted: "exemplary damages
that in result affects the person's
properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach
wrongdoer that tort does not pay." 28
can
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Unlike aggravated damages, actual loss by the person need
not be shown for an award of exemplary damages . How-ever, a
strong connection between the the plaintiff and defendant must
exist in order to avoid a "windfall " to the plaintiff .
At the same time, to merit exemplary damages the
defendant's actions must be more than merely inconsiderate of
the plaintiff's rights. The actions must be such that they are
reprehensible in nature, offending community standards and
sensibilities. For that reason judgments involving aggravated
damages will typically use such adjectives as "wanton", "in
contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs rights", "arbitrary" ,
"opppressive", "callous", "disgraceful", or, "grossly fraudulent"
to describe the defendant's conduct
29
This form of damages,
thus,represents judicial and societal disapprobation of the de-
fendant's conduct .
For the most part, while the kinds of adjectives given
describe an intention to harm, it has also been suggested that
lack of sinister intent will not preclude exemplary damages, but
rather simply reduces the amount awarded.30 In aggravated
damages, the means of the party is always material to the
assessment of the damages, in the main, because of an assump-
tion that the purpose of the award is punishment, and that a
lesson will be learned only by responding to the means of the
party.
Because of the seemingly penal basis, some writers have
considered exemplary damages as operating as a civil fine 31
This may not be an accurate characterization. Unlike a criminal
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law fine, the stigma attached to the payment is less here and,
unlike a criminal law fine, this recompense goes to the plaintiff,
not to the State . The award, in part, counteracts some of the
usual disincentives to bringing action . In this way community
interests in upholding the law, as well as the individual's own
personal interests, are protected .32
Nonetheless, over the years some courts have expressed
concern that exemplary damages, unchecked, might be used to
intrude into the realm of criminal law . In this view fines would
not only punish, but operate in a manner without criminal law
safeguards . Consequently, in England, the House of Lords in
Rookes v. Barnard33 limited its use to two situations - firstly ,
where government has abused its power and secondly, where
"the defendant's conduct has been calculated to make a profit
for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable
to the plaintiff" .34 With respect to the latter situation, Lord
Devlin commented "where a defendant, with a cynical disregard
for a plaintiff's rights, has calculated that the money to be made
out of wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk, it is
necessary for the law to show that it cannot be broken with
impunity." 35
However, this narrow scope for exemplary damages has
subsequently been broadened . As orginally noted in Rookes
and later elaborated upon in Broome v. Cassell.3
6
the courts
have recognized that calculating a profit can take a variety of
forms:
It is not necessary that the defendant
calculates that the plaintiff's damages if he
sues . . . will be smaller than the
defendant 's profit. This is simply one
example of the principle . The defendant may
calculate that the plaintiff will
not sue for it at all because he has not the
money, or because he may be physically or
otherwise intimidated. What is necessary is
that the tortious act must be done with
guilty knowledge for the motive that the
chances of economic advantages outweigh the
chances of economic or perhaps, physical
penalty . 37
One can think of instances where this might occur, such as an
employer in a small community paying women less than the
minimum wage, knowing full well that, with few employers in
the area, the women are not likely to complain to any official
body, and are even less likely to sue38
By limiting exemplary damages to the two categories of
governmental abuse and unjust enrichment, the House of Lords
explained it was not their role to punish use of power per se,
particularly if that was private power :
Where one man is morepowerful than another,
it is inevitable that he will try to use his power
to gain his ends; and if his power is much
greater than he might perhaps be said to
be using it oppressively. If he uses his power
illegally, he must of course, pay for his
illegality in the ordinary way; but he is not
to be punished simply because he is the more
powerful. 39
Arguably, there are many other instances than this where
use of power might become abuse of power, either by exercising
it for a purpose for which one is not entitled or exercising it
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for purposes entitled, but in manner not intended
. The com-
munity regularly makes decisions in a variety
of legal
relationships about unacceptable uses of private power that
fall well short of "criminal illegality" 40 In each, what is
acceptable to the community at large, or conversely what
offends our sense of "justice", enters into play .
Perhaps for this reason, other commonwealth jurisdictions
have expressed less reluctance in awarding punitive damages
in tort cases.41 Some have realized that "conduct worthy of
punishment may often not fall within the scope of the criminal
law, or may not be thought to justify prosecution, or if
prosecuted, may be insufficiently punished."42 Canadian courts ,
for certain, have found tortious liability and, with it, exemp-
lary damages, in circumstances far short of criminality . Once
again, other jurisdictions stress Lord Devlin's assertion in Rookes
v. Barnard that "exemplary damages can be properly awarded
whenever it is necessary to teach the wrongdoer that tort does
not pay."4
3
Exemplary damages in Canada have been awarded for
most forms of legal wrongs, with the possible exceptions of
negligence, deceit, and breach of contract . 44 Yet, even in respect
of contract, it has been allowed for interference with contract. 4
5
Typically, it has been used in areas where criminal law
offers no effective alternative- such as in defamation actions .
Arguably, human rights matters are of similar character, in
that with the possible exceptions of incidental prohibitions on
assaults and racism, criminal law does not focus on human
1 5 5
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rights infringements. Others have stressed that exemplary
damages should be awarded only if they will in fact achieve
some rational purpose, the typical purposes again cited being
deterrence, punishment and unjust enrichment .46 Unfortunately,
there is a "Catch 22" situation here: until exemplary damages are
forthcoming in a new area, one cannot prove deterrence .
3 . Damage Awards
The amounts awarded as exemplary damages differ with
the facts in various cases, but what is frequently stressed is
that the award must be more than an insignificant license' fee-
the judgment must be proportionate to the situation. In cases
where the defendant has realized a profit, the award will, at
least, constitute an amount equivalent to that profit . The courts
place emphasis on the need for amounts of sufficient
magnitude to change the calculus of future actors faced with a
similar choice . 47 Once again, the level of award is tailored to the
means of the offending party. At the same time, the nature of
the award may preclude insurance coverage for it . Adjusted for
inflation, the sums are often in the thousands and tens of
thousands dollar range, thus sitting far beyond any damage
award typically offered by any human right commission .
4 . Exemplary Damages in the Human Rights Context
Courts have not often had the opportunity to consider
exemplary damages within a human rights context . One ex-
ception is Constantine v. Imperial Hotels 48 in which a black in
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the 1940s was refused accommodation at a hotel. The court
gave only nominal damages as the plaintiff was able to find
accommodation elsewhere. This view was soundly criticized and
it has been suggested that the claim, in effect, was for punitive
damages, it being felt that the gravamen of the offence was
that the defendant's conduct towards the plaintiff was insulting
and was based on the fact the plaintiff was black .49 Although
the plaintiff did not succeed in getting exemplary damages in
Constantine v. Imperial Hotel, this case should not dissuade one
from the considering the impact of exemplary damages today.
Tort law, in general, and exemplary damages, in particular,
reflects what the community considers as reasonable or
unreasonable behaviour, a standard that has been gradually
changing over time5 0
C. Substantive Advantages of Torts
Tort law's greater capacity to affect human rights
protection lies not so much in its attachment to procedural
advantages as in its flexibility and ability for expansion . Tort
law maintains its vitality by allowing old actions no longer
suited to present societal realities and philosophies to wither
and, conversely through the extrapolation of first principles to
respond to new circumstances.5 1 It is impressed upon those
who study and practice law that the categories of torts are
never closed. Instead, tort law's role is to respond as justice
demands . This next section sets out that expansion .
I . Donaghuev.Stevenson
Of course, one of the strongest examples of this capability
for flexibility and expansion was the 1932 landmark case of
Donaghue v. Stevenson .5 2 Prior to Donaghue. liability based on
negligence was perceived as only being asserted in connection
with particular relationships- innkeepers and their guests,
landlords and their tenants, salespeople and their customers .
Legally, other categories had remained untouched . In Donaghue
a consumer of a defective product suffered the damage . There
was no legal relationship between the consumer and the
shopkeeper, nor between consumer and the manufacturer .
Lord Atkin in Donaghue stated, while the law was not
capable of protecting every instance of moral wrong-doing, it
could nevertheless look to an overarching principle to explain
where the law and the judiciary should step in. During his
analysis, Lord Atkin set out what has come to be known as the
"neighbour principle":
The rule that you are to love your
neighbour becomes in law, you must not
injure your neighbour . . .
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour .
Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer
seems to be persons who are so closely and
directly
	
affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as
being so affected when I am directing my
mind to the acts or omission that are called
into question . . . 53
The caselaw that existed to that point was seen as offering
specific instances of that same principle . The case effected a
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quantum leap in increased responsibility to groups that might
heretofore not have been tortiously liable as a legally cog-
nizable category but, at the same time, it limited the range of
the complaints and the extent of their remedy .
Donaghue also may have represented a change in tort
liability because community standards were changing in respect
of what the community was willing to accept as reasonable
and fair conduct. To a large extent, "the neighbour principle"
became an obligation to obey certain
	
basic standards of
behaviour in
society.-54
Both the common law "neighbour
principle" and basic international human rights standards such
as Article 29 of the Universal Declaration which specifically
speaks of "duties to the community" act as limits on behaviors
and choices, whether those are individual or mercantile ones 55
2. The Effect of Donaghue
For the purposes of discussion here, Donaghue is important
for two reasons . Firstly, the case moved away from seeing tort
law as a number of specific rules prohibiting certain kinds of
harmful activity. The old-style of reasoning would have left
anything not specifically listed as a legally cognizable rela-
tionship as being outside the sphere of legal responsibility
.5 6
Secondly, Donaghue also demonstrated that the judiciary could
effectively change what seemed to be the direction of the law to
that time by reference to an overarching principle- tort
principle which has a human rights corollary .
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Donaghue is also a good example of the fact that, in
developing the law, the courts, in the main, work from that
which already exists. "It is clear that every judge, however
powerfully influenced by considerations of policy, is bound to
consider the effect of his rulings on the logical symmetry of the
existing law." 57
This symmetry has both conservative and expansive
components. In its conservative form it may try to keep the law
much in its present state, considering any large shift by a
single case as upsetting that balance . The need for symmetry
requires organization of matters in such a way as to avoid
anomalies. At the same time that internal order establishes
principles which can be extrapolated t fact situations
heretofore unconsidered . What might otherwise be considered
as anomalies are examined for similarity of first principle that
gives answers to new questions.
3 . The Right to be Free from. All Harm :
Admittedly, Donaghue did not venture so far as to see the
law of torts as consisting of a fundamental principle that it is
wrongful to cause harm to others in the absence of some
specific justification or excuse.-5
8
That is, however, an approach
the American courts have been willing to consider for several
decades. Known in the United States as the "prima facie tort",
the basic principle is seen to be that where there is the
intentional infliction of damage, it will be actionable unless
justified
. 59
In American jurisprudence, the idea of the prima facie
tort is that anyone who intends to cause harm is prima facie
liable for it . " Intent" , as used in this sense, means that there
exists a substantial certainty that harm would result.
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Principally concerned with economic interests such as the
interference with contract, (and this would cover situations
such as application for jobs) the American effort has been
applauded in some quarters as having " the potential for
providing a broad tort principle that could accommodate a
variety of situations that legitimately call for legal support
and yet do not fit into any of recognized economic torts .
-61
Only one commonwealth case has tried something
analogous to the prima facie tort. In Australian case of
Beaudesert v. Smith, the court maintained
r
independent of tresspass, negligence or
nuisance, but by an action for damages upon
the case, a person who suffers harm or loss as
the inevitable
	
consequence of the unlawful .
intentional and positive acts of another is
entitled to recover damages from that other .
emphasis added) 62
This was seen as an ostensibly broad statement of liability,
causing considerable consternation among both academics and
the courts of the commonwealth, in that it was seen to
countenance liability to an indeterminate class of persons only
incidentally affected by the unlawful action . This resulted from
the fact that the terms "unlawful", "intentional" and "positive
acts" were seen as open to a variety of inter pretations .6 3 Some
1 6 1
1 6 2
felt this vagueness would throw the reasonably well-
established boundaries of many torts into confusion, the con-
sequence of which would be that the whole structure of torts
might collapse.
64
To date, Canadian courts have not gone so far as to suggest
that there might be a general principle of a peoples' right to
be free from all harm . 6 5 Instead, the Canadian view has been
that the person must show why existing principles of liability
should be extended to cover her situation (that is, she must
identify the nature of the right she invokes) and the person
must justify the right's protection.
66
Arguably, the justification for protection of human rights
by the courts would not be a difficult hurdle, particularly in the
area of discrimination . Arguments based on peace and security
of the community and situated in principles of democracy
create that justification . These recognize that to effectively
exercise democratic rights the preconditions of non-discrim-
ination must exist. These also recognize the potential for harm
to the community where protection is not offered .
The requirement of showing why existing principles of
liability may properly be extended to cover a plaintiff's
situation typically would be met by, either showing that the
right to be acknowledged is similar to the main stream of tort
law or by demonstrating that the demands of justice and
equity require a new cause of action. This may be accomplished
by stressing that one of the most basic requisites of justice
demands that the person has a right to an effective remedy . By
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showing that no substantively effective statutory remedy
existed, justice requires the common law fill that lacuna .
4. Beyond Physical Harm: The Expansion to include Emotional
and Psychological Damage
While torts typically . handled personal and property
damage, the courts also have come to recognize that other types
of damage can result. In 1897 the court in Wilkinson v.
Downton 67 accepted emotional harm as an actionable injury .
The ratio decidendi set out "that if a person wilfully does an
act 'calculated' to cause harm to another and thereby infringes
his legal right to personal safety, and in consequence causes
physical harm, including mental distress, a cause of action
arises in the absence of lawful justification."(emphasis added) 68
At the - time, in part because the courts feared that mental
injury or shock was easy to over-estimate or fake, the case
was seen as limited to its own peculiar facts (in effect tying the
mental damage to a physical consequence of illness). It was,
however, an early step towards respecting the psychological
security of the person. Since then, by reference to modern
cases dealing with remoteness of damage
69
it may now be
possible to argue that as long as mental suffering is the kind of
injury that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, it
therefore will be an actionable kind of damage?°
In comparison, the American response to damages for
mental distress has been broader than our own to date. The
Americans have given recovery for mental distress, in an action
separate from wrongful dismissal, where a white in the process
of firing a black called him a goddam nigger"7 1 In another
instance the plaintiff recovered damages when called "a fucking
spic "," a fucking Mexican greaser" and " nothing but a pile of
shit" by the county Commissioner
. 72
These types of actions seem
to speak to an objective mental injury, that is to say that a
reasonable person would assume a psychological damage would
be flowing from the action of the defendant . While the dignity
of the person is protected by these American cases, it is in a
restricted sense of having caused mental distress . To that
extent it still remains short of viewing the actions as
abrogations of one's inherent dignity. Our Canadian approach
has been to award aggravated damages, which of course, have
an emotional or psychological aspect . These damages to date,
however, flow only out of some other cause of action, for
example, battery.
D. Expansion in Other Areas : Motherwell v. Motherwell 73
Our Courts and law in general, have an
obligation to protect those who for whatever
reason cannot
	
themselves [because in] a
very real sense the law belongs to the
people . .. 74
Negligence is not the only area of tort law to demonstrate
expansion and adaptation to new problems or circumstances . In
Alberta there was no legislatively mandated law of privacy and
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in Motherwell the court had to consider whether common law
principles could be seen as including this right .
In Motherwell the defendant, suffering a paranoid
condition, harrassed the plaintiffs by repeatedly calling them
as often as 60 times in a day. The plaintiffs brought action for
invasion of privacy and nuisance, asking for
an injunction and
nominal damages.
In finding for the plaintiff, the court refused to be tied to
the traditional categories of nuisance. The court explained that
it was not only negligence that could offer redress for
the
interests of justice . Instead, it was stated that the courts have
consistently demonstrated that common law principles can be
adopted to serve
the changing and expanding needs of society:
"Courts do have the power, and must exercise the power, of
adapting the common law to the facts of the day ."75
In Motherwell, Appeal Judge Clement pointed out that
"categories may be expanded
by reference to "principles" { " a
general concept of legal rights and duties in an aspect of human
activities in which some common element is to be found")
76
By
"categories", Clement meant "the application
of a principle to a
particular circumstance, discernible in precedents, which have
been found to come within the principle" :
When the circumstances of a case do not
appear to bring it fairly within the concept
of a principle that consideration of a new
category is warranted . The scope of a
category may in time be broadened by a trend
in precedents which reflect judicial
considerations going beyond the
disciplines of stare decisis . Those same
1 65
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considerations , arising from adequately
demonstrated social need of a continuing
nature, may lead when necessary to maintain
social justice, to a new category or the
review of a principle_ 77
In many respects the judicial reasoning of Motherwell was
not dramatic activism . It was, however, a principled decision
that bodes well for future decision-making in human rights
decisions .
Concomitantly, the courts, from time to time, have also
recognized that in terms of providing real "remedies",
vindication in principle alone may not be sufficient . It has been
pointed out that plaintiffs must have access to the forum of
their choice without fear that even though vindicated in
principle they will suffer financially. 78 Consequently, some of
the "human rights" cases in other jurisdictions have striven to
ensure that claimants are not penalized by legal costs incurred
in the enforcement of their rights
.79
E. The Interplay of Tort Law and Statutes
As noted in Chapter 3, all Canadian jurisdictions presently
have human rights statutes of one form or another in place,
which raises questions of how tort law might coincide, and not
conflict, with these legislations . Over the last few decades the
courts have been trying to work out in general terms the
complexities of the interaction of tort law with statutory law, a
task that has yielded mixed results in regards to human rights
issues.
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1 . SaskatchewanWheatPool
In Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v . Can . 80 the Supreme Court
of Canada considered whether a breach of a statutory provision
was sufficient in itself to give rise to liability, without proof of
negligence. The Court stated that although there could not be a
tort of negligence based directly on a breach of a statutory duty,
rules established by the law could be evidence of a duty and
failure to live up to it could be negligence of that duty . This
proposition opens up the possibility of tort action where an
actor has failed, neglected or ignored the duties established by
human rights acts .
Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
deprecated attemptsto look for legislative intent when con-
sidering whether or not to permit rights of action . Justice
Dickson in dicta went so far as to suggest that liability cannot
be created by a statute where there is no express provision for
it
. 81
However, in later cases, the fact that a statute covered
some of the same ground as a recognized tort was not seen as
necessarily totally precluding civil liability. In Baird v. R in
Right of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal stressed that
whether there was to be civil liability in a particular context
required reference to the common law principles governing
liability . Those principles look to such concepts as the
proximity of the parties and remoteness of damage . Where one
meets those first principles, civil liability can and probably
should be waiting. This is an important concession, because it
will later be shown that, in the area of non-discrimination, both
concepts are fairly easily met 82
2. Omission of Statutory Duties
Outside the area of negligence, there have been numerous
other instances in tort law that have worked towards an ex-
tension of liability. One direction of expansion that has been
noted of the Canadian courts is a growing potential for tort
liability for omission prompted by specified statutory duties. 83
A background, commission (misfeasance) has typically been
seen as the "active misconduct working positive injury to
others"
84
and omission ( non-feasance ) has been viewed as
passive inaction failing merely to take positive steps to benefit
others to protect them from some impending harm ."8 5 While,
historically, there had been a reticence to attribute liability in
instances of non-feasance ( partly
out of legal issues of
remoteness and partly out of a philosophy of individualism,
wherein to assist others was seen as more properly a matter of
individual morality), 86 today a heightened sense of social
obligation and other "collectivist tendencies" have eroded the
distinction between the two . 87 A borderline between the active
misconduct and passive inaction, which has never been easy to
draw, has become ever increasingly blurred, with liability being
found more frequently for personal failures to act .
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a_ OutsideofPersonalOmissions
In contrast to omissions for personal acts, certain
relations involving control over the conduct of third parties
seem to have always required "special assurances of safety in
accordance with prevailing assumptions of social
responsibility . 88 In each case there seems to be operating
either a "special relation between the defendant and the injured
person who is entitled to rely upon him for protection" or a
special relation "between the defendant and the third party who
is subject to the former's control"8 9 While typically we see
these as occurring in circumstances of occupier and visitor,
employer and employee, or innkeeper and guest, either
alternative could also apply to the relationship between public
authorities and their constituents. Using this approach,
individuals are to be protected and third parties are supposed
to be subject to the public authorities' control .
Until quite recently, courts were cautious about finding
liability for omission by public authorities . The courts drew a
distinction between positive injury caused by active exercise of
powers and a mere failure to exercise the powers adequately or
at alL
90
Liability would only be found in instances where there
had been an active exercise of power. Twelve years ago, in Anns
v. Merton London Borough Council91 there was a substantial
shift from that approach, expanding tortious liability of public
authorities .
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b . Anns v . Merton London Borough Council
Anns involved a local authority,which, in contravention of
the statute governing it and in contravention of its own by-laws,
either failed to inspect (omission) or negligently inspected
(negligence) the foundations of a new building . As a result, the
building suffered structural movements, jeopardizing the safety
of anyone who entered the building .
The court had to consider whether they could hold the
local authority tortiously responsible . for having failed to carry
out either a statutory or common law duty . In Anns, the court
saw that the local authority was to control the activities of
builders. The local authority's duty was to assure that breaches
of by-laws did not occur and this duty was owed to those
whose health and safety might be jeopardized by such
violations
. 92
In the course of its analysis, the court drew a distinction
between the operational and the policy-making aspects of a
public authority's discretion. The court concluded that, while it
always was up to the body to decide what was the best
financial allotment of resources, once committed to that course
a body had a duty to the public to carry through with the
duties that had been set. In Anns the authority failed in its
public duty to live up to the operations framework it itself had
established.
I
	
the circumstances of Anns , the court noted it was
sufficient that, by exercising their power properly, the
1 7 0
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defendant public authoritycould have prevented the harm.
Having not done so established a prima facie duty which was
not negatived by any countervailing policy .
c. The Significance of Anns to Human Rights Protections
For the purposes of this paper, Anns
93
is relevant in that
it establishes at least two paradigms- one in respect of the duty
owed by government officials in the operation of human rights
commissions and the second in respect of the duty owed by
private individuals under the human rights acts .
Since then, courts have followed Anns as a precedent
somewhat timorously. For one thing, it has been noted that the
ratio of the case could only be invoked if the empowering
statute has as its object the protection of someone like the
plaintiff against the contemplated risk . 94 A failure of public
authorities to live up to the mandate of human rights statutes
conceivably could meet that criterion .
Arguably using the reasoning of Anns , bureaucrats are
not only under a duty to see that the human rights acts are
complied with and to assure that their staff members fulfil
their statutory obligations, they also have a responsibility to
control such matters as the timing of process in such a way
the court will not later throw the case out because of excessive
delays. Failure to do so may lead to liability in negligence .
However, it is important to keep in mind that going after
the officials is not only a limited solution, it
	
is a circuitous
route to tackling human rights problems . What one really wants
to stop is the discriminatory behaviour of individuals or
corporate bodies, not restrict the power of those seeking to
protect the weak .
d. Anns and the Private Actor
Anns also detailed an approach to new potential actions
covering the duty of private individuals, looking to the kind of
damage and kind of duty involved . In essence, Anns reduces
to a two step test: 1 ) is there a general proximity between the
parties to this action and 2) are there policy reasons for limiting
that presumed duty. 95
Applying this approach to human rights legislation, the
damage to be avoided by human rights acts is, f course,
disparagement of dignity of the person . Such disapprobation
might be accomplished in any number of ways- through words,
actions, failure to take into account the other's needs or desires,
failure to consider the other on a basis of equality . The duty of
the individual is to not act in such a way that there is such
damage to the dignity of the other .
Where this loss of dignity has occurred, prima facie
there
would not be a reason the duty should not apply, unless it could
be framed as a policy argument. Possible policy arguments
would include: 1) the traditional worry that the floodgates to
civil litigation would be opened, 2) a belief in the difficulty in
establishing the range of persons affected, or 3) a concern over
fitting the case into the existing conceptual structure of torts .
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The floodgates argument must be acknowledged . However,
an overly cautious reaction to the mere potential of "floodgates"
can cause an undue restriction on the access to justice and an
unwarranted fettering of just and equitable remedies for
victims. Those floodgates assumptions would likely be correct
only if the categories are left wide open or if the conceptual
structure of torts could not be kept intact . The extent to which
human rights torts parallel the provisions of human rights
legislation ( or otherwise parallel basic non-discrimination
concepts of "sufficient connection"), the potential for wide open
categories decreases . Similarly, any detrimental effect on the
conceptual structure of torts will be minimized Human rights
acts exemplify categories of people to be covered. They also
establish situations in which discrimination is neither a
legitimate exercise of freedom of choice nor a reasonable
standard of behaviour (such as within the employment
process or in accommodation). Even as one moves beyond the
confines of statutes already in place, looking to international
concepts of non-discrimination, reliance on first principles still
provides the necessary coherency desired .
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e. The Movement Towards Concurrent Liability
Thirty years ago, tort law would have been perceived as a
concept totally distinct from all other forms of legal relations . 97
Yet today the court has asked the question : "Does the existence
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of one kind of legal relationship necessarily exclude tort
liability?" and it has answered the question in the negative .
The courts have stressed that a common law duty of care
is created by certain kinds of relationships, whether or not the
relationship simultaneously exists in some other arena . 98
Importance instead is placed on the proximity of the parties ;
with the proper question being whether there was a relationship
of sufficient proximity, not how it arose .
It has been felt that if the facts disclose the self-same
duty arising in more than one type of legal relationship and
there is a breach of that duty then the plaintiff can sue under
the legal relationship that he feels is best for him .99 Typically,
this is framed within a contract/tort context and the existence of
a contractual duty of care has been seen as not precluding
parallel claim in tort. Similarly, it may be argued that the
existence of the statutory duty under human rights legislation
should not preclude another common law duty- simply, what is
is important is the proximity of the parties and the existence of
the duty.
F. Tort Law As a Political Tool
It has been suggested in some circles, that tort law, itself,
can be used as an instrument of social pressure upon the
centres of government, financial and intellectual power .
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It
has been explained that " [a] tort suit can challenge the
decision-making, power of the omnipotent and omnipresent
managers of modern society. In a world increasingly dominated
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by distant, elite decision-makers, this watchdog role is becoming
more and more necessary ." 101 From this view, tort law can exert
its pressure not only through financial damages, but also
through the adverse publicity that may follow a particular
incident when a lawsuit is involved. For those who feel that
community standards are higher than the legislated protections
and for those who feel that the hard-gained advances made are
easily open to. erosion or legislative reversal, the suggestion
has appeal.
The use of the publicity is purported to have at least
three effects . It can cost the defendant money far in excess of
any damage award . If the defendant is a company it can cause
the diminution in the value of corporate shares . Secondly, it can
bring about a loss in prestige and can tarnish a defendant's
reputation, both of which take money, time and effort to
restore .
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Thirdly, harmful publicity may induce government
intervention in that politicians may be forced to enact new
legislation to control the perceived abuse .
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One perceived limitation of this, however, is that there is
no way of assuring that a tort suit will receive any media
attention at all. Argument can be made that media has its own
agenda in selecting which events to cover . Coverage, if it does
occur, is often sporadic and
may emphasize different elements
of the case or situation than those elements which are important
from the plaintiff's point of view .
Additionally it has been argued that the public may not
think the challenged conduct is very reprehensible and public
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officials may not be spurred to action. Defendants may also be
able to withstand the effects of such bad publicity by launching
a counter- campaign.
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Even worse, the existence of the tort
action may lull the legislatures into inaction, seeing the civil
remedy as having already handled the matter .
Despite these possibilities, tort law as ombudsman has
been considered to have a significant advantage - the lawsuit
and its attendant publicity sanction are in the hands of the
ordinary citizen. As one writer noted :
It is both triggered by ordinary citizens and
imposed by them. Thus anyone who feels injured
by someone else may institute civil proceedings .
He does not have to wait for some prosecutor or
civil servant to take up his cause . Too often such
public servants are reluctant to move. They may
have limited resources at their command . Politics
may be involved_ An aggrieved individual,
however, labours under no such burden; he can
unilaterally commence proceedings at any time,
even if his case is by no means iron clad
." 105
Admittedly, there are times when the common law falls
behind the times. Yet, even where the common law lags behind
the popular will, it has been noted law remains an instrument
of change :
Paradoxically, the rigidity of the common law
sometimes fosters law reform, rather than
impedes it. A harsh decision in a well- publicized
test case can spur legislative reform, whereas a
decision that corresponds with the public's sense
of justice may submerge what may be a rather
unsatisfactory state of law in a particular
area. 106
This is precisely what happened in Ontario
	
around 1948-50 .
In Re Noble and Wolfe
107
the judiciary upheld a restrictive
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covenant that would have prevented the sale of land to anyone
but whites. In doing so the judiciary refused to follow the
earlier decision in Re Drummond Wren . 108 The decision in R
Noble "stirred public reaction, aroused the press and brought
pressure groups to the doorstep of the government . . ." .
109
The
response was swift : "(i]n March , 1950 the Ontario Legislature
unanimously passed The ConveyancinR and Law of Property
Amendment Act which declared covenants in deeds of land
with restrictions on race, religion or ancestry be void
." 110
A.M. Linden the person who first offered the idea of tort
law as ombudsman, acknowledged the economics of tort liti-
gation limits the power of tort law to act in this role . "Unless
there is a good chance of winning a substantial award, it is
unlikely
	
that civil litigation will be undertaken and if
sensible settlement is made, that will probably be taken
rather than proceeding to trial ."
111
To overcome this limitation,
Linden suggested the use of the contingency fees. Other writers,
using mathematical models, have stressed the role of punitive
damages, seeing these as decreasing the ratio of award in
relation to expenditure and creating as a disincentive for
employers to discriminate .
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G . The Educative Ability of Torts
Closely aligned with tort laws' watchdog power is its
perceived educative ability .
113
Certainly positive results have
been seen recently in areas such as social host liability .
114
In
the medical malpractice field it has been acknowledged that the
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overall consequence of the threat of litigation in the area has
been one of fostering a higher quality of health care, putting
pressure on doctors to live up to specific standards of
conduct. 115 It is believed tort law could similarly help in the
private spheres of the human rights field . At this point it
might be advisable to more closely examine how tort law has
fared when it has been involved in the protection of human
rights.
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CHAPTER 6 :
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORTS
IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PART II
I . Introduction
While Chapter 5 pointed out the theoretical advantages of
tort law in the protection of human rights, this chapter
examines actual situations in which legislatures have recognized
that potential for progress . From time to time, legislatures
have enacted legislation specifically delving into the human
rights areas and utilizing civil action. To should be noted at the
outset that certain deficiencies have become apparent.
Nevertheless, by having an understanding of the difficulties
encountered in these areas, hopefully, one can then proceed to
construct new torts that could avoid those same pitfalls .
Although for the most part descriptive, the chapter also
contains evaluative elements, setting out the criticisms made of
the legislated efforts . As such, the chapter provides a guage of
effectiveness of tort law in this kind of protection and highlights
the areas where problems have arisen .
II . Domestic Attempts at Using Tort Law as a Protective Device
A. The Privacy Acts
Perhaps partly because privacy is considered by many as a
fundamental value to our liberal culture, several jurisdictions
in Canada have attempted to protect the human right to privacy
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by providing for tort action.1 The reasons given for the
protection are varied . For some, the requirement of privacy is
based on the individual's ability to develop his individuality
and creativity,
2
or is seen as being necessary to the creation of
intimate personal relations .3
Typically, in these acts "privacy" remains undefined.
Instead, the acts give some guidance as to the factors to be
taken into account to determine if the defendant has invaded
the plaintiff's privacy, sometimes giving a general principle
followed by a list of situations which may amount to a breach
of privacy
. 4
The act will also give certain defences such as
consent, public interest or fair comment, privilege, and defence
of person or property, and they offer damages or injunctions .
1 . The Results
The legislative attempts, so far, have been less than
outstanding successes, having been pitted with difficulties.
Criticisms of these acts fall into four broad categories: "the
uncertainty and unpredictability in the application of the Acts,
the heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove an actionable
invasion of privacy, the broad and nebulous scope of the
defences and the denial of access to the lower court to litigate
small claims."5
This last factor has been seen by some to be the most
serious obstacle
.6
The court of first instance in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan is the Queen's Bench, and, in British Columbia,
it is the provincial Supreme Court . Reliance on "superior courts"
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has been seen as severely diminishing the effectiveness of the
legislation, in that litigation before higher level of courts is
both expensive and time consuming . This is especially so, in
light of the unpredictability of the quantum of damages.? As
one writer has noted, "(flaw reform which gives rights to
individuals is a fruitless exercise, unless there is a forum for
their enforcement that is practically accessible .-
8
For that reason, one might easily assume that any tort
development in the protection of human rights should be
redressable at the level of lower courts, perhaps even small
claims level . As will be seen later under the section with the
Quebec's Charter of Human Rights (the "Quebec Charter") , this
conclusion needs to be approached with caution, though-
thoroughly weighing any advantages against the disadvantages .
The unpredictability in damages comes, in part, from the
fact that the court cases that probably could have offered
exemplary damages, so far, have failed to do so. This is in
spite of the fact that Canadian provinces have not followed
Rookes v. 'Barnard .9
2 . The Quebec's Experience
Although privacy acts have been legislated in several
provinces, Quebec's has probably been one of the more
successful. The Quebec Charter sets out the approach to privacy
rights differently and, it is submitted, more effectively . As
part of overall approach to provincial protection of human
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rights, the Quebec Charter expressly gives a civil action for
privacy and all the other rights included in the Charter .
The right to privacy in Quebec is given legislative
expression in Article 5 of the Quebec Charter which provides
"Every one has a right to respect for his private life ." I
drafting a right to privacy and inviolability of the home, it was
felt that there should exist something that had already been
maintained by some Quebec judges- a recourse for reparation of
the moral injury caused by invasion of the privacy of the
home.
It should be noted that, in Quebec, the judiciary had
been responsible for the legal recognition of the right to
privacy even prior to the Quebec Charter . Even though the
Quebec Civil Code made no specific enunciation on the right to
privacy, the right to privacy emerged as a judicial creation
prior to its legislative enunciation . 10 In Quebec, the courts
worked out the content of the right and the defences to it .
Admittedly, while the civil law method differs considerably
from that of the common law, it does demonstrate that one
judiciary has tackled a specific type of human right question
within the curial forum.
Unlike the common law jurisdictions, Quebec has no one
court set aside to hear the privacy cases. Instead, the usual
court procedures are followed so that injunctions, damages over
$6000, or class actions must be heard before the Superior
Court. Where lower amounts are involved the cases are heard
in the provincial court and, if the amount claimed is less than
192
$500, in small claims court .
1 1
Small claims court , of course,
avoids the costs of legal representation, while appearing to
offer comparative speed and simplicity .
In some instances, compensation in Quebec has been of an
apparently nominal character, but it should be noted that the
level of awards in the past has been limited by the traditional
rule in Quebec that punitive or exemplary damages . were not
permitted . However, now the Quebec Charter explicitly makes
provision for exemplary damages.
12
In other cases, more
substantial damages have been ordered . 1
3
B. Defamation Act
Manitoba's 1934E amendment to the Libel Act, has been
another legislated attempt to protect human rights .14 The Act
provides for an injunction where there has been libel against a
race or creed. While the section of the Act 'has not received
much publicity or use, it was relied upon in the 1972 case of
Courchene v. Marlborough Hotel .
15
In Courchene a hotel front office manager had prepared a
memorandum directing the staff not to provide accommodation
to natives or Metis. The Manitoba Indian Brotherhood obtained
copy of the memorandum, correctly considered it as
defamatory of Indians, and sued under the Manitoba
Defamation Act and under the Human Rights Act, . Both pieces
of legislation, at the time, provided only for injunctions .
The application was denied . According to the account
given, immediately upon discovering this "policy", the president
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of the hotel countermanded it . The Manitoba Trial Court and the
Court of Appeal said that while the contents of the memorandum
could be construed as defamatory and could constitute
discrimination if it was a policy of the hotel, this was not this
hotel's policy_ Instead, it was considered to be the erroneous
action of one person .
The case is interesting for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is how legal reasoning has changed in the last 18
years . First of all, according to the court 's interpretation in
Courchene, the behaviour of one staff member ( even one in the
position of the office manager) was not attributed to the hotel .
This proposition flies in the face of doctrines such as resoondeat
superior and vicarious liability . It certainly would no longer
hold up in light of Hinds v CEIC.
16
Secondly, since the wrong-doing had ceased, it was felt
there could be no injunction for discontinuance: This is a
limitation inherent to injunctions, but it also underscores need
for wider remedies .
Thirdly, there was dicta by the trial judge that the section
was ultra vires the province, on the grounds that it dealt with
criminal libel . 17 As mentioned earlier, this has been one of the
problems plaguing the whole human rights area when dealing
with legislated actions .
Fourthly, the trial judge did not find the material
defamatory (or at least he felt that in the circumstances there
could be seen a defence of qualified privilege) . 18 Standing
alone that kind of reasoning bodes . ill for judicial activism and
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for the protection of human rights by the
judiciary . Still, the
decision must be placed in perspective . Since
the 1970's, the
courts have been instrumentally involved in both human rights
legislations and the Charter , and that experience offers promise
for the future .
C. British Columbia Civil Rights Protection Act
19
In 1981, British Columbia passed legislation that allowed
for stiff monetary penalties
20
and damages payable to any
person, organization or society hurt by the prosecution of
individuals or groups perceived to have committed racist acts .
Specifically, what is prohibited under the Civil Rights Protection
Act is promoting "hatred or contempt of a person or class of
persons" or promoting "the superiority or inferiority of a
person or class of persons in comparison with another or
others on the basis of colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or
place of origin
.''21
The practicality of the legislation has been questioned
considering the high cost of litigation and the enforceability of
judgments once obtained. Additionally, it has been pointed out
that a racist group simply disbands and
then sets up as
another group, thus evading the legislation . Still, it has been
suggested by race relation advocates that this
kind of
legislation be enacted across the country-- leaving it up
to
the individual to decide whether pursuing a civil action was
worth the time, effort and monetary investment .
22
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To date only one case, Brochu v. Nelson., (which
was
unsuccessful) has been reported under this legislation
. 23
However, the failure of the Brochu case seems to be more
that the facts simply did not support a conclusion of racism . A
French speaking plaintiff alleged that the boss was offering to
others, but not to him tasks that carried with them a higher
pay scale .
On the evidence the allegation was deemed not founded .
Instead, the denial of the opportunity to drive hydro vehicles
which generated more pay resulted instead from certain driving
incidents in which the plaintiff had been involved . Under non-
discrimination principles, where there is a seemingly dis-
criminatory result, but with no cause other than the non-
discriminatory explanation , then no "discrimination" will be
found. If there were two causes ( e .g. poor work habits and race)
leading to a seeming discriminatory result, one of which is the
impugned action, then discrimination could be found .
Brochu points out two considerations . In order to have a
good first case, the plaintiff must have a solid position in order
to woo the judiciary and to properly educate them
about
what transpires in "the real world"
. Something out of the
cracker jack box, involving a comparatively
trivial problem,
only reinforces any judicial predilection to assume
that this
kind of issue is a waste of the court's time .
The second has to do with lawyers' awareness of legis-
lative provisions . If they don't know about it, they won't use it
.
Lawyers, even if aware of a statute, will demonstrate reticence
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where the statute is unproven, or has not had notable success
to date. They are there to win for the client and themselves,
which may mean one is faced with a problem of circularity . Yet
lawyers have a reasonable sensitivity to arguments that work
and one good succesf ul case will increase the probability of
further use and of later successes .
D . Newfoundland Human Rights Code
In 1988, Newfoundland took the step of explicitly
permitting "the right of any aggrieved person to initiate
proceedings or to lay a complaint before a court of summary
jurisdiction ." Z 4 By virtue of s. 24, if one proceeds with this
route, one is excluded from the Human Rights Commission
avenue . As no court case under the statute has been cited by
the law reports it would appear that the civil action has not
been used thus far. At the same time it should be mentioned
that very few commission cases ever get reported from
Newfoundland either.
E. Attem is Based on Human R his Acts
Because it will be discussed in far greater length in the
next chapter, I will just touch lightly upon the case of
Bhadauria v. Seneca College 25 here. In Bhadauria it was found
at appeal level in Ontario that a new tort of discrimination
could lay. That decision was overturned at the Supreme Court
level.
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However, before it was reversed, other similar actions
had
been brought, most notably Azizv. Adamson. 26 In Aziz, the
judge stressed that, where possible, it was the responsibility
of the Court to co-operate with the legislature in promoting the
public policy enshrined in the Code. He believed the appeal
court decision in Bhadauria was an "eminently sensible one" .
27
He noted that, while most people would proceed by way of the
commission, there may be occasions where a plaintiff might
prefer to proceed by civil suit. As one example, there might be
instances where there was no "violation" under the act, but
where nevertheless the plaintiff believed there had been and
still wanted " his day in court" .28 There might also be occasions
where the plaintiff was unhappy with a proposed settlement and
was insisting on the continuation of a public inquiry . It has
been suggested that if the plaintiff is unwilling to accept even a
reasonable settlement, then he should pursue the matter at his
own expense, not the public's .
29
F.The Quebec Charter
Quebec's handling of privacy rights has been touched upon
previously
. As with privacy rights, Quebec's recognition of the
possibility of human rights
protection through tort action has
been more comparatively
longstanding than that of its
common law neighbours . In 1968 the Quebec
Report on Civil
Rights was emphasizing that, "
[i]n many instances,the most
effective recourse against a governmental body , a public officer
or a private individual who infringes the liberties of another
remains the civil action in damages ."3
0
At the same time, in the Quebec Report it was felt that the
Quebec civil law had already expressed a tradition in protection
of individual rights, one developed through an interpretation of
principles of civil responsibility and of action in damages .3 1 The
Quebec Civil Code was seen as having provided an instrument of
protection in section 1053 which declared that
lelvery person capable of discerning right
from wrong is responsible for the damages
caused by his fault to another, whether by
positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of
skill. 32
The 1968 report acknowledged that while the fundamental
principles had been set out by codifiers of the Civil Code of
1866, these were seen as constituting such a brief statement
that the courts were obliged to develop the principles through
recourse to the more general rules of civil responsibility and
the provisions of the Civil Code relating to "public order and
good morals" .33 By virtue of the extreme vagueness of those
concepts, the courts needed more direction .
The Report's recommendations were intended as providing
some direction as to the nature of cognizable "rights" . Many, if
not most, of the recommendations eventually became embodied
in the Quebec Charter .34 Importantly, the Quebec
Charter
provided for civil action and included provision for exemplary
damages.
35
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Among the accepted recommendations was that there
should be included the right to protection of dignity, honour
or reputation. With regard to "the right of protection of dignity"
the advisory body said that, it had no intention of creating new
causes of action for dignity alone . However, it noted that, when
mentioning honour and reputation, the Court decisions also
contained the idea of human dignity.3
6
When drafting an non- discrimination article to
specifically deal with contracts and public goods and services ,
the advisory body was interested in getting past old
jurisprudence of the previous century which made the
proprietor the sole judge of which customers would be served.
The advisory body's recommendation utilized the approach of
listing "such distinctions as ." Such a direction in result would
have had a list of enumerated grounds of prima facie
discrimination, and an expandable ground of unenumerated
grounds that might come to constitute discrimination . In the
final result, the legislature went for a longer but, seemingly
exhaustive, list.37
Nonetheless, it should be noted that section 50 says "[t]he
Charter shall not be so interpreted as to suppress or limit the
enjoyment or exercise of any human right or freedom not
enumerated herein ." Arguably, this could still give possible
tort action for unenumerated categories outside the specific
provisions of the Quebec Charter_
The Quebec setup, both before and after the Quebec
Charter, has been seen by some as having potential. In part,
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the allure comes from its strong contrast with common law
style reasoning :
The legislation is not drafted as particular
rules for particular situations . The
legislation contains general principles
	
of a
high degree of abstraction . There are no
definitions, no special precise rules, but
instead broad flexible principles with a
low degree of certainty_ 38
This dynamic approach of principles as sources of law to be
developed, from which to reason and analogize would seem
unconventional to the common law mind . In comparison with our
emphasis on precedents, under Quebec civil law,
" (prredcctability, form and substance are given by the more
general principles, not from the legislation but by judicial
decisions in particular cases . As the case law is not binding on
future courts, the predictability and certainty is supplied
without imperilling the flexibility and dynamism of
legislation." 39 One might suggest that if Quebec civil law
decision-making was integrated in the way that corresponded
with rationally defensible principles of human rights, a far
stronger remedy could be offered to victims of discrimination .
1 . An Evaluation of the Quebec Charter
To date, in Quebec the bulk of cases are still brought
before the Quebec Human Rights Commission . 40 When cases have
gone before the courts the Quebec Charter has met mixed
success for plaintiffs . Critics can find some tempting examples
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of why the courts should not be involved in this area 41 C.D.P .
for Leclair c. Paquet et Paquet 42 involved the denial of a lease
to a man of social assistance.This was not seen as constituting a
discrimination on the basis of "social condition"
.43
Instead
(totally erroneously, it is submitted ), the court maintained the
defendants were only looking for a "good tenant", " one who
could pay the rent" . That, of course, was precisely the kind, of
unthinking assumptions about social relief many hoped human
rights legislation would rectify.
Further, according to the provincial court judge the fact
this complainant also had epilesy was not seen as a "handicap"
in light of the fact that it was not readily visible . More
worrisome was the judge's comment that by virtue of the
Charter the liberty of the defendants ( in particular, their right
to contract) had to be preserved. That style of decision-making
harkens back to a period of laissez -faire which, if it ever
existed, is no longer in tune with present social, ethical or legal
realities .
Complainants have had better success where the courts
dealing with injunctions or with relatively settled areas of law
such as agreements and covenants . There, the courts seem more
willing to offer redress.44 In Le Pretre c.
Auberge des
Gouveneurs
45,
for example, the issue involved the successful
application for injunction to prevent dismissal from em-
ployment on the basis of racial discrimination . Gagnon c.
Brassiere La Bulle Inc 46, a case involving sex discrimination
and
	
requiring an interlocutory injunction to re-instate the
plaintiff, was also successful .
In Johnson c. Comm . des Affaires	Sociales,
47
the
plaintiff was seeking a writ of evocation from a S .C. decision
sustaining Social Welfare from denying him welfare after having
been laid off while the company was on strike. The Court was
of the opinion that the Quebec Charter rendered . 8 of the
Quebec Welfare Act as inapplicable to the plaintiff . The Court
has also upheld a cause of action based on "work for equal
value " that was invoked under articles 19 and 87 ( a) of the
Quebec Charter . 48
2 . Quebec Conservatism
It should be noted that even if there is sometimes a
conservatism in Quebec, it is not-limited simply to the courts .
Human right commissions in sponsoring cases coming before
the court have been seeking quite low levels of awards (in the
$100-200 range). What is more unfortunate is that the court's
response has been to award even lower than that .49
To be fair to the courts, in some cases the low award is
easy to explain . 50 Thibault c. College de Sherbrooke, where
$1 was given, involved one of those difficult situations where
an institution (and a court) feels damned no matter what it
does. The school had set up a program to help women returning
to school. It had hired three women to teach, but did not want
to have a "work ghetto", so the fourth position was offered to
a male . A female applicant with equal qualifications to the
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male applicant sued. The College was ordered by the court to
cease the practice, with $1 set as damages. Arguably, no
damages should have been awarded in the circumstances .
Explanations can be offered for some of the other low
awards . These cases are often heard in the provincial court,
which has the advantage of hearing matters quickly. However,
in doing so, one runs into the obverse problem of having
matters pushed through . Even to the inexperienced, it is
apparent that a small claims a judge has little time to reflect
on the state of the law or what types of protections the
legislature was trying to effect with the Quebec Charter .
Because the kinds of decisions with which the judges in the
lower courts have the most familiarity are proprietary interests,
such as bad debts and mechanic liens, one must wonder how
well human rights cases would fare . Human rights
considerations are fundamentally different from the typical
small claims issues. In a heavily used small claim court, the
judge may not or cannot be able to take the time to leisurely
consider whether there is " a reasonably sufficient connection"
between the act or decision made by one party and an impugned
distinction. Therefore, only the most readily apparent cases
have a chance of success in this court.
III . The Attempts by Other Fora
A. Bngland's Race Relations Act :_
England's human rights are basically controlled by two
pieces of legislation - the Race Relations Act.1976 and the Sex
DiscriminationAct, 1975. Under the former, the Commission for
Racial Equality investigates, identifies and deals with
discriminatory practices in industry and institutions, through
policy recommendations or sometimes through legal proceedings
for injunctions .
Complaints in the employment field are covered by
industrial tribunals . If an industrial tribunal hears the case, it
may make an order declaring the rights of the parties, make an
order requiring the respondent to pay the complainant
compensation or recommend that the respondent adopt a
particular course of action .
Complaints in all other designated areas are dealt with by
county courts. If the case goes before the county or sheriff
courts, an order declaring the rights of the parties may be
made, an injunction or order may be declared, or damages may
be awarded.51 In appropriate cases, individuals may receive
help from the racial equality commission, both in deciding
whether to proceed and with presenting a case in the most
effective manner. If the
Commission considers that the case
raises a question of principle, or is too complex for the
individual to deal with unaided, the commission
can give
further assistance.5
2
During the period of 1976-1980, only sixty-two cases were
successful before the Industrial Tribunal, and the Commission
provided legal representation in fifty of those cases
.53 During
the same period of time only twenty-five cases reached county
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courts, of which only sixteen were successful, and of these all
were brought with the assistance of the commission. 54 These
figures seem to suggest that there may be an advantage in
relying on the experience of the commission either in
presenting the case or explaining the concepts .
Disconcertingly, there has been a significant decline in the
number of requests for assistance from the commission . Part of
this is due to two major drawbacks of the British legislation -
back pay is absent as a remedy and British laws do not yet
permit class actions so that the rights of a group of plaintiffs
could be adjudicated at the same time . 55 At the same time, it is
felt that when discrimination is found, the low amount of
damages does not make the trouble worth its while. This
criticism exists irrespective of which route, commission or
court, is taken by the complainant. Thus it is apparent that any
proposed remedy must avoid these pitfalls .
B. England's Sex Discrimination Act. 1975
England's other legislated protection, the Sex Discrimination
Act gives a right of action to the individual, but also allows the
Equal Opportunities Commission ("EOC") to assist and represent
the complainant in appropriate cases. The EOC itself can also
.bring certain proceedings
56
While an action can only be
brought in a county court, all the remedies of a high court will
be available .
The protection from sex discrimination in England is not
handled in a unified way. Where the claim occurs in connection
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with employment, it will be dealt with by an industrial tribunal .
The tribunal compensates according to tort rules which a county
court would apply, and this can include damages for injury to
feelings . However, it has been subject to the upper limit set
for tribunal awards generally
57
The limitation periods are
brief- the time limit under the Sex Discrimination Act is six
months (three months if in relation to employment) as
compared to s. 57 (5) of the Race Relations Act which has a
limitation period of eight months.5 8
Despite these limitations, some viewed the Act's blend as a
good one:
This combination of the right of individual
access to the courts, with strategic functions
attached to a Commission responsible for
enforcing the law in the public interest, is
an ambitious attempt to combine the virtues of
tort and administrative law.59
Irrespective of any apparent virtues, the English law
reports, so far, offer only one court case on sex discrimination
-- Gill v. El Vino Co.Ltd. 6 0 There certainly may be other
instances but to date they have not been recognized as
noteworthy by law reports .
Gill v. El Vino Co. Ltd . was brought by two women,
lawyer and a journalist, who had not been allowed to stand at
the bar at a popular wine bar close to the courts . Instead, they
were told they would have to be seated at one of the tables 61
The plaintiffs claimed that they had been discriminated against
because they were treated less favorably than men, being
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denied the opportunity to drink where others drank, to mix with
other people ( particularly business associates
)
and denied a
choice of companions .62 The remedies sought were a declaration
and an injunction to prevent future breaches .
The respondents tried arguing that if the women had been
treated differently there really was no detriment to them
here, and if there had been, it was more a matter . de
minim.is " . However, Judge Eveleigh pointed out that the de
minimus argument was not appropriate where what had been
denied to the plaintiff was the very thing that Parliament
sought to address, namely, services and facilities provided on
an equal basis. Consequently, a significant detriment need not
be shown and the plaintiffs got the desired declaration .
It is apparent that the English legislation, although allowing
for a tort action, is ineffectual in many respects . Considering the
political. stripes of the present government, it probably is
intended to be so. The Commission can help complainants in
bringing court cases (and .are helpful when they assist), but it is
unclear whether the commission is under obligation to do so .
However, more deleterious, the tort remedies themselves are
exceptionally limited by legislation, either in terms of being
limited to injunctions or declarations or, where damages are
allowed, in the level of damages .allowed
. These limitations
seriously discourage the use of the action.
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B.TheAmericanEfforts
The Americans have developed a substantial jurisprudence
in the use of torts for the protection of rights, particularly
where violations of human rights by public actors occur at the
state or federal level . 63 Following the Civil War with Section
1983 and again in 1964 with the Civil Rights Act . 1964, the
American Congress enacted statutes dealing in the areas of
discrimination . Several additional acts have been added since
that time .
Both Section 1983 and the federal tort routes have been
well - used in American courts . 64 As a matter of fact, to some,
the extensiveness of use has actually been perceived to be a
downfall in that American courts over the last few years have
responded by establishing defences or by interpreting the
rights in a manner that reduces the chances of success . Part
of the reason for this appears to be the fact that these torts
are dealing with public actors and public allocation of
resources, areas which are not traditionally seen as within the
purview of the courts .
1 . Civil Rights Act, 1964
This federal act, inter alia, gives district courts in the
United States jurisdiction to give injunctive relief against
discrmination in public accommodation and authorizes the
Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional
rights in public facilities .6 5 It also extends the Commission on
Civil Rights to establish a Commission on Equal Employment
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Opportunity . In public accommodation cases, if the Court figures
they can get voluntary compliance they will send it over to the
Community Relations Service first .
Title VII of the Act deals with equal employment. "The
expressed aim of Title VII is to prohibit all practices that create
inequalities in the workplace among identifiable groups and
thus the remedies available under Title VII operate to redress
the impact of discriminatory actions on protected groups than on
individuals." 66
Basically, under this section the person files a "written
charge with the Commission which endeavours for voluntary
compliance. If there is a local law prohibiting the unlawful act,
the person must go the local route first . Any local body has
sixty days to commence proceedings .67 If they have not or if
the matter was terminated before that, the person can proceed
the federal route .
A charge must be filed within nine months
. 68
Once the
Commission is seized of the matter, they have thirty days
to
get voluntary compliance .69 After that point
the person can
commence a civil action. The court may, if it is deemed just,
appoint an attorney for the complainant without the payment of
fees, costs or security.
In this way some of the financial
disadvantages against the victim are mitigated . If the Attorney
General feels the case is of public importance,, she or he may be
permitted to intervene in the action .
Title VII focuses mainly on institutional change as
t
authorizes equitable remedies. The complainant
can get
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reinstatement, promotion, hiring of employees, with or without
back pay.70 Unfortunately, other damages such as mental or
emotional harm have been disallowed 7 1
In became apparent in the American scene that in some
instances of rights violations, such as sexual harassment in the
employment sphere, 72 not all the damage suffered was being
compensated under Title VII . In particular her sense of
degradation and humiliation and the cost of her psychological
care remained uncompensated
73
The result was that individuals
who suffered this form of right violation began to go to other
legal theories to redress their injuries, and found that state
statutes and state common law provided a variety of causes of
action for sexual harassment .
74
As an example, American wrongful discharge theory has
held that dismissal for a refusal to date her employer violated
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the
employer and the employee?5 Traditional tort theories such as
assault and battery, negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional duress, invasion of privacy and tortious interference
with a contract of employment have been successfully advanced
in sexual harassment cases .76 Presently, these are used
concurrently with a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII .
The state tort claims are not seen as a total panacea, though,
because under state tort theory injunctive relief is not available
to shape future behaviour and change social norms
of the
workplace .
77
One last matter that is noteworthy. In American law in
this area, insurance may cover some of the employer's claim .
While a standard employeer liability policy does not cover
claims for sexual harassment per se, it sometimes covers "bodily
injury by accident or disease" , which includes the emotional and
psychological sequelae. Thus, the unauthorized invasion of the
employee's body or, offensive touching may constitute assault
and battery which may be compensible.78 To some, this .policy
of insurance protection seems indefensible in the sense that
the employer would be buying a way out of facing the full
financial consequences .
IV . Conclusion
Each of these forms of tort actions has had deficiencies,
some greater than others . It would appear that for torts t
succeed in the area of human rights, at a minimum, what is
needed is 1) underlying principles to which can judges turn for
guidance, 2) leeway for the judges to tailor the remedy to meet
the specific problem, and 3) some form of legal assistance for
the complainant .
The extent to which those facing harm will use the remedy
will always be a significant concern, as will the direction and
interpretation of the rights when developed by the courts . It has
been pointed out that in Charter litigation concerning sex
equality rights, women ( as a less powerful group ) make less
use of the Charter as a tool than do men . Perhaps, as a result,
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the sex equality arguments advanced ( and accepted) in the
courts support mate -oriented themes and interpretations
. 79
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CHAPTER 7
BHADAURI A v. SENECA COLLEGE :
PRECLUSION OF TORT ACTIONS IN THE AREA
OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
I . Introduction
It may be argued that any discussion of tort actions in
the protection of human rights is belated, the posssibility having
already been foreclosed by the 1978 Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Seneca Colleste v. Bhadauria .1
The case involved a well- educated East Indian woman who
applied for several teaching positions at Seneca College over a
number of years . From time to time she was informed that she
would be contacted for an interview . She was never called and
she was never given any reason for the rejection of her ap-
plications . The plaintiff alleged that the people who eventually
filled the positions had lower qualifications than she did . None
of them, however, was of East Indian "origin . For this reason she
felt there had been discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin .
Seeking the right to pursue a suit in tort for the alleged
discrimination, she claimed damages for wrongful deprivation of
opportunity of employment, loss of self-esteem, mental distress,
and insult to dignity, basing her claim on either a common law
duty not to discriminate or upon a breach of s . 4 of the Ontario
Human Rights Code (hereafter referred to as the Code) .
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Whereas it had been accepted at appeal court level that
there could be a tort of non- discrimination based on the public
policy exemplified by the Codee in Bhadauria , the Supreme Court
of Canada found that the Code ( although not expressly excluding
such a remedy) was structured in such a way that tort action
would not be compatible with it . This chapter examines the
reasoning of both levels of court .
It is important at the outset to realize that in Bhadauria,
the plaintiff was not without some manner of redress . There
existed human rights legislation which offered the satisfaction
of having the complaint investigated and which generated
further remedies if the complaint was well-founded, such as
censuring the respondent and the possibility of monetary
recompense.
However, the plaintiff chose to pursue a tort remedy
rather than the legislated remedies available at the time . Such
a choice is not surprising considering that while the Code made
provision for special damages such as loss of wages, that loss
had to be proven. By the nature of Ms. Bhadauria's complaint ,
she had not lost wages or even met any of the usual heads of
damage because she did not get the position . Thus, her only fi-
nancial redress under the Code would have been general
damages for insult to dignity, loss of self-esteem, etc .
However, for quite a few years prior to the plaintiff's case,
no human rights board of inquiry in Ontario felt it had the
legislative authority to recommend payment of general damages .
While the legislation was amended in 1971 to assure the
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possibility of general damages, up to 1975 ( the time frame of
the plaintiff's application to the College)
the largest award by
the commission for "psychic wounds" ( damage to reputation
and dignity) was $100 .2 It has been recognized that such a small
sum would be more insult than consolation .
Preferring to take her chances by way of lawsuit, the
plaintiff presented the court with two possible ways of finding
tortious responsibility, either through a common law duty not
to discriminate or under a statutory duty as established by the
provisions of the Code . At first instance the claim had been
struck out as "disclosing no reasonable cause of action", as it
was felt that the Code established a comprehensive and
exclusive scheme . In contrast , at appeal level the court felt that
the common law duty based on public policy ( as detailed by the
preamble to the Code) offered a sufficient basis and so never
went on to judicially consider the possibility of statutory
breach. The Supreme Court overturned the appeal court
decision.
It is respectfully argued here that, in the main, the Appeal
Court's reasoning was the better founded of the two approaches .
In particular , it is argued that the Supreme Court justices
erred by basing their conclusion in large part on the
existence of what was presumed at the time to be an "effective
remedy"
It is posited that the judiciary were dealing with a novel
form of action at a point in time when several difficult tort
issues accompanying the case would have to be
	
resolved
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concomitantly. Certain legal assumptions underlying Bhadauria
have significantly changed over the last eleven years.
Consequently, the Supreme Court decision , premised on a state
of law that no longer exists, requires reconsideration. More-
over, the context in which the Supreme Court decided Bhadauria
(i.e the specific framework of the Ontario legislation) can not
be readily extrapolated to other provinces' legislation .
Whether human legislation ever established an "effective
remedy" has already been discussed at length in Chapter 4 . In
summary, it may be noted the late 1970s was a period when it
appeared that human rights legislation would eventually cover
a greater field and it was optimistically presumed that human
rights developments by way of legislation would continue to
expand and strengthen, not wane . But , as we have seen, it was
a presumption that has subsequently lost its vigor.
With respect to the matter of the development of tort
law, this chapter will show that since 1978 most, if not all, of
the tort related issues involved in Bhadauria have been
resolved. The present state of tort law can provide a more
reasonable foundation on which to argue for tort actions against
the violation of human rights than the law as it existed in 1978 .
Moreover, the courts in the 1960s and 1970s were under
considerable pressure from legislatures to show deference to a
variety of administrative tribunals, generally for reasons of
expertise and expedience.3 This trend has been tempered and
in some cases reversed. Through interpretation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the human rights acts,
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courts have been gaining an unprecedented experience in
human rights matters so that through principled reasoning it is
the courts that set the standards . At the same time, one must
always keep in mind that judicial deference must never be so
great as to effectively wipe out the legitimate right claims of
people.
II . Reasoning of the Courts in Bhadauria
A . The Jurisprudential Approaches
The two courts provided fundamentally different
approaches to human rights concerns in this matter, one tied to
positivism and deference to legislative decision-maki ng, the
other less narrowly confined. Each route is set out below, with
analysis of which should be considered the better .
1 Positivism
The decision of the Supreme Court in Bhadauria, was one
based heavily on rule-of law and positivism in its widest sense
of perceiving the court's proper function as being the
interpreter of, the law, as opposed to being judge of its value
.4
As often stated, the stance of the positivist has been : "The
existence of the law is one thing, its merit or dismerit is
another." 5
By employing the traditional rules of interperetation used
in positivist reasoning , the Supreme Court attempted to discover
the law as it truly existed . Only where there was ambiguity,
could the Court refer to "policy", which for the Supreme Court
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meant something framed in the utilitarian
terms of the
collective good or in pragmatic considerations of the decision's
impact on future cases. In Bhadauria . the Supreme Court seems
to have preferred to "discover" the law, not looking to the
efficacy of the remedy advanced by the legislation .
For the Supreme Court, the Ontario Human Rights Code
was simply a legislated political decision about the best way for
a province to deal with discrimination. The Code was a goal-
based strategy and was geared to the public welfare of people
living in Ontario . It was a decision that took for granted that the
rights of people are best protected in a congenial atmosphere of
friendly settlement and education . That policy assumed that, by
changing people's behaviours in such a setting, attitudinal
changes would follow . Because the legislation was geared to
overall result maximizing pleasure or general utility, a minority
of the public might still find themselves either unprotected,
underprotected or otherwise dissatisfied_ The breadth of the
legislation within this framework was a matter solely for
legislative concern . 6
Positivism, however, was not the only possible approach
to this kind of legislation. Indeed, arguably, positivism is not
the proper form for treating this subject matter . It must be
remembered that human rights legislation is not the usual kind
of subject matter with which positivism works . A human rights
code is not a simple black letter regulatory matter such as the
Carbonated Soft Drink Containers Regulations.? Instead
	
the
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legislation is a recognition of human entitlement which can not
be read in a narrow fashion .
2 . Rights Based Perspective
It is submitted that the Court of Appeal took a rights
based perspective . In contrast to positivism, rights based
perspectives emphasize that where questions of human rights
are involved, the judge should look not only to the rule book and
what it provides, but beyond it. If the rule book is silent as to
the solution, then the judge should determine the conclusion
which best fits the background moral rights of the parties .8
Using this framework, it can be argued that within our political
morality, one of the root principles is equality - the principle
that, at a minimum, "no one in our society should suffer because
he is a member of a group thought less worthy of respect, as a
group, than other groups ."9 So, within the facts of Bhadauria, it
is important to realize that when one discusses equality in the
employment sphere one is not necessarily presuming a right to
a job, but at a minimum, the right to compete with all others
for that position on an equal basis. In essence it is the right to
be judged on merit, to be judged as an individual, free from
sterotypes
. 10
In marked contrast to the Supreme Court, the judgment of
the Court of Appeal in Bhadauria stressed principles of equality
and in doing so took a decidedly rights-based approach. By not
basing the case directly on the Code, but instead upon the
public policy exemplified by the Code, Madame Justice Wilson,
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for the Appeal Court, moved away from a narrow black letter
interpretation and moved on to a view that considered the
background moral rights of the plaintiff . The Appeal Court also
seemed to see the role of the judiciary as integrative with the
legislature, rather than as in conflict with it .
The Court of Appeal had two choices available to it. The
Court could deny the suit because there was already human
rights legislation in the area and because the legislature had
not explicitly stated that there could be civil lawsuits. That
would have given some remedy for some discrimination in some
cases. The other possibility open to the court was to permit
the suit to proceed because the legislature had not explicitly
excluded the possibility . The Court of Appeal accepted the
latter option .
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the role of the judge
in a rights- based perspective is to decide which of the
alternatives in the case best fits with the background moral
rights of the parties. The Court of Appeal accomplished this
by allowing the complainant the right
to pursue the tort of
non discrimination. In deciding to acknowledge the existence
of a tort action, Madame Justice Wilson was undoubtedly aware
that this might better capture the rights of the plaintiff for
several reasons. It might eventually cover
areas of
discrimination that the legislature did not anticipate, or had
not yet the time or the political will to tackle
. At the same time
it offered a measure of self-determination for victim
. 11
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As the judicial responsibility is to best capture the rights
people actually have, within a rights -based conception a judge
also has the right to examine the efficacy of a remedy . 12 Under
this view, concomitant with the concept of "right" is the right to
an "effective remedy" as opposed to some nominal form of
remedy. To act otherwise would be providing mere lip service
to equality and non-discrimination .
Assuming for the moment that human rights legislation
faltered in some respect, presented with evidence that the
legislation did not work the way it was set out on paper, 1 3 a
court properly could consider any gap between the intention
and the reality and properly could do anythi ng within judicial
power to lessen the gap .
3. The Better Jurisorudential Approach to Bhadauria
Because the subject matter of Bhadauria is non-
discrimination (an inalienable right of all people) a rights based
approach is the more sound basis for jurisprudential analysis in
the case. Inalienable rights, by their nature, are not to be and
cannot be subjugated by considerations of policy such as those
that positivism would characteristically consider . That it might
seem economically sound to discriminate or seem
administratively more efficient to discriminate are both
irrelevant issues . Instead, at most these rights can only be
balanced against against other human rights.
B. Breach of Duty
1 . Introduction
In Bhadauria one of the core issues discussed at both the
Supreme Court and Appeal Court level was whether the
legislation itself could give rise to a private right of action, with
the two courts coming to different conclusions on the matter.
The Appeal Court sidestepped the question of a legislated duty,
relying on the statute mainly as evidence of a duty at common
law, probably for some of the reasons detailed below, but
possibly because relying on the statute alone would severely
restrict the development of principles that could respond to new
forms of inequality. Conversely, the Supreme Court summarily
denied there could be a common law duty, placing the bulk of
its examination on whether there could be a duty established
by the statute. The next sections consider each possibility in
turn.
2. Problems of Statutory Duty- A Question of Legislative
Intention
For decades prior to Bhadauria there had been waged
heated curial debate in Canada and England over whether
courts could use statutes to extend civil duties. In light of a
perceived ossification of tort law and "the encrustation of
precedent", expansion in this manner was seen by many judges
as acceptable and -necessary . 14 Other courts felt that this could
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be a legitimate exercise for the judiciary, but only where a
legislative intention to allow the civil duty could be discerned .
Unfortunately, there was no guidance on how that intention was
to be determined, the "examination of intention approach"
became a legendary hunt for the "will o' the wisp" and,
consequently, the approach had been castigated by others as
unwarranted judicial intervention and judicial law-making .
Around this same time, the traditional direction taken in
statutory interpretation was if a statute was passed " in the
interests of the country as a whole and not for the benefit or
protection of any particular class of persons"15 then, the sta-
tute's provisions could not be the basis for a civil action for the
individual .
On this conventional analysis the human rights act runs
into difficulties, because of the legislation's dual nature of
serving both a private interest and a public interest. Whereas,
allowing a civil action might serve the private interest, the
public one might fall by the wayside. Typically, this is what is
emphasized by those who see it as acceptable to preclude a
civil remedy .
However, it may be argued that in contrast to there being
a duality of interests ( an individual interest in conflict with
the community interest), what we are actually considering here
is essentially the same interest- one of fair treatment of the
individual within the community, without which both the
individual and the community suffer .
3.The Leeislation as a Comprehensive and Extensive Scheme
In the end, because of the ambiguity surrounding pre-
clusion or inclusion of a civil remedy, both levels of court went
on to examine the matter in depth. The Supreme Court's
principal attack on the possibility of a legislative intention to
include the tort action was through the statute itself . A great
deal of stress was placed this being an extensive and
comprehensive scheme, particularly in respect of the statute's
administrative and adjudicative features . At the same time,
cc5nsiderable emphasis seems to have been placed on the fact
that this was a "Code" . The argument can be attacked on each
accounts . Both extensiveness and comprehensiveness are
conclusions of fact and one may disagree with that conclusion .
Moreover, the term "Code" carries no magic of its own .
a. Getting beyond Labels
It is worrisome that the labelling of a piece of legislation
as a "Code" somehow might have fundamentally altered the
nature of the consideration for the Supreme Court , as codes are
created for a variety of purposes . 1 6 Some simplify, clarify and
modernize the law in an area.1 7 Others, such as the Quebec Civil
Code operate under general rules that lead to the
interpretation of the law. In contrast with both f these
alternatives, the Criminal Code is a compilation of the common
law rules into one book.
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It is debatable as to which of these possibilities the
Ontario Human Rights Code is most closely akin. The Ontario
Code was a compilation of four earlier acts dealing with
discrimination in several fields, and so in this sense is similar in
nature to the Criminal Code . It may be argued what
distinguishes the Ontario Human Rights Code from, say, the
Criminal Code is that the Criminal Code , in s. 8, specifically
precluded the existence of any other common law offences not
included in its works. Also, the Criminal Code specifically set
out all penalties and remedies. The human Rights Code made no
such explicit statement .
Over the years other provinces have also used the title
"code" for their rights legislation, but their provisions are not
necessarily any broader or any more extensive in what they
cover or provide in the way of remedies than the human rights
protection of provinces where the legislation is labelled as an
ordinary "act" . For example, Saskatchewan and Ontario "Codes"
both have quasi-constitutional status, but so does_ the
Individual Right's Protection Act of Alberta .
It would appear that name alone should not assist the
Supreme Court in mounting a persuasive argument against
allowing a civil remedy. If anything, what may be argued is that
the Ontario legislature by using the term "Code" saw the
legislation as a broader ethical statement than ordinary
legislation. Arguably, the designation was initially meant as a
flag to the judiciary to set the human rights legislation apart
from most regulatory legislation and to interpret the legislation
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generously, not narrowly, much in the same way that the
designation "Charter of Rights and Freedoms" has in the public
sphere. Part of that broad interpretation could have easily
included a civil remedy .
At a minimum, a comprehensive and extensive scheme
should entail the existence of a well-functioning human rights
board. As has been shown previously in Chapter 4, academics
have assessed the performance of the boards from time to time
and have found them not only under- budgeted but also
subject to significant political caprices. Moreover, the
ideological bent of the government appointed individual board
members may be so similar to the government's own
philosophy that the board, while acting in good faith, effectively
denies well-founded claims of discrimination or compensates the
complainants by way of nominal awards.
b. Contradiction in the Supreme Court Position
It should be noted that there exists a curious contradiction
in the Supreme Court decision. On the one hand the legislation
was touted as being comprehensive, yet there is no specific
preclusion of civil remedy. It seems strange that the legislature,
having put its mind to all the other issues, would not have made
some pronouncement on the exclusiveness of the legislation as
well, especially considering the legislatures' celebrated vexation
about this time over courts meddling in matters not rightly their
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concern. In the past, that is exactly what the legislature has
done in many administrative law matters .
c.Way Assume Preclusion
One reason why the court might assume preclusion of civil
remedy was explained by Dickson J. in Saskatchewan Wheat
pool
18
a few years after Bhadauria . Justice Dickson stated as
that the legislatures were increasingly stipulating private
remedies for breaches of statutes dealing with consumer
protection, landlord-tenant relations, business organization and
securities legislation, the legislature's silence must now be
taken to indicate an intention not to create civil liability. In
some sense, this is merely a variation of the time-held adage
expressio unius exclusio alterius. where the expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of the other .
This line of reasoning has been criticized by some as
being a reversion to, and a mere reversal of, the "intention
theory" that the courts have usually tried to avoid . At the same
time, it is possible that in specifically stating remedies in these
new legislations, the legislatures, out of an abundance of
caution, are pre-empting the possibility that the court might
not find a civil remedy where the legislature intended
otherwise.
After pointing out that Canadian law is clear that
a
statutory remedy does not automatically preclude a common law
remedy, one writer stressed
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the very existence of a human rights code
bespeaks of a legislative concern with the
social problem. How can it be argued that
judicial recognition of a common law right not
to be discriminated against is contrary
to . inconsistent with , or a usurpation of
legislative
	
prerogatives? 19
The answer to this may be not so much in the recognition of the
right, but in the interpretation of its boundaries, a matter which
will be addressed further in Chapter 8 . Even so, as the writer
went on to note, court decisions have allowed private civil
remedies less compelling in public importance than human
rights legislation . 20
d . Further Reasoning By the Supreme Court
One of the main reasons that the Code was seen by the
Supreme Court as comprehensive in its administrative and
adjudicative features was because courts were not totally
excluded. Instead, the statute included a right of appeal to the
Court on both fact and law. The right of appeal has already
been discussed at in Chapter 4, but it should be reiterated here
that not all provinces carry the same scope for appeal as the
Ontario legislation . In some instances, a right of appeal is not
even mentioned within the legislation
. More important, however,
is the limited extent to which on appeal
a court can look to
substantive issues. Matters are quite differently and typically
;
more narrowly defined than at first instance
. Unfortunately, a
court confined to a postivist perspective has difficulty taking
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this into account in the course of determining whether a civil
remedy can be allowed .
4. The Legislation as a Policy Statement
Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court treated the whole
matter of Bhadauria as a policy issue. Both the Code and the
statutes preceding it were viewed as legislative vehicles
designed to eliminate discriminatory treatment of a persons on
grounds selected by the legislature . 21 The legislature was seen
as creating broad act designed to benefit the private
individual and the community. Thus, the question arose
whether therefore the courts should create an adjunct that
would assumedly serve only certain private interests. If the
courts acceded to private interests they would run into the
problem that" a collateral lawsuit might well undermine , the
whole legislative scheme .
The statute worked towards friendly settlements . In
contrast, adjudication necessarily makes its decision at the
conclusion of an adversarial process. As a condition of
settlement the Human Rights Commission may publicize the
infraction and the awards, but private lawsuits are assumed to
mean private out-of- court settlements,
with little or no
attendant publicity. Thus, to 1 some, it may seem that the
opportunity to educate the public about impermissible conduct
would be circumscribed or totally lost.22 Each premise should
not be unquestioningly accepted . It may also be suggested that
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there are ways of addressing these concerns about publicity and
education of the public.
a. Proceeding Through the Board First
It has been suggested that the person could be required to
go through the Human Rights Commission process first, at least
to the point where it becomes apparent that friendly resolution
is not possible . 2 3 Of course, there are deficiencies associated
with pursuing the board remedy first . To draw from the
experience of labor law, in instances where negotiation also
includes the prospect of binding arbitration, the parties, while
not technically refusing to negotiate, instead take a severe
position, on the basis that this will give their side greater
leverage later on during arbitration. So too, it may be that
human rights cases twinned with the threat of a lawsuit will
cause the "friendly settlements" to become intractable, with
few cases going all the way to successful, peaceful conclusion
through the commission
. 24
b. Attendant Publicity
A few comments may be made with respect to attendant
publicity. Firstly, it may be questioned whether it is the issue
or it is the method which draws the public attention for human
rights cases. For example, a recently publicized human rights
commission case involved a baptized Sikh's being denied entry
to a Royal Canadian Legion. According to the tenets of his faith,
the Sikh would be required to wear the turban and carry the
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kirpan, both of which potentially would be violating Legion
rules against wearing headgear in the presence of the picture of
the Queen and Legion rules against carrying knives on the
premises.
It may be posited that it is the issue that generates
public debate, not the forum. Newspapers cover the incident
because it is controversial. In the circumstances of the case
people find themselves asking what exactly is meant by
discrimination on the basis of religion or race and asking in
what circumstances is it in the best interest of the community
to control a "private club" regulations .
Also, the attendant publicity, so highly touted by those
who stress relying solely on the commissions, goes only to a few,
perhaps unrepresentative, cases.25 Not every human right
commission case becomes publicized, and the average offender
may find it overall in his economic best interests to pay the
price and still discriminate26 At the same time, it should be
noted that, typically, it is not until the case comes before the
judiciary that the greatest publicity arises .
C. Common Law Duty
1 . Action on the Case
In discussing possible ways of accepting a tort, both courts
considered the existence of a common law duty, each to varying
degrees and with differing conclusions . Basically, if accepted,
Bhadauria would have been an "action on case" because it did
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not fall within the. typical categories of cases such as negligence,
trespass, nuisance etc
. 27
By way of explanation, in the early common law all civil
litigation commenced with the issue of the writ indicating the
nature of the plaintiff's case .
Success, however, was totally
dependent on whether a form of action was available for one's
case. If not covered
by any of the specific forms, the case
could not be heard and compensation would not be forthcoming .
The rigidity of this technical system of forms of action
was eased somewhat in the thirteenth century by a new law2
8
authorizing the Clerks of Chancery to create new
writs
whenever new complaints coming before them
were 'in a like
case' ( in consimili casu ), ('
falling under the same right and
requiring like remedy.")
.29
Initially, any new cases were
accepted on the basis of similarity of circumstance or principle .
However, it was later noted by the legal profession that just
as much importance was attached to the general principle
of
providing much needed remedies, as to similarity of principle.3 0
Thus, the law gave the the justice system both the opportunity
and the incentive to experiment with new remedies .
31
Action on the case required that four main elements be
established: a wrong, damage from
that wrong-doing,
32
remedy, and analogy.33 For each court, in any particular case,
the aim was to discover whether community values had, in
effect, given a "right" in the sense of a cognizable claim and
therefore a remedy in common law .
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In Bhadauria,. the plaintiff's case , in part, relied on Ashby
v. White .3 4 where a person had been denied the right to vote
by a returning officer . The oft-quoted statement from Ashby is
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of
necessity have a means to vindicate it and
maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in
the exercise or enjoyment of it; indeed it
is a vain thing to imagine a right without a
remedy; for want of right and want of remedy
are reciprocal. 35
In Jhadauria, the two levels of courts seem to have taken two
different approaches to Ashby and action on the case. The
Supreme Court placed emphasis on the case for the "right"
entailed in Ashby , stressing that voting was to be seen as a
proprietary right,36 which could then warrant a remedy.
However, for Bhadauaria the Supreme Court inferred that there
was no similar proprietary right and, so, Ashby could not be
relied upon for the case at hand .
There is another way of casting the case : basically, the
plaintiff in Ashby had been subjected to discrimination for
which there did not seem to be a readily apparent remedy in
existence at the time. Chief Justice Holt in providing remedy in
Ashby_ was both enforcing the pre-existing right to vote (or
more specifically the right not to be discriminated in respect of
voting) and providing a remedy for that right . This seems to be
the approach the Appeal Court took
. 37
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a. Common law precedent and Bhadauria
Prior to Ihadauria there were few precedents directly
concerned with whether there could be a legally protected
right against discrimination. The three or four cases offered by
the plaintiff were dated prior to the late 1940's, a period
when attitudes were just beginning to change . These were
Rogers v. Clarence38 , Constantine v. Imperial Hotels39, Christie
v. York,40 and ReDrummond Wren41 . Those early cases were
often willing to give priority to freedom of commerce rather
than to non-discrimination.
Rogers v. Clarence Hotel involved refusal to serve a black
in a beer parlor. The majority ofthe Court , in Rogers , saw the
refusal to serve the black as an exercise in freedom of
commerce (which was considered at the time to be a significant
community value)- In Constantine v. Imperial	otels the
defendants, in breach of an innkeepers' duty, refused the
black plaintiff lodgings . However, because he was lodged by the
defendant at another hotel, it was assumed that no actual loss
had occurred, and only nominal damages were awarded. R
Drummond Wren involved a restrictive covenant
on land which
attempted to prohibit the sale of land to Jews. In the case the
judge worried about the spectre of segregation or ghettoization
that might develop if the judicial endorsement f
such
restrictive covenants continued . In the- end,
	
h
several available grounds by which the court could invalidate
the restrictive covenant's provision. "Inter alia,
the covenant
identified
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could be seen as,. a violation of the old Racial Discrimination
Act 42
or as being contrary to the public policy expressed in the
Act. Of these, the judge specifically saw it as contrary to public
policy, arguably, so that the ratio decidendi, in future cases
might be extended beyond restrictive covenants .
b . Supreme Court Response to Action on the Case
The Supreme Court in 15hadauria seems to have interpreted
the need for a pre-existing right in a very narrow fashion,
simply examining whether the majority in any previous court
decision had found a right to non-discrimination. For them for
this to be an action on the case, the plaintiff in Bhadauria
necessarily had to show herself as falling under some exact same
right to be thus, " in a like case" .
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, many cases in the area
were antiquated and could be seen as blatantly discriminatory
in the conclusions.43 The Supreme Court examined the
precedents to date, felt that they inadequately offered the
possibility of a common law tort, and summarily dismissed the
possibility.
Theirs is a very conservative, narrow approach to what
the common law system is , viewing it more in terms of rigid
precedent than as an entity that has vitality or
that
transforms as community values and priorities change
. The
Supreme Court judgment makes no attempt to place common law
precedents within a historical context or to view the role of the
common law as a measure of society's values .
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Moreover, the Supreme Court had a choice . It could have
easily stated that the earlier cases that failed to reproach
these kinds of discriminations were totally out of date with
present realities and could have also concluded that the laissez -
faire doctrine was no longer paramount in today's society. The
Court did neither. It is unfortunate that the judiciary failed to
comment on the validity of these older cases and failed to
directly overturn them . Neither effort would have seriously
undermined the court's conclusion on other bases and the
absence of judicial comment bodes poorly for human rights
development because it failed to dispense with the possibility
that such practices might still be acceptable .
c. The Supreme Court Reasoning with Respect to Precedent
In concluding that no tort action could lie for J5hadaur' a ,
the Supreme Court looked at precedent in a formalistic manner .
In doing so the Court was able to cast cases that might have
been favorable to the plaintiff's position as not necessarily
requiring any reference to the issue of discrimination .
Constantine v. Imperial Hotels . for example , was viewed
as having been decided on innkeeper's liability not on a right
against discrimination . The Supreme Court stated
( ti he common law of innkeeper's liability ,
historically developed along different lines
from that respecting restaurants and taverns ;
keepers of a common inn were under an
obligation to receive travellers or intending
guests, irrespective of race , colour or other
arbitrary
	
disqualification. 44
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While the court might have explored the foundations of
innkeeper liability further, they did not . Had they done so, they
might have considered why non-discrimination was
fundamental part of the history of innkeeper liability in the
first place .
As it turns out, in 1624 Chief Justice Lea explained that
while the liability of innkeepers was not, as had been suggested
at the time, " a custom of the realm" in the sense of a duty that
people readily acknowledged to one another
45
Innkeeper's
liability was a judicially imposed duty, the aim of which was to
counter both the discrimination and the victimization of "aliens
("foreigners") who were travelling through the area by
unscrupulous innkeepers and their "helpers" . 46 The reason
that innkeepers specifically faced these burdens seems to have
been that the complaints that were being placed most frequently
before the courts were against this group . The courts were
preventing them from discriminating and harming foreigners
because innkeepers were the group with the most frequent
opportunity to victimize, defraud or steal or otherwise violate
the rights of visitors.
That was not the only error in respect of precedents that
the Supreme Court was to make in its decision. The Court also
mistakenly drew a distinction between restaurants and
taverns (Christie v. York) and "inns" (Constantine v. Imperial
,Hotel) with respect to liability, seeing only inns as carrying
"innkeeper's liability" .
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Historically at least, an inn for liability "would have been
a place offering food, drink, and if so required, sleeping
accommodation ." 47 Historically, the fast food establishment, the
hotel chain, and the local pub all would have been on equal
footing for liability for non-discrimination. Only in more recent
times has there been differentiation among the types of
establishments (and not for reasons of liability) .
Discounting these minor errors the track for the court was
still relatively clear to be able to conclude that common law
had not heretofore recognized a right to non-discrimination. The
greatest obstacle for the Supreme Court was in respect R
Drummond Wren, where the case was specifically decided on
the basis that there now existed a public policy of non-
discrimination.
At this juncture the Supreme Court had two choices
available to it. In light of earlier cases the Court could view
the decision in Re Drummond Wren as an anomaly or it could
find that the case was actually decided on another basis . Using
a little judicial sleight of hand the Supreme Court concluded
that because another case also dealing with restrictive
covenants, and decided around the same time, was found
invalid on the basis of uncertainty and restraint of alienation, 48
that this necessarily must have been the "true' basis on which
Drummond Wren had been decided, irrespective of the grounds
the judge in the case gave for invalidating the covenant .
If Judge Mckay of Re Drummond Wren was around at the
time Bhadauria was decided, he might have felt like Lewis
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Carroll's Alice upon encountering Humpty - Dumpty, finding
words taking on a peculiarity of meaning all their own.
49
If it
is inappropriate under positivism for the judiciary to consider
what the law should be, it would seem similarly inappropriate
for the judiciary to speculate on what might have been the "real
basis" on which another judge's case should have been decided,
unless they are willing to reverse it or explicitly disti nguish
it. 5 0
d. The Appeal Court Reponse to Action on the Case
By way of contrast, Madame Justice in the Court of Appeal
decision was aware of the lack of strong precedent directly
dealing with non- discrimination, and so took another tack .
She placed less emphasis on precedent and directed her
attention more to determining whether "community values" had
now seen fit to protect these particular interests of the
plaintiff (those interests being the right to not be discriminated .
against and to not suffer injury as
result of that
discrimination)
. Madame Justice Wilson stressed the rights were
not created by the statute, just recognized by it .
In a sense, this may be considered a view of rights as
extant, as opposed to claim that first has to be recognized by
an official body as legitimate. The Court of Appeal relied
heavily on an argument of the existence of a "public policy" of
non- discrimination, a policy which in reality had only gained
recognition and momentum either on the national or the
international scene comparatively recently .
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While equality (even in the limited sense of and for certain
persons) may have dated back to the Magna Carta,
discrimination was not formally declared as reprehensible until
the late 1940's in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . Despite the U + 'vernal Declaration's non- binding
status, Canada was not ready to sign the document in 1948 .
Indeed , it-was not until Canada realized that by not signing , it
would be in the company of non-democratic countries such as
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Soviet bloc countries (which
even then were noted for their egregious violations of human
rights), that Canada eventually changed its position .5
1
It took until 1966 before there was drafted a legally
binding responsibility on signatory states to ensure non-
discrimination. Even this later instrument, the International
Covenant on Civ'1 and PoliticalRights,
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did not come into
force until ten years after its intial presentation to the United
Nations. 53 Canada's own intransigence may have been, in
part,
responsible for the fact the Court of Appeal had very few
precedents in support of a "public policy " argument. The cases
offered were dated from the 1940's when attitudes were just
beginning to change. For the most part,, early courts
were
willing to give priority to freedom of commerce rather than to
non-discrimination.
e. Use of Precedent by the Court of Anneal .
In order to stay
	
away from some of the negative
beginnings that the Supreme Court so easily accepted as "the
law", and in order to build an effective argument,
	
Madame
Justice relied on the dissent of Mr. Justice O' Halloran in Rogers
v. Clarence Hotel . There, justice 0' Halloran maintained that the
denial of service was contrary to the common law principle of
equality for all British subjects (a principle that he saw as
"elementary" and "deeply rooted" in the British system of
justice). Ordinarily, relying on a dissent judgment may be
weak tactic , except where the intention is to show that there
has been a change in people's thinking ..
Madame justice then took cases from a -variety of areas-
restrictive covenants, contracts, innkeeper's liability and tried
to find an overarching principle that reasonably explained the
results in the cases. The principle that she arrived at was that
there existed public acknowledgement that discrimination was
not only morally reprehensible, but legally unacceptable as well ..
Through the use of those cases, Madame justice came to
the conclusion that they evinced a cause of action at common
law.-5 4 One other early case not mentioned by Wilson , Johnson
v. Soarrow, would have given further support to the
proposition. There, the failure to allow black couple
`admission
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to the theatre after they had paid was actionable ,
not necessarily on an action for discrimination but as a breach
of contract .
In Madame Justice's Wilson assessment, each of previous
judicial decisions underscored the existence of a continui ng legal
policy against discrimination . Legislation in the field merely
recognized that same policy. Working from the sparse under-
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pinnings that these cases gave . Madame Justice Wilson went to
the Preamble of the Code and held that it, too, evinced "what
is now, and probably has been for some considerable time, the
public policy of this province respecting fundamental human
rights." 55 Thus, the Code was seen as recognizing, or perhaps
demarcating the bounds of, a right that already existed .
2. Common Law and Public Policy
The question throughout Dhadauria was whether it
could be argued that the plaintiff had a pre-existing right .
Arguably, the Code could be seen as creating a right (by means
of a statutory duty), but, as previously mentioned, Madame
Justice foreclosed the possibility when she stated that "Iwlhile
the fundamental right we are concerned with is recognized by
the Code, it was not created by it. "56
But if not created by the Code, from where could the
protection come? The answer to that, quite simply, was from
the part of the common law known as judicially recognized
"public policy". From her statements it would appear that
Madame justice rested her analysis on an inherent common law
right, exemplified by the public policy statement in the
preamble to the Code .
a. The Concept of Public Policy
By way of introduction to the concept of "public policy, it
was mentioned earlier that the focus of tort law has been the
protection of certain community priorities . Centuries after the
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protection of traditional values of integrity of the body and
property came gradual extensions to matters like emotional or
psychological integrity, so that the protection of reputation
created actions in libel and slander . The changes have continued .
One hundred and fifty years ago, or even forty years ago,
community values would not have viewed discrimination as
repugnant, but societal values have been tempered somewhat
since then. From time to time these sensibilities became
judicially noticed as public policy ."
Unfortunately, there is a lot of ambiguity in that
catchword . "Public policy" is capable of being twinned with
variety of discordant expressions and perspectives, even
personal preferences. In the words of a nineteenth century
judge- unharnessed, public policy could be an unruly horse,
dangerous to ride.5
7
Still, other members of the judiciary have
recognized its benefits . As Lord Denning put it
With a good man In the saddle, the unruly
horse can be kept in control. It can jump
over obstacles . It can leap fences
put by
fictions and come down on the side of
justice. 58
As one example of what has been considered public policy",
one judge, considering a restrictive covenant that prohibited
sale of land to Jews, asserted that "lalny
agreement which
tends to be injurious to the public or against the public
good is
void as being contrary to public
policy .
59
From this
perspective, there seems to be the need of some evidence of
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harm to the public. Restrictive covenants that would tend
segregate and ghettoize people would create such a harm
There are other approaches. The Quebec equivalent
	
f
public policy" is ordre public ( aconcept involving public
order and good morals). 60 Within common law when we speak
of something as "against public policy", the phrase may
respectively mean "against opinion", "against public values" or
somehow " against the law". The difficulty with pinning down
what constitutes "public policy " is further exacerbated by the
fact that " public policy varies from time to time"
. 61
While greatly advantageous at times, this flexibility and
responsiveness to changing circumstances can also be criticized
as leaving the concept so vague as to be, at best , unwieldy , or
at worst, judicial meddling . Thus, it became imperative for
Madame Wilson that she have some concrete foundation on
which to base her assertion of the existence of a public policy
with specific boundaries.
In a way, this reasoning would seem to have a degree of
circularity to it. Having said the right existed prior to the
legislation, why would Wilson now turn to the legislation to
prove something that existed prior to the legislation's
enactment. Even if confirming a principle that had been in a
series of prior enactments, there would seem to be nothing to
indicate whether the first in the series was an embodiment of
a pre-existing right or a newly created one .
Once again, A he confusion here results from the amorphous
nature of "public policy" . Among other things public policy may
be seen as existing
i . prior to legislation ( giving the impetus
to legislation , and once successful being
totally embodied by the legislation),
ii . subsequent to the legislation ( a
legislative decision to change the ways
things are done, irrespective
	
what a
particular group or groups of voters may say
they want), or
iii. independent of legislation (running
parallel with a statute or standing
irrespective of a statute - due to a
constitutional division of powers issue) .
Justice Wilson seemed to be of the opinion that the public
policy she is addressing existed independent of the legislation,
but the other two posssibilities are just as likely. Indeed, as
Wilson herself has noted, considering the fact that at the time
of the earliest anti-discrimination legislation, no judge except
perhaps O'Halloran had made judicial comment might be in
any way reprehensible. The legislation seems more likely to
have been put ' in place to change people's behaviours than as
indication of it .
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Nevertheless, Madame justice might have a reasonable
rebuttal to this suggestion. The preamble to the Ontario Code
talks about codifying, extending earlier enactments and simp-
lifying their administration. Codification, as we saw earlier,
often means taking that which is in the common law and
placing it within the framework of a statute . Codification is
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often done for clarification purposes such as when a practice
has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction . In this sense policy
existed prior to the legislation . Also, once again, a legislature
can enact only that which is within its constitutional ambit .
When it legislates in this area, the provincial legislature is
dealing in ways that it sees best the s . 92 provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867 that it is empowered to handle. So,
provinces can cover discrimination in services, goods,
accommodation and employment, but cannot deal with
discrimination in matters of federal concern . 64 Public policy
against discrimination, as conceived by the common law, may
well extend beyond those limitations on the province's power .
In that sense as well, it exists as an extant and more far
reaching right than the provincial legislation .
b. The Scope of the Public Policy
It is evident that simply demonstrating the existence of
the right is not enough, its scope must also be shown . The
reason delineation is considered so imperative is because it is
felt that, otherwise, the court would be left with a policy over
which it would have no control- a case of an unruly and
unbridled horse. The Supreme Court in iihadauria were of the
opinion that Madame Justice Wilson was relying on the Code to
provide those necessary standards . 6 5 Others, too, have felt the
Court of Appeal made much of the fact that the particular- type
of discrimination the plaintiff alleged was condemned in the
preamble to the code .
66
It thus would be difficult for Wilson to
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employ the argument that the nature of public policy against
discrimination was any broader than which the legislature
acknowledged.
Yet, if she acceded to the conclusion that public policy was
no broader than the statute, then the question becomes why rely
on the common law at all? The answer has two aspects . Firstly, it
is the categories of discrimination ( such as race, creed, sex)
that Wilson is relying on, not necessarily the provisions of the
legislation such as employment, services or accommodation . To
that end, it should be noted that Madame justice specifically
mentioned only the Preamble, and not s . 4 of the Code.
Secondly, from her perspective, the legislation has set only the
administrative scheme for those who want to use the human
rights commission's services. The plaintiff in J3hadauria did not .
For the plaintiff it is the common law that is relevant .
c. The Search for Certainty
Nevertheless, none of this addresses the issue of whether
there is sufficient certainty in the Preamble . The words to the
Preamble of the Code seems sanguine, speaking of "inherent
dignity" and equal and inalieanble rights
. .. of the human
family ` as the foundation of freedom justice and peace in the
world. " Reference to public policy of the preamble is equally
hortatory:
And Whereas it is public policy in
Ontario that every
	
person is free and equal
in dignity and rights without regard to race,
creed, colour . .. And Whereas these
enactments have been confirmed in a
number of enactments of the
legislature. 67
Arguably the allusion to confirmation of principles in the
preamble gave Madame justice evidence of the strength and
continuity of this public policy . Thus it can be maintained that
it is neither temporary nor a "will o' the wisp" . Reference to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Code further
underscored that the policy was not idiosyncratic to Ontario
either, but perhaps an obligation cognizable at international
law.
Unfortunately, some may argue that words like "equal in
dignity and rights" are grounded in such vagueness and
generality as to be virtually worthless . The words may be
seen by some as salutory gestures giving no substance to the
term "public policy Without a firm core, judicial
pronouncements on public policy fall prey to the accusation of
judicial law-making .
Others may argue that phrases offer no direction as to the
way the public policy would be best effectuated. Consider for a
moment as a contrast, Re Drummond Wren. There, the court
was dealing with a deed of land and property law has
underlying it a general principle of freedom of alienation of
land. Consequently, the type of case (real property, combined
with a public policy that stressed there should not be
discrimination as that would be a restraint on alienation)
almost directly pointed at only one possible answer for the
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judges- invalidating the restrictive covenant. In Bhadauria the
same sort of conclusive result is more elusive .
A few points- need be made at this juncture . As an aside, it
is submitted that judicial activism may not be an undesirable
state of affairs in the area of human rights. Secondly, judges in
civil jurisdictions and at international law have been working
with exactly the same kind of generously worded articles for
some time now, with positive results. With respect to common
law , the Charter with its open texture has been giving our own
judiciary the same experience . Admittedly, the exercise has not
always been easy.
The fact that no one set direction is given in the preamble
may not be disadvantageous. The need for prohibition occurs as
quickly as people's ability to develop new prejudices and
methods of demonstrating those prejudices . The latitude offered
gives the Court of Appeal a better chance at, not only best cap-
turing the rights the person really has but also, in molding
the remedy to the right.
d. Public Policy and the Rights-Based Perspective
It is hypothesized
here that Madame justice may well be
according a Dworkinian approach to the problem in Bhadauria .
In the view of Ronald Dworkin
it is permissible for a judge to
"make law", as long as she looks to overarching principles
and
decides the case in a manner that better captures the rights that
peope actually have .
If therefore some case arises as to which
the rule book is silent or if the words in
the rule book are subject to competing
interpretation, then it is right ] for the
judge] to ask which of the possible decisions
in the case fits the background moral rights
of the parties.68
With regard to Bhadauria. it is submitted that, for Madame
Justice Wilson, the policy statement exemplified a moral right
to be given equal consideration in employment, which in turn is
predicated upon a right to equality. Also, although Madame
Justice was relying on a policy statement, she was
not
necessarily considering the collective welfare, at least, not in
any utilitarian sense. If it was a collective welfare,
it was
more akin to A J.M. Milne's perspective that the overall good
for the community is to protect individual and is to assure
equality of treatment.
D. Statutory Duties
In contrast the Supreme Court placed most of its emphasis
in Bhadauria
not so much on common law duties, but more on
whether room could be found
for a statutory responsibility
entailing a civil suit .
1 Strict Liability
Chief Justice Laskin started the majority's analysis with a
discussion of breach of statutory duty
. Laskin acknowledged
that cases relying on statutes "have been used in the area of
negligence, with the legislation viewed as establishing standards
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of behaviour, and deviation, unless excused, amounting
to a
species of strict liability." 69 His words gave little by way of
hint as to the propriety or impropriety of that usage, but some
have concluded that he was suggesting that reliance on statutes
for anything more than just standards of conduct in negligence
actions was an unwelcome extension of the common law .
Laskin's comments typify a concern about relying
on
statutes as evidence of the existence of civil remedy. Laskin
assumed strict liability would be involved in Bhadauria That
particular conclusion came about "especially in regard to the
way in which the issue herein arose" . There may well be a
confusion of terms here. With talking about "strict
liability"
there are a couple of discrete matters to which the Chief justice
might be referring, vicarious liability and "liability without
fault".
2. Vicarious-Liability
The rights issue in Bhadauria arose when the personnel
department had not responded to the plaintiff's
applications.
Laskin may have been referring
to the fact that some
individual, as opposed to the College as a corporate body,
may
have been responsible for the decision to exclude Ms
. Bhadauria,
leaving the College vicariously liable
70
Thus, . . the Court may
have been concerned about the issue of an employer's vicarious
liability for the acts of its employees
. Under this principle only
misfeasance of the employee need be show
. Once that hurdle
has been met, the employer will be held for the damages
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flowing from those acts. In this sense, there is liability strictly
applied. However, it has been only quite recently that the
Courts have started to find employers vicariously liable for the
actions of their employees in respect of human rights
violations
. 71
3. Liability Without Fault
While in some respect loosely connected to vicarious
liability, as a term of art, strict liability "means liability without
the necessity' of finding fault, that is, liability where fault is not
a relevant issue, whether or not it in fact exists ." On a
jurisprudential basis, we are more likely to hold people legally
liable where they intend their act. Strict liability, intuitively,
seems to runs counter to that impulse by making the person
liable even if they have taken reasonable steps to prevent the
event from occurring.
Laskin was cognizant that strict liability had been prob-
lematic in jurisprudence, particularly English jurisprudence,
about this time. Under the British regime, breach of the statute
was seen as negligence per se . No relaxation of the standard of
reasonable behaviour was possible under strict liability . The
result was viewed as unduly onerous to the defendant
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4. The l ifficulties of Strict Liability
Because of the British reliance on statutes (which, typically,
had typically been to support a particular standard of care in
negligence actions), Laskin may have assumed that strict
liability was involved. If so, then there are difficulties with the
Supreme Court's analysis in Bhadauria It must be emphasized
that this was not a tort in negligence. As Laskin pointed out
early in the Bhadauria decision, this was an intentional tort- it
being presumed on the facts that Seneca College or its agents
intended to discriminate73
Historically, the categories of intentional torts have been a
rag-bag , but in contrast to negligence, in each instance there is
positive mental state of either foresight and desire of
consequences or certainty of consequences74 Intentional torts
need not carry strict liability75 A variety of defences are
available and they are tailored to the circumstances of the
particular intentional tort. At most, what may be argued is that
this proposed new intentional tort does not readily fall into any
of these categories of rebuttal . In result, there might exist strict
liability . Nevertheless, we know however that the Ontario Code
does permit certain exceptions and defences - for example for
affirmative action ("special programs", s . 19),76 for certain age
categories (s.14) or for bona fide occupational requirement
(s.10). If the public statute created the right, as Laskin seemed
to presume, it would seem foolhardy to not consider it as a
possible source for defences77
5 . The Strengths of
Strict Liability
Even if strict liability was involved, that may
not
necessarily be an unfortunate state of affairs
. Strict liability,
despite its limitations, has served in many instances a
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constructive purpose. There have been circumstances where
society has decided that a particular harm is of such gravity that
they have legislated strict liability for offences of that kind .
Typically, these occur in public welfare offences such as
pollution, but they also surface in places such as s . 246 .1 (2)
of the Criminal Code where consent to sexual activity with a
young teenager is no defence, even if that person is believed to
older . 78 There, the perceived harm to youth in general was
seen as outweighing a defence of consent for the accused
. 79
In other instances too, the possible harm to society in general
was seen as outweighing the excuse . In the area of tort law,
strict liability typically enters into the equation where an
extraordinary peril to society has been created and an ordinary
standard of care will not suffice .
Basically, strict liability is in place in these instances
because it is so difficult to prove either intent or conventional
negligence, and the harm to society is so great. The question at
this point becomes, does discrimination fall into such a
category? Arguably it may. In its worst form, discrimination
and the inequality it entails not only generates distrust among
people, but also in the worst cases leads to open violence .80
While strict liability may be problematic in some ways to
a tort of discrimination, it would not appear to be determinative
of whether the tort should exist .
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E. Problems of Being an Economic Tort
In the view of the Supreme Court there were still other,
possibly more serious, difficulties in acknowledging discrim-
ination as a tortious behaviour. For one thing, justice Laskin
earmarked this as an "economic tort" . 81 Once - again there seems
to be an imprecision of terms here- with possible confusion of
"eco-nomic torts" with "pure economic loss or with "com-
pensation for loss of economic opportunity"
1 . The""conomic Tort"
As a term of art, what is usually meant by "economic tort"
is the protection by compensation of a person's interest in
earning a living or a company's interest in the running of its
business . 82 Difficulties with the grounding of an economic tort
lay in the nature of the right:
[w] e can hardly say that there is a legal right
to one's living in the way that there is a right
in property, because although neither
interest is unqualified , the former is qualified
almost to the point of extinction by the
similar right of one's competitors-83
For the most part, compensation for this kind of loss has been
denied by the courts, who tend to view it as being capable f
creating a drastic economic restructuring
. "For, to take but one
obvious example, it would clash with the paramount policies of
a free market economy if the prospect of economic loss to a
competitor should impede one's commercial activities ."
84
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Even further removed from the case of the company whose
actions have hurt another's business, are where one party's
actions has hurt another's job prospects . What should be
remembered, however, is that Ms . Bhadauria was not claiming a
"right" to work, but rather the loss of opportunity to compete
on an equal basis with other applicants .
2."Pure Economic Loss"
A second possibility as to what the court may have meant
by this being an "economic tort " - is that there may have been
"pure economic loss". By this, what is meant is damage that is
totally unconnected to a head of physical damage . Compensation
for "pure economic loss has been a concept that has been
developing very slowly in torts. Whereas the judiciary has been
willing to consider economic loss deriving from physical injury
(for example, loss of wages as a result of an automobile accident
or loss of profits flowing from damage to a piece of machinery),
other economic losses were generally left to fall where they
may. The distinction between what was allowed and what was
not resulted, in part, from the fact that the former losses were
already tied to core areas of tort protection-- physical damage
to person or property. 85 Although in tort law there has been
categorical refusal to protect contractual expectancies against
negligent
	
damage", . it is noteworthy that the courts have
been more willing to redress loss against
intentional
damage, 86 which of course would have been the case for
Bhadauria .
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Like "economic tort", compensation for pure economic loss
has been seen by the judiciary as _having potentially drastic
ramifications in terms of economic redistribution . Such changes
to the balance of power has been considered, in some quarters,
as a political role believed inappropriate for the judiciary.
Courts typically worried about defendants could be facing vast
liability in situations where the parties were, heretofore,
legally unconnected and legally not responsible
. Theoretically
speaking, it is often assumed that the situation would be
further compounded by the fact often there would be no way
for the tortfeasors to spread the loss to a larger group, such as
the public. The impact on the group's liability, therefore, would
be disproportionate to any benefit they might receive .
In considering these economic ramifications for the parties
and society as a whole, the courts , until relatively
recently,
have preferred not to intervene in actions for pure economic
loss. It is easy to see those kinds of concerns coming to the
fore in Bhadauria
what we have here . . .is a species of economic
tort new in its instance, and founded , even if
indirectly, on a statute enacted in an area
outside a recognized area of common law duty .
It is one thing to apply a common law duty of
care . to standards under a statute .. . It is
auite a different thing to create by iudicial
fiat an obligation . . toconfer an economic
benefit upon certain persons, with whom
the alleged obligor has no connection,
and solely on the basis of a breach of
statute which itself provides comprehensively
remedies for its breach.(emphasis added)87
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The Supreme Court went on to say that what was involved in
Bhadauria was a refusal to recruit or to employ, and that
refusal to enter into contractual relations had not been
considered in common law as giving rise to any liability in tort .
That, of course, is an erroneous characterization of what
transpired . What the plaintiff lost was a fair chance at being
considered for the position and that is tortiously compensable
as loss of economic opportunity .
3 :'Loss of Economic Opportunity"
Laskin's reference to this case as an "economic tort" carries
at least three possible meanings. Of these, compensation for
loss of economic opportunity is the most likely, "especially in
light of how the circumstances arose". Yet compensation for
loss of opportunity is probably easiest for a juidge to handle .
Admittedly, elements such as how long the plaintiff might have
been employed by the College or how far she might have
advanced might be open to conjecture, and courts typically
avoid those precise calculations simply because of the vicis-
situdes of life. Nevertheless, the court could still quantify the
plaintiff's chance of success had she been permitted to
interview using simple probabilities .
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Undoubtedly, the
estimation would be very rough, but it is still a task that the
Court carries out on a regular basis
. 89
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F. Floodgates
In Bhadauria there may also have been an undercurrent of
fear that if the tort was permitted the court would not be able
to contain its effect to the parties involved. The damages paid
by the College might be passed on to the public by way of
increased fees, but there would be both political and regulatory
limits on that capacity to pass these on .
Perhaps even more worrisome to the court was the
possibility that the floodgates were being opened to any kind of
distinction made among applicants . One can imagine the
situation of a large number of applicants for positions, all
claiming discrimination (rightly or wrongly) and all with whom
the respondents would have had no previous connection
whatsoever. In each instance a College ( or any prospective
employer) would be leaving itself open to a lawsuit which it
would have to defend or settle .
A few comments need to be made with respect to this
argument though. As we have seen in the Charter area, legal
reasoning develops on a case-by-case basis to establish the
what constitutes reasonable distinctions as opposed to what
constitutes "discrimination" . This case-by-case development
holds back the flood.
Also, it a misconception to see the parties as unconnected .
They are part of the same community whose continued
existence depends on conditions of which trust, promise and
respect of the rights of others . 90 Without these there could be
2 67
no joint undertakings, no systematic co-operation, and as a
result no community
. 91
Also, expansion of liability, especially in the human rights
area, may not necessarily be disadvantageous if, in effect, it
would dissuade discrimination . Arguably, it would take
merely a few well publicized cases of heavy damages to change,
not only this employer's behaviour, but to act as a caveat to
others as well. Reliance on this method of altering behaviour
will depend on how important we consider non-discrimination
to be .
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CHAPTER 8 :
FRAMEWORK OF THE TORT
I . Introduction
Despite tort law's theoretical advantages in the area of
human rights, some writers may suggest that judges are unlikely
to become involved in this area of law without a practical
framework within which to work . Some may argue that there is
so much that could fall within the rubric of "human rights", the
task would be fraught with vagueness and uncertainty. Without
perceivable boundaries, expansion of judicial efforts in the area
of non- Charter human rights may be seen as transcending
legitimate activism . That same need for certainty and clarity
affects each of us as we try to organize our lives according to
the law .
Concomitantly, we are reminded that law will not com-
pensate all losses . Academics tell us that shifting of loss will be
justified only where there a reason for the defendant to bear it,
rather than the plaintiff on whom it happened to fall .1 Once
again, it needs to be shown that there are borders between what
will and what will not be compensated .
At the outset, it must be emphasized that there are very
specific boundaries to both human rights and the tort law that
would buttress it . This chapter considers a framework that can
be set for torts in the area of human rights . Firstly, it is
suggested that international law can be used to define and set
boundaries of the human rights torts . Using the tort of
2 7 6
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discrimination as an example, this chapter illustrates how
international law can define terms like "discrimination". That
same law can establish a starting point for categories of
prohibition and offer precedents as a guide to interpretation .
This approach of relying on international law not only
would be in keeping with the international obligations Canada
has undertaken, but it could also respond to questions and
issues that otherwise seem intractable . Often the "intractable"
becomes less so when set against the standards of the larger
international community, with the experience of that community
serving to establish an understanding of what is "objectively"
discriminatory . 2
II . The Tort of Discrimination
A . The Matter of Definition
From time to time one encounters the argument that there
is nothing per se wrong with "discrimination" . Some people,
relying heavily on "the authority of the dictionary",3 would have
us believe that "discrimination" is "nothing more than the
expression of a preference" .4 Thus, discrimination, at worst,
would be neutral in its effect, because the making of distinctions
is the mark of individuality. But discrimination is more than
merely making distinctions over personal characteristics5 we
like or dislike. To reduce it to this denotative meaning is to
denigrate a term of art. If discrimination simply meant to
differentiate, then discrimination might be more tenable .
However, the differentiation becomes used as a justification to
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ends detrimental to others. At that point, discrimination is no
longer a neutral term .
For others, discrimination is more a procedural issue which
fails to meet two criteria :1) the rules used to dispense rewards
or penalties must be legitimate and 2) the set of standards used
to dispense the rewards or penalties must be impartially
applied .
From this perspective, it is maintained that the problem is
not that "unwarranted discrimination" should be eliminated, but
that there are problems in identifying such practices . Under this
approach, the whole question becomes what constitutes an
"unwarranted" distinction : "Iiln short, the key to understanding
unwarranted discrimination lies in the establishment of valid
selection criteria .
,,6
Putting aside for the moment the proposition
that this is an excessively narrow definition of discrimination
that ignores historical imbalances,
7
the proposition, nonetheless,
poses a serious consideration-- that in looking for criteria there
is the need for an objective standard, one that lies beyond
personal morality. It is argued in this chapter that the objective
standard already exists. It comes from the community and
included in that definition of "community" is the international
community. 8
Through covenants, treaties and declarations the inter-
national community has provided not only a definition of what
discrimination is, but also provided specific examples of
situations within which it can objectively be seen to be
operating . As previously mentioned, at international law
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"discrimination is defined as occurring when in a given case no
sufficient connection exists between the equality or inequality
aspects on the one hand and the nature of the treatment on the
other ." Sufficient connections exist only where the classification
is relevant to the subject, fairly related to it, not capricious or
arbitrary, but instead reasonable and just . 9 The distinction must
be "real and substantial" and that classification must be relevant
to the objects .
10
Internationally, over the last few decades, communities
have had to tackle this question of definition . The European
Human Rights Court has established that discrimination occurs
and the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the
distinction has no valid objective or reasonable justification
. 11
The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation
to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration and
regard is given to principles which normally prevail in
democratic societies . This must not only pursue a legitimate aim,
for the article is also violated when it is not clearly established
that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim to be realized.
12
At international law, it has been noted that discrimination
may be "wrongly equal or wrongly unequal treatment" 1 3 which,
in turn, is to be judged in relation to the nature of the subject
matter regulated . 14 I litIlt therefore would be inappropriate to try
to reach a decision concerning the occurrence of discrimination
without an examination of the subject matter regulated ." 15
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Within the international definition of the term, the non-
discrimination principle must be regarded as implying not only
formal equal treatment but also the attainment of material
equality. Accordingly, non-discrimination is not only a matter
of equal treatment of essentially equals, but also of unequal
treatment of essentially unequals.
To assist in the determination of "wrongful unequal
treatment" the international documents enumerate prohibited
grounds of discrimination. Both the Universal Declaration and
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, for example,
set out race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status
as prohibited grounds . In that the international obligations
establish specific explicitly prohibited grounds of discrimination,
this definition of discrimination creates the necessary objective,
community-based standards .
Each category of prohibition represents that which was
perceived at the time of the drafting of the internationmal
document as a particularly problematic area. At the same time,
each category of prohibition also reflects a fundamental and
underlying principle: the unreasonableness of the distinction
with respect to the treatment . In each instance there is a lack of
sufficient connection between the inequality and the nature of
the treatment. It is this principle which offers tremendous
potential for expanding prohibited grounds of discrimination in
tort law past the inequities of any particular decade .
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International bodies also recognized that there could be
other similar situations (or "statuses") that would not meet the
test of "sufficient connection". Today, the necessity of "sufficient
connection" offers the prospect of establishing other prohibited
grounds, including marital status, criminal arrest or conviction,
family relationship, sexual orientation, and source of income. In
so much as "status" is defined as "state, condition or relation",
both physical and mental disability would be covered, as would
age.
III . Use of International Law to Meet Canadian Division of
Powers Problems
For the Canadian judiciary, reliance on basic international
minimums can effectively serve several objects . First, it part-
ially resolves the jurisdictional problems that Canada has had up
to now, a problem which has prevented Canada from internally
implementing the international obligations to which the country
has committed itself .
16
It also avoids the political myopia of
time and place . It recognizes criterion external to Canada in
which personal or particular social morality become irrelevant :
each must obey the law. Equality and non-discrimination no
longer become matters of tolerance. Reliance on international
instruments by the Canadian judiciary is not extirely novel . It
has been used in common law cases in the past 17 and is
becoming progressively more significant with the advent of
Charter of Rights and Freedoms .' 8
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TV. Elements of the Tort of Discrimination
Academic writers have established a framework to exam-
ine and explain curial decisions for actions, looking at duty of
care, breach, heads of damage, remoteness, factual causation,
complete defences, apportionment and measure of damages . It
has been pointed out that substantial gaps in any one of the
requirements may lead to rejection of the case by the courts
.19
Drawing upon that framework, this chapter sets out the most
likely shape a tort of discrimination would take .
A. Necessary Level of Fault for the Tort
Strict liability, negligence, and intentional actions operate
as three overlapping standards for the degree of fault required
in an action of discrimination. Of these, prima facie, intentional
incidents of discrimination would probably be the ones that the
courts would acknowledge most readily. It is also the one for
which the courts probably would be most willing to award
punitive and aggravated damages . Having intended to harm the
person, the actor would readily be held liable because deliberate
injury is usually devoid of all social utility . At the same time,
excepting some intervening social policy, one is held responsible
for the harm one causes .20 Thus, the usual limits on freedom of
action have been met .
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1 . LimitationsoftheIntention for Tort Liability
There are numerous problems with relying solely on an
intentional basis for the anti-discrimination action though. The
type of legal "intention", here, means more than just intending
to act, 21 it refers also to "intending the adverse consequences" .
Few discriminatory actions can be seen to fall into this category .
More often than not, discrimination occurs not out of malice, but
out of routine, tradition, a particular view of economics,
paternalism, or simply not thinking.
22
Indeed, human rights advocates consistently have stressed
that adherence to a concept of "intention" has seriously hamp-
ered the effectiveness of human rights laws?3 By focussing so
strenuously on the mental state of the actor, this form of fault
shifted attention from the consequences to the victim .Z4 Reliance
on intention also made it hard to call into question policies and
practices that appear neutrally motivated but where the
exclusionary consequences on the others are nonetheless real . 2
5
Additionally, the concept of intent has been recognized as
producing a series of almost insuperable factual difficulties,
with individual cases becoming bogged in the vagaries of finding
the intention . 2 6 However, to overcome this it might be argued
that proof of differential treatment constituted relevant and
important evidence from which intent could be inferred .
27
Consequently, it would appear that focussing on the actor
intending certain consequences limits the usefulness of the
approach. Even if intention was expanded to include a form of
recklessness 28 (which is to say, not caring about the con-
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sequences of the action), it would still have very limited
application .
Recognizing these drawbacks, attempts have been made to
expand the definition of "intention" . The interpretation has
shifted so that "...intentional discrimination was meant to denote
either that the respondent desired to cause a disadvantage to a
protected group or that he was conscious of the fact that such a
consequence would result from his actions ."
29
This meaning was
sufficiently broad to include both discrimination based on malice
or evil motives and discriminatory acts which were motivated
by neutral or even positive considerations but which were
known to cause a disadvantage to a protected class
.30
It may be necessary to consider other than intentional
harms for more than just these reasons . For one thing it is felt
that to apply a single method of analysis for all forms of
discrimination would only compel parties to gloss over relevant,
but complex, issues31
2 . Strict Liability
At the other end of the spectrum of fault lies strict liabil-
ity. This would see any "discriminatory" act, as defined by the
courts, as automatically leading to liability . No intention to
discriminate would be necessary here . However, as discussed in
Chapter 7, here the problem is that strict liability is usually
seen as entailing unduly severe consequences to potential
defendants, with the substantial restriction on activity . The res-
ponse to strict liability typically is a fear that this would impose
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an undue burden and tend to discourage enterprise. In response,
the courts may read the concept of "discrimination" or the scope
of the prohibited grounds in such a narrow fashion that ef-
fectively negates any substantive remedy. Thus, strict liability
is unlikely to take a significant place in establishing a tort of
discrimination unless it can be shown to the courts that the
harm caused by discrimination is sufficiently grave to merit the
more onerous level of liability .
3 . Negligence
In light of the limitations of both strict liability and
intentional torts, it is posited here that the most fruitful area
for a tort of discrimination may be that of negligence, where
negligence is defined as occurring where the defendant has
failed to live up to an objective, community-based standard of
what is reasonable32 In comparison to intentional injuries,
curial protection against unintended harms are typically more
modest. This is because greater weight is given to the
countervailing interest of the defendant in freedom of action .
There will always be a limit on that freedom when it exceeds
boundaries set by the community .
The question at this juncture becomes what that community
standard should be . Typically, the "common law" is considered as
"backward looking" and conservative, pronouncing only on what
society has already strongly accepted as reasonable in practice .
This view sees the common law as following public opinion, not
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leading it. For that reason "community" should not be limited to
the regional criterion .
Alternatively, in the search for community standards an
easy choice for the judiciary would be reference to elements
common throughout the human rights legislation . The drawback
to this approach is that applying it only to grounds uniformly
found throughout Canada would effectively limit the actions to
the four prohibited categories : race, sex, physical disability and
colour. This is far too narrow to be an accurate representation of
community standards, Canadian or otherwise, let alone common
morality .
Another choice would be to rely on any ground that existed
in any province's legislation. While this course would certainly
attach a certain "legitimacy" to the judge's activism and cer-
tainly could be considered evidence of "no sufficient connection",
the drawback to this approach is that the tack is subject to the
political suasions of particular interest groups . To focus solely
on those quite legitimate exercises of power may leave by the
wayside other equally legitimate claims heretofore unsuccessful
in political pressuring . At the same time, actions tied to "what
is" fall prey to the spectre of being tied to a particular time and
place .
Instead, it becomes more important to turn to an under-
lying principle33 such as "sufficient connection", as previously
discussed, without explicit regard to categories and then use
policy considerations as a restriction on the duty .
287
B. Duty of Care
The framework of any tort requires consideration of duty
of care. As has already been shown part of that duty flows from
the definition of discrimination: the duty being owed whenever
there is an action that causes inequality of treatment and the
action is tied to a prohibited ground of discrimination . Admit-
tedly, this is an exceptionally wide application of the duty
concept. Consequently, it will need to be narrowed by policy
considerations :
1 . Duty of Care and Policy Implications
Social policy question asks
whether given an acceptable
proximity, there is any good
reason why the damages
remedy is not appropriate and
just in the general type of
circumstances
	
involved." 34
Typically, liberal philosophies have assumed a wide free-
dom of action for the individual, upon which intrusions upon
that freedom were substantially limited. Personal preference
was wide under this view . Human rights legislation, to date, has
been careful to preserve a significant portion of that personal
preference,
35
for example, by exempting "discrimination" in
respect of accommodation where the people would be be sharing
the same house or in employment of farm employees who share
accommodation with the employer and in the employment of
domestic staff.36 Ostensibly, because the person would be
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sharing part of the private life of the other people, it has been
seen as appropriate to allow "discrimination" in these areas 37
Within a community- based perspective the private realm
within which "discrimination" is permissible becomes more
narrow. In contrast to there being discrete "public" and "private"
spheres of action, here all life takes on social responsibilities,
with exceptions perhaps being restricted to opinions, beliefs,
and to selection of friends . "Permissible discrimination" may
exist with respect to opinion and belief, not necessarily because
it is acceptable but because pragmatically it is difficult (if not
impossible) to control either of these . Where actions occur
within the commercial (and obviously public) arena personal
preference must give way to non-discrimination .38
2. The Distinction Between Policy and Defin'tion
Exemptions from the prohibition of discrimination have
been legislatively allowed for a variety of reasons . In some
provinces people in "sheltered workshops" may be treated
differently by receiving a lower wage . Legislative exemptions
from non-discrimination in employment also are given for non -
profit groups operated to foster the welfare of a specific
group
.
39 Typically, this is seen as a policy of helping disabled
people gradually integrate into the work force . Sometimes
allowances are made for religious or ethnic groups, other times
for philanthropic or social organizations .
Under a tort action none of these need necessarily be an
incorrect approach, but the manner in which that conclusion is
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reached will be somewhat different . For example, refusal to
accommodate in the family home someone that one does not like
for racial or religious reasons may be discrimination, but it
would be balanced against a right to privacy . In this regard,
right is balanced against right .
As a second example, the fact that a sheltered workshop by
providing work experience for the employee is operating for
"rehabilitative" as opposed to "commercial" purposes, offers the
necessary "sufficient connection" between the discrimination and
the treatment so as to accept the treatment as not dis-
criminatory . However, should the work in all essential respects
resemble "regular employment" (but without the same benefits),
that lower wage would constitute discrimination that would be
actionable .
Consider, also, certain non-profit groups operating for the
enhancement of specific religious, racial or philanthropic goals :
in such circumstances religion, creed, colour or national origin
attention to a particular religious or language qualifications
might be considered reasonable and justifiable occupational
requirements and once again meets the "sufficient connection
test"
.40 In these senses this is differential treatment, but it may
not fit within the definition of discrimination .
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However, situations such as that existing under Newfound-
land's Code s. 6 (a) which in respect of the particular charitable,
religious or similar non-profit group could make no explicit
reference to occupational requirements, under a tort action, be
seen as discriminating to the extent the "sufficient connection"
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was lacking.42 While these allowances may be part of a policy
to help advance minority goals and pluralism, without that
"sufficient connection" the policy cannot be seen as justifiable .
3 . Restrictinst Policy Exceptions
Because it is a restriction of what would otherwise be the
other person's right to equal access to employment oppor-
tunities, each "exemption" or "exception ', must be read narrowly.
Even if operated for "non-profit" and for the advancement or
enhancement of the group goals (often within minority group
sphere), the groups having entered into the commercial sphere
(or conversely moved beyond the private sphere) by such things
as renting their facilities, should be held to the same respons-
ibilities as all other people .
As one example of where exemptions should be read
restrictively, consider an experience common in American
human rights literature- the refusal of Rotary or Kiwanis club
branches to allow women into the chapter . On one hand, here we
have a "fraternal association" that stresses the need for male
camaraderie and choice of friends. The clubs also provide
invaluable business connections for members. To deny women or
any other group access to those social and business contacts
effectively reduces their edge in the marketplace. At the same
time, it is difficult to consider a chapter with three thousand
members as still being in the private sphere . Consequently,
irrespective of whether this is non-profit fraternal organization,
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the need for equal treatment would severely constrict allowable
differential treatment within fraternal organization .
C. Breach of Duty
The question here is whether the defendant's conduct fell
below the standard of the reasonable person or reasonable
institution . 43 It is normally pointed out that in considering
whether there has been a breach of duty, it is important to look
at the impugned action or inaction. The plaintiff's rights are
then balanced against the burden of eliminating or minimizing
the risk coupled with the demonstrably justified social utility of
the defendant's conduct
. 44
Specification of the action to be impugned is important
because in an intentional tort there is no competing interest of
the defendant. An intended harm is antisocial . 45 In negligence,
in contrast there is concern is that we may be unduly burdening
legitimate activity .
Consider, for example, wheelchair access to the workplace .
Modifications to the workplace can be so costly to the employer
that she may have to "discriminate" in the employment of some
disabled in order to keep the business afloat. There is, however,
a question on whom the burden of showing the feasibility of
reasonable accommodation lies on the complainant or on the
respondent to show that such an accommodation was impossible
short of undue hardship. The Supreme Court of Canada has taken
the view that the responsibility lies with the employer, as the
employer is in possession of the necessary information to show
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undue hardship-- stuff that is short of undue interference in the
operation of the business and without undue expense to the
employer . Breach of duty also considers how a "reasonable
person " would act. Typically in negligence actions, we rely on
the general practice of "the reasonable employer", to see if the
reasonable employer would have acted in a particular way .
Conceivably, we may run into difficulties with that approach in
a tort of discrimination. It may be seen as maintaining the
status quo . If many employers in an area did exactly the same
thing, e .g. discriminated against hiring women full-time because
they "might get pregnant", the behaviour might seem reasonable
to the business community .
However, the standard lacks empirical objectivity. For that
reason, it is necessary to turn to a more objective criterion, that
of a "sufficient connection" between the aspect of inequality and
the nature of the treatment . Once again sufficient connections
will be those that are relevant, rationally and fairly related to
the object, reasonable, just, and not capricious or arbitrary .
D. J amasze
The question here is whether the type of damage is action-
able? Once again the categories of compensable damage are
going to be heavily dependent on the facts of the case . It may
include injury to dignity, loss of wages, economic loss-- any of
the variety of kinds of damage. Where there is outrageous
conduct, punitive or aggravated damages may also be appropri-
ate. Indeed, serious consideration should be placed on treating
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discrimination, in and of itself, as a harm or injury without any
other damage being proved . This section addresses only a few
of these .
With regard to "loss of dignity", it has been contended
that liability cannot be extended to cover "every trivial
indignity" :
There is no occasion to intervene with
balm for wounded feelings in every
case where a flood of billingsgate is
loosened in an argument over a back
fence. .. 46
Instead, it has been argued that there should be liability only
for conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by society :
[The action should be] of a nature
which is especially calculated to cause
and does cause mental damage of a very
serious kind. 47
Arguably, the existence of international censures for discrim-
ination demonstrate that even these onerous requirements have
been met, and the harm caused by discrimination exceeds the
bounds tolerated by society .
Nevertheless, injury to dignity runs into a problem of
proof of damage . In that dignity is assumed to be principally an
internal feature, how does one prove damage to one's dignity?
In some places, for example the United States, the view is
gaining ground that the enormity of the outrage itself may
sometimes carry conviction that there has in fact been a severe
emotional shock, neither feigned or trivial, so as to dispense
with the proof of physical injury as a guarantee of the
genuineness of the plaintiff's claim . 48
Similarly, in other instances it may be appropriate to
assume by the nature of the act that damage has occurred .
Certainly, under the British Columbia Civil Rights Protection Act
the violation, itself, is considered a tort without proof of
damage. Similarly, in other tortious situations damage is
assumed to flow from the act. In this light, a minimum level of
damages could be set for any act of discrimination .
E. Factual Causation
In respect of factual causation the question becomes
whether as a matter of scientific or
philosophical fact the defendant's
breach can be said to have caused the
plaintiff's infringement and whether
consequential damage was the result of
the infringement. 49
Typically,what is of concern in factual concern is that there
is a connection; that "but/for" the discrimination, the adverse
consequences would not have followed . The most narrow
approach would be to require to direct causal link between the
discrimination and the consequences ; and that was the direction
taken in the Ekco Canada case, where the Quebec Superior Court
required a direct causal link between the exclusion and the
religious beliefs of the complainants.50
Because in these areas people do not act with one motive,
the "but/for" route may be inadequate in actions for
discrimination . A person may be fired for her job not only
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because she is a woman, but also because she is seen as too
"aggressive" . Recognizing this, Canadian commission cases on
discrimination have generally avoided the "but/for" test. It is
widely recognized that in order to establish a causal relationship
the discriminatory element need not be the only cause, nor must
it be the major or main cause . It is sufficient that it be an
"operative element" in the decision that is alleged to be
discriminatory. By way of example: the fact that a person is
member of trade union, plus is quick-tempered, is aggressive,
and is prone to foul language (each adding to the termination of
employment) would not preclude a legitimate finding of
discrimination on the basis of trade union membership .5
1
The reason for this is that the person is equal in dignity
and human rights, without regard to race, colour, religion,
national origin. That purpose would not be served if these
factors could be validly considered, merely because they are in
conjunction with other legitimate factors .5
2
F. Remoteness
Under this head several issues arise :
Was the plaintiff or the damage or loss
considered sufficiently closely linked to
the defendant's conduct to be recoverable .
Here the considerations are 1) plaintiff
proximity 2) proximity of damages 3)
intervening causes 4) post-infringement
events
. 53
Of these, only plaintiff proximity will be touched upon at
present. Here, there arise questions of whether a victim must
be a member of a protected group in order to have recourse
under an anti-discrimination action or whether third parties are
entitled to a remedy where decisions affecting them are related
to a prohibited ground54 Consider, for example, whether a
person dismissed for not following the discriminatory policy of
an employer55 or person penalized because she associates with
a protected class member (inter-racial marriage) should have
legal recourse under a tort of discrimination . Although not
directly discriminated against herself, she certainly faces the
adverse consequences of it . Certainly, human right boards
normally view these actions as illegal and subject to remedies
under the legislation, basically because the objectives of human
rights otherwise would not be served .
G. Complete Defences
Another important consideration for the framework of a
tort of discrimination is
whether despite satisfaction of the
other elements of the claim there
existed circumstances giving rise to a
defence which completely excuses the
payment to the plaintiff . 56
Human rights literature has directed considerable amount of
attention to the issue of defences to claims of discrimination. In
the literature, distinctions are typically drawn between
defences applicable to direct discrimination and those for
adverse effect discrimination . Writers suggest that the two
should be different because the two theories of discrimination
surrounding them are conceptually different .57
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Consider direct discrimination : "The purpose of a defence
under direct discrimination is to demonstrate that a group
classification which is directly based upon one of the prohibited
grounds... is justified and necessary for the safe and efficient
operation of the business, irrespective of individual merit ."58
Thus, a position in railyard that purports to preclude diabetics
because of the possibility of insulin reaction on the job might fit
the requirements of direct discrmination .
On the other hand, the 'business necessity defence' seeks to
justify a facially neutral business practice such as Saturday shift
requirement or and aptitude test . Under this defence the goal is
to demonstrate that despite its adverse effect upon a protected
group the practice is essential to the business . The abilities of
individual group members are completely irrelevant to a
determination of business necessity .59
On one level one wonders if there should be defences avail-
able, that is to say that having failed to meet the sufficient
connection test, any further allowance should be made.
Nevertheless, the defences are now under present human rights
legislations.
1 . Defences to Direct Discrimination
Over the years human rights commissions have developed
defences to direct discrimination . Three presently considered
are :
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a. Proof that the act was based only on a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, such as personality conflicts . However, as
mentioned earlier under causation, the discrimination need not
be shown as the only cause of exclusion to negate the defence .
What if the defendant offered as an excuse for refusing
accommodation to those on social assistance the explanation
that he wanted to assure that he had good, paying tenants . The
problem here is that a landlord, in reasonably wanting to get
paid may, in one respect, be using a "non- discriminatory
reason". At the same time, the landlord's assumptions may be
based on erroneous stereotypes about people on welfare . It may
be suggested that once a prima facie discrimination has been
shown, the burden then lies on the defendant to refute that .
b. Proof that the case falls within one of the exclusions or
exemptions . Under this heading, discrimination in single family
dwellings is the common example . As shown earlier, some of
these will not be "discrimination " because, by definition, there
exists sufficient connection between the aspects of inequality
and the treatment. Some of these exclusions function as limits on
the right to non-discrimination in that they reach into other
rights. However, as exceptions these rules should be read
restrictively .
c. Proof that the exclusion is justified under the "bona fide
occupational requirements" exception (BFOR). One must be
careful with terms such as BFOR.60 To be a BFOR it "must be
honestly, in good faith and in the sincerely held belief that such
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limitation is imposed in the interests of adequate performance
of the work involved with all reasonable dispatch, safety and
economy". Typically, we assume "bona fide" to mean that which
is not ill-willed and we twin it with concepts such as "good
faith." Yet if good faith and the issue of motive were rightly
put aside in the discussion on intentional discrimination, to re-
introduce an element of motive via an affirmative defence
appears incongruous. "Indeed a subjective approach appears
incongruous when dealing with a concept which is essentially
objective in character, where the respondent's state of mind has
little to do with a finding of illegal discrimination and where it
is the effect upon the victim or group, rather than the desire to
punish the discriminator, which is said to be of the utmost
concern." 61
While boards have often relied upon a combination of
subjective and objective criteria (with the objective ones holding
primacy), 62 case law has also shown that strictly objective
criteria can (and perhaps should be) employed in ascertaining
what is a BFOR.63
In Malik v. Ministry of Government Services6 4 the board
said once disproportionate impact is shown, the employer must
show not only that the impugned device (for example some
mechanical aptitude test that is used as an entrance require-
ment) produces employees with the job-related qualities
required, but also that the test is the only way of selecting such
employees. 65
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While this level of proof would go far to combatting
discrimination, it may be seen as unduly onerous to the defend-
ant, in that he may not have the money or the expertise to
critically assess the tests he utilizes in screening applicants .
Consequently the courts, too, may tend to give some legitimacy
to subjective beliefs that a particular procedure, requirement or
qualification produces the desired kind of employee .
However, what case law has stressed is that "in addition to
the characteristics of good faith and honestly held belief, BFOR
must also be related in an objective sense to the performance of
the employment concerned, in that it is reasonably necessary to
assure the efficient and economical performance of the job
without endangering the employee, his fellow employees and the
general public."
66
The need for job requirements to be objectively related to
the position accomplishes much getting away from general-
izations, suppositions, faulty assumptions that flow from
stereotyping and prejudice . Because it is on a factual basis, the
information forces the employer to move from "impressions" to
thinking about what exactly she or he wants in an employee .
2. Defences to Adverse Effect Discrimination
At present, the defences to adverse effect discrimination
are rebuttal evidence and justification. Technically, rebuttal
evidence is not a nominate defence . Instead, it is simply proof
that the adverse effect claimed does not exist in fact .
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In respect of "the business necessity defence", this is an
objective standard determined by necessity, not by convenience
to the employer
67
In order to explain the concept of "business
necessity" consider the following : If an employment regulation
seems neutral on its face (applying equally to all prospective
employees) but has the effect of excluding certain groups (e.g .
women) under present interpretations it will still be valid if the
regulation is in good faith and "reasonably necessary in all the
circumstances" to the employer's business .
There have been some attempts to use a rather subjective
test interpretation of what constitutes "justifiable" under the
business necessity defence. E.g. "if a person produces reasons for
doing something which would be acceptable to right-thinking
people as sound and tolerable reasons for doing so, then he has
justified his conduct. " However, some have suggested that this
reading would amount to reading the prohibition of indirect dis-
crimination out of existence .68
Other readings such as business convenience as opposed to
necessity similarly whittle away the equality rights . Reasons of
hygiene or safety are often explanation for excluding certain
groups. For example, chocolate factories may have a no beard
policy for reasons of hygiene . This rule, however, would
effectively preclude baptized Sikhs males from working there .
If we look only to some business reason, without examining the
feasibilities of less discriminatory alternatives, the test
becomes more one of business convenience than of business
necessity, with the party subject to the adverse effect discrim-
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ination losing out again.69 It would appear that any tort of
discrimination must look to a proportionality between the ends
and the means to the end .
H . Conclusion
Without specific factual circumstances, a detailed frame-
work for a tort of discrimination becomes difficult to formulate,
but some possibilities have been suggested here . Negligence, by
which is meant failure to live up to the standard of conduct
expected by the community writ large, offers promise. That
definition of discrimination, itself, forms the duty and the
defences .
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION: THE EDUCATION OF THE
"REASONABLE PERSON"
Tort law has long made reference to the "reasonable
person" in deciding the boundaries of what is legally protected
and what is not. Standing by itself, the concept of the reasonable
person represents a focal point from which common sense and
common values of the community are applied to a given
situation. Time after time and case after case, this application
cumulatively becomes the measuring stick to which the
community and the persons comprising the community may look
the reasonableness of a particular action or course of actions .
The concept can be used either to proactively predict or
subsequently determine acceptable behaviour .
Of course, as we have seen, this measuring stick is not
static. Over the years, the reasonable person has become less in
tune with classical liberalism and more aware of social
responsibilities . With that evolution in mind, one might suggest
that the "reasonable person" would similarly be the guiding
mind at the centre of a tort of non-discrimination . However, in
order to be applied in each particular instance, the reasonable
person must always be created in the mind of the judge or the
civil jury, who are presumed to be capable of the task .
The reasonable person is key to the resolution of
conventional negligence cases and, arguably, should play a
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prominent role in the determination of cases under a tort of
non-discrimination. Nonetheless, if the courts are to be effective
in sharing a greater portion of the human rights field with the
statutorily constituted commissions and boards, then the courts'
"reasonable person" must be one who is also educated in
understanding the meaning of inherent worth and in
understanding that the concept of equality extends beyond
treating persons the same .
It is generally accepted that the reasonable person cannot
simply be a majoritarian and is not simply the echo of popular
opinion at any given instance . Hence, a judge would not be
rendering a legally correct (or philosophically sound) decision in
upholding a prospective employer's decision not to hire Ms .
Bhadauria because (hypothetically) empirical data was available
showing that 86% of all adults favoured a "whites only" hiring
policy for college instructors
. Clearly, using the international
definitions as the quintessential crystallization of community
standards (and using human rights legislation as limited
variation of these), the judge would be free to find that the
actions of the potential employer were against public policy
. In
doing so, the judge in effect might say that (instead of the local
community's reasonable person, who, at least at this time, is not
being reasonable) the standard of an educated or ideal
reasonable person shall be applied .
The example given above is intended to illustrate that the
reasonable person considering questions of discrimination must
be more politically aware than the reasonable person of the
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more conventional torts . Although it goes without saying that,
to some extent, policy is everpresent in all torts, it must lie
much closer to the surface in judicial consideration of human
rights than in the more private situations. However the policy
engaged must be one based on fundamental principles of
equality.
When considering what type of education we expect the
educated reasonable person ( judge or juror) to have, we must
not only look to human rights legislation, but we must also
examine our attitudes toward the evils which we seek to curtail .
Historically, prohibitions against discrimination were not
developed in anticipation of problems. Rather, prohibitions
against specific categories arose because serious situational
injustices were noted in those specific areas . Of course, some
expansion occurred as a result of analogy, but such analogies
have almost always been based on established categories . This
observation is in no way intended as a criticism . Indeed, it is
only logical and necessary that where religious persecution is
consuming a community, for example, then steps should be
taken to protect the endangered group .
Having noted this, it must be pointed out that, as necessary
as it is, this approach (commonly used by legislators) suffers
from a major shortcoming. Simply, the shortcoming is that
human rights policy is largely based on reacting to particular
consequences, rather than being comprehensive and preventive
and based on fundamental principles. While such policies could
not have been expected from those who pioneered the
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development of human rights, we have to expect logically
coherent policies from our educated reasonable person today if
judicial expansion into the area is to foster positive results .
At the crux of legal analysis is the ability to dissect a
complicated issue into its most basic conceptual components in
order to determine, inter alia, whether or not the propositions
being propounded by each side have integrity . The
jurisprudence of a tort of discrimination would necessarily
require that these components be valued in the context of the
aformentioned comprehensive policy. While initially, as a
practical matter, the courts would probably rely heavily upon
the jurisprudence of the statutorily constituted commissions, the
inherent flexibility of tort law would eventially illuminate
numerous opportunities for judicial innovation .
In light of the comprehensive policy, the court's duty to
examine the substance of discrimination on an equal footing
with the consequences of discriminatory behaviour will likely
throw light on shades of discrimination to which not much
thought or analysis has been given . In line with the objectives
of the comprehensive and proactive judicial policy, the
jurisprudence which would develop in these areas would serve
to fill in the gaps between the protected categories. This, in
turn, which would diminish uncertainties in the community
about how discrimination is to be handled .
As with the developing Charter jurisprudence, over time
the anti-discrimination jurisprudence would take on
complexion such that a victim, properly advised, could make a
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reasonable determination whether to pursue the case through
their human rights board or to relinquish that opportunity in
order to pursue the case through the courts. The potential
offender could also measure his or her decisions according to
the law against discrmination . Of course, as noted earlier,
financial concerns would be a significant factor in many cases,
but the victim can still be said to have a potential additional
course of action that would not otherwise be available .
It is clear that although some recent Charter jurisprudence
such as Turpin 1 has more clearly defined potential openings for
judicial expansion into the area of human rights and
discrimination, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Bhadauria 2 still constitutes a major stumbling block on the path
to providing better protection for minorities . The decision in the
case was premised on an optimism for expansion of legislation
that has since foundered . No matter what the reasons for this,
the results have had serious consequences not only for the
immediate victim, but for the community as well . If we are
serious about effective remedies for rights violations, then we
cannot legitimately limit the forms or categories presently
available . It is for that reason, it is submitted, that it is time
that the Bhauduria, case be reconsidered and with it our
commitment to rights protection .
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